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found guilty of de jure segregation, (l) is the DC' s power in remedying said segregation 
limited silnply to reassignn1ent of pupils to acMeve a desegregated environment, or may 
the DC also impose additional progran~s which it thinks necessary to combat the effects 
of earlier segregation and to assure success of the desegregation plan; and (2) may the 






2. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND HOLDING BELOW: This case is 
befqre the Court for the third time. In the original DC action, the court found the State ____ ___, 
of Michigan and the Detroit Board of Education guilty of de jure racial discrimination. 
It directed the preparation of a school desegregation plan which included 53 school 
districts in addition to Detroit. 338 F. Supp. 582 (E. D. Mich. 1971). CA 6 affirmed, 
484 F. 2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973). This Court reversed and remanded, holding that a school 
desegreation plan could not include the districts surrounding Detroit, absent a showing 
. 
that they had individually or in concert with Detroit been guilty of segregation. Miliken 
v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). The Court remanded the case for further proceedings 
directed toward development of a remedy for racial discrimination within the Detroit 
City school system. 
to 
On remand the DC ordered the school district/acquire 150 additional school 
buses, as an interim measure. The buses were to be used in implementing such plan 
as the DC might later approve. CA 6 affirmed, but modified the order by directing that 
the state bear 75o/o of the cost of those buses. 519 F. 2d 679. This Court denied cert. 
423 u.s. 930 (1975 ). 
Starting August 15, 1975 and continuing through May 11, 1976, the DC entered 
orders approving and rejecting various l....tbn~issions by the parties with respect to the 
implementation of a desegregation plan. The plan, as finally shaped, involved reas s i gn---- ~
ment of pupils wit hin 5 of the 8 regions within the Detroit district, the acquisition of 
100 additional bus e s, and the bussing of 21, 853 stu_Q.ents. That portion of the o r der was 
....... ............. ... .... u 
affirmed by the CA, Appendix at 16 7a, but is not now before the Court as none of the 
parties petitioned cert. The DC also ordered the implementation of a number of 
"educational components" which are "comprehe nsive programs which were found to b e 
essential to the success of the desegregation effort." Appx. at 168a. As to four of the se 
G 
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programs, it held that the state would be required to pay one half of the cost. These 
four programs are: (1) Reading and communication skills; (2) inservice training of 
"'-- -
faculty; (3) non-discriminatory testing; and (4) counseling and career guidance. The DC 
ordered that the Detroit school board disclose the highest budget allocated in any previous 
year for these programs and determired that and additionally $ll, 645, 000 would be 
required to implement the court- ordered programs. The state 1 s share of that am.ount 
is $5. 8 million. 
The State appealed and CA 6 AFFIRMED. As to the necessity for these 
programs, the CA held that: 
) 
The Distrm Court found that these Educational ~mponents 
are necessart"fo remedy effects of t segre atio~o assure 
a successful esegregation e fort a o minimize the possibility 
of resegregation." [citation]. This finding of fact is not clearly 
erroneous, but to the contrary is supported by ample evidence. 
Appx. at l70a. More specifically, the CA found that: 
[educational training] is needed to insure that the teachers and 
administrators will be able to work effectively in a desegregated 
environment. [Non- discriminatory testing] is needed to insure 
that students are not evaluated unequally because of built-in bias 
in the tests administered in formerly segregated schools. 
-.vithout reading and counseling components, black students might 
be deprived of the motivation and achievement levels which the 
desegregation remedy is designed to accomplish. 
'l Id. at 170a-7la. 
1, The CA also rejected the state 1 s argument that the Eleventh Amendment 
barred the DC 1 s order compelling the state to pay one half of the cost of the educational 
components. The CA held that this case was not controlled by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 
'--' 
, 651 (1974) because the money here to be paid by the state was not compensation for a 
past wrong, but rather an adjunct to prospective declaratory and injunctive relie f, fallin g 
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within the Rule of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 150 (1908), see Edelman, 415 U.S. at 
667-68. The CA concluded: 
The eleventh amendment contention of the state defendant 
is without merit. 
We hold that it is within the equitable powers of the court 
to require the State of Michigan to pay a reasonable part of the 
cost of correcting the effects of de jure segregation which State 
officials, including the Legislature, have helped to create. We 
reemphasize that it is the law of this case that the State of 
Michigan has been guilty of act.s which have a causa 1 relation to 
the de jure segregation that exists in Detroit. ~ 484 F. 2d at 
238-41. 
Appx. at 178a. In justifying the DC's holding that the State was required to pay $5. 8 
million in addition to funds it would otherwise pay for education in Detroit, the CA stated: 
Since Michigan State officers and agencies were guilty of acts 
which contributed substantially to the unlawful de jure segregation 
that exists in Detroit, the State has an obligation not only to 
eliminate the unlawful segregation but also to insure that there is no 
diminution in the quality of education. This principle was stated 
in Hart v. Community School of Brooklyn, 383 F. Supp. 699 (E. D. 
N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 512 F. 2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975) .... 
Appx. at 179a. In affirming the DC, the CA noted the poor financial shape of the school 
district, stating that: 
it will be difficult for the Detroit Board 1o pay its share of the costs 
.... Our affirmance of the District Court on this issue is not 
intended as a mandate for a cutback in essential educationc '. progra1ns 
in order to meet the expenses of implementing the desegregation plan. 
We affirrn that part of the judgment relating to the costs of the plan, 
but without prejudice to the right of the District Court to require a 
larger proportionate payment by the State of Michigan if found to be 
required by future developments. 
Appx. at 180a. 
3. CONTENTIONS: (1) In the absence of a showing of a constitutional 
"-- ) v~t~ with respect to educational programs, the DC exceeded its authority in ordering 
t the implementation of educational components as part of the desegregation plan. (2) The 
( 
-!>-
tenth and eleventh amendments bar the DC' s order requiring the state to pay $5. 8 million 
to finance the said education c01nponents. 
4. DISCUSSION: (1) Petr relies on the following statement from this 
Court's prior opinion in the case, Miliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974): 
The controlling principle consistently expounded in our 
holdings is that the scope of the remedy is determined by the 
nature and extent of the constitutional violation. Swann, 402 
U.S., at 16. 
Petr would therefore argue that since no segregation has been shown with respect to the 
.........,. .._.... awa :w-,..-, "~ .....,.. 
educational programs in the district, the DC' s power to fashion a remedy for past 
segregation cannot include the addition of education programs. However, the Court in 
Miliken was discussing the question of what individuals may be included within the scope 
of the remedy provided by the DC, and held that "[b]efore the boundaries of separate 
and autonomous school districts may be set aside by consolidating the separate units 
for remedial purposes or by imposing a cross-district remedy, it must first be shown 
that there has been a constitutional violation within one district that produces a 
significant segregative effect in another district." Id. at 744-745. I am not p er suaded 
that the same reasoning would apply in fashioning a remedy within a single district. 
It seems to 1ne that within broad limits, the DC should be able to ord~ r/such 
' 
educational programs within the district as are necessary to assure the success of the 
desegregation plan. At least two of the programs -- racially unbaised testing of student s , 
and training of faculty to adjust to a desegregated environment -- would appear to be 
directly related to the desegregation task. I have more difficulty with reading e nhance-
ment and career planning programs for they are not specifically designed to deal with 
the problem of desegregation; but seem rather designed to generally enhance the quality 
of education in the district. 
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However, the DC found, and the CA affirmed the finding that all of the 
components were necessary to remedy the effects of past segregation. And, as quoted 
earlier, the CA concluded that the reading and counseling components are necessary 
to secure to black students, the motivation and achievement levels with the desegregation 
remedy is designed to accomplish. Appx. at 170a-17la. While it is difficult, on the 
facts presented and without a record, to determine the precise connection between these 
two educational components and the success of the desegregation plan, the problem is a fa< 
specific one and the CA and DC did not seem to be applying the wrong legal standard. As 
the Court noted in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16 
(1971) 11 a district court has [equity] power to fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary 
school system. 11 Unless this court wants to fashion a rule that the only remedy for 
segregation in a district involves reassignment of students and/ or teachers, this aspect 
t" ....____ 1 I 
of the case is probably not cert-worthy. 
(2) Petr 1 s second contention seems more troublesome. I find the CA 1 s 
distinguishing of Edelman v. Jordan, and its reliance on Ex parte Young unpersuasive. 
"' In dealing with the Ex parte Young precedent, the Court in Edelman rejected the fU6tion 
1 I 
-An alleged conflict of this case with Keyes v. School District No. 1, 521 F. 2d 465 (lOth 
Cir. 1975), cert denied, 44 U.S. L. W. 3399 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1976) appears to turn on the 
facts of the two cases. In Keyes, the DC ordered the implementation of a plan over-
hauling 11 the [school] system 1 s entire approach to education of minorities; its proposals 
extend[ed] to matters of educational philosophy, governance, instructional scope and 
seque.o.ce, curriculum, student evaluation, staffing, non-instructional service and 
community involvement. 11 Id. at 480-81. The CA fully recognized the broad power of the 
DC 1 s 11 to effectuate their rP.medial orders by removing all obstacles to meaningful 
desegregation, [but 1hi.s orrer lrrr,x:>sed] upon school authorities a pervasive and detailed 
system for the o:hcation of rninority children. 11 The CA concluded: 11 We believe thi. s goes 
too far. 11 Id. at 482. CA 6 distinguished Keyes, simply noting that the DC in this case 
'--- had not gone too far. 
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that "any form of relief may be awarded against a state officer, no matter how closely 
it may in practice resemble a money judgment payable out of the state treasury, so 
long as the relief may be labeled 1 equitable' in nature." 415 U.S. at 666. The Court 
then stated that "the difference between the type of relief barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment and that permitted under Ex parte Young will not in many instances be that 
between day and night." The Court noted that the "injunction issued in Ex parte Young 
was not totally without effect on the State' 9 revenues .... 11 Such effect, however, was 
incurred by 11 state officials in order to shape their official conduct to the mandate of the 
Court's decess, [and thereby becoming] more likely to spend 1noney from the state 
treasury than if they had been left free to pursue their previous course of conduct. 11 
Such permissible "ancillary effect upon the state treasury" was contrasted with imper-
missible "payment of state funds, not as a necessary consequence of compliance in the 
future with a substantive federal-question determination, but as a form of comp ens<:•tion 
.... " Id. at 668. 
While I suppose in this case it could be argued that the State is not being 
required to shell out $5. 8 million as compensation for past action, but rather in order 
to comply with prospective orders of the DC in exercise of its equity power, that would 
., / , 
appear to stretch Edelman quite a bit. The theory is undercut by the <...,A 1 s own justificatio 
elsewhere in its opinion to the effect that the reason the State is called upon to pay for one 
half the cost of the programs is because it had been, in fue past, guilty of promoting de 
jure segregation. Moreover, the CA left open the possibility that the DC charge the 
state for more than one half of the cost of the educational programs, should the school 
board be unable to pay. See p.4 supra. This all seems very difficult to fit into the 
mold of .l:!.:delman as simply the incidental e ffects upon the state treasury of compliance 
-B-
2/ 
with a prospective injunction. 
Petr raised a tenth amendment argument for the first time in his petn. In 
light of the fact that neither the CA. nor the DC had an opportunity to consider the is sue, 
petr cannot now raise it for the Court's consideration. Tacon v. Arizona, 410 U.S. 
351, 352 (1973). His argument, in any case, does not seem to have merit. He relies 
on this Court's recent decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465 
(1976) which seems inapposite since it dea.ls with the powers of Congress under the 





There are two responses. 
Kozinski All opns in 
Appendix 
-Another aspect of the CA' s op1111011 causes difficulty with the notion that this is m e rely 
relief ancillary to an injunction, rathe r than a money judgm.ent. This is the provis ion, 
page 4 , supra that the State may not reduce the amount of mone y it pays for othe r 
education s e rvices, but has to pay the $5. 8 million (or mor e ) in addition to funds it would 
otherwise provide to the district. It seems to me that if this were truly an incide ntal 
expense connected with the injunction, the state should be permitte d to adjust its own 
budget in whatever way it s e es fit to compens ate for this ex pense. The fact that it is not 
permitted to sacrifice other educational services to comply with the judgm.e nt n1akes the 
$5. 8 million look more and more like imposition of damage s against the state for pa s t 
wrongs. 
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BENCH MEMO 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Dave Martin 
No. 76-447 Milliken v. Bradley 
This is the latest round in the long-running Detroit 
school desegregation case. As it reaches us this time, there 
are a few important "givens" no longer at issue: Both the 
State officials and the Detroit Board were found to have 
in the constitutional violation 
fostered de jure segregation. The State participated/b~ 
~ ~~+tJh~SJl • d • • (•t h d t Aits roLe Ln sc oo sLte ecLsLons L a a ve o 
1962 over every such decision) and construction; by its 
failure to fund certain aetroit programs, particularly 
transportation, while it funded equivalent programs in all 
other parts of the state; and by Act 48, passed in 1970 to 
voluntary 
thwart the Board's own initial/efforts to desegregate. It 
both the Board and 
must be accepted for our purposes here that/the state xax were 
• constitutional wrongdoers. 
The only questions here have to do with remedy. The DC's 
r in light 
-lA -
task is clear in light of our past cases: "the task is to 
correct by a balancing of the individual and collective 
interests, 'the condition that offends the Constitution.' 
A federal remedial power may be exercised bnly on the basis 
of a constitutional violation,' and' [a]s with any equit1 
case, the nature of the violation determines the scope of 
the remedy."' Milliken I, 418 u.s., at 738, quoting from 
or • b purposes to be servErl 
~wann. There are two specific sub-takksAthat are also 
clear from our past cases: ._ (1) to eliminate the dual 
school system "root and branch" arrl assure the implementation 
of a unitary system, and (2) to "restore the victims of 
discriminatory conduct to the position they would have 
occupied in the absence of such conduct," Milliken I, at 
746, or, as you put i1l it in Austin this term, "to eliminate 
the effect~£ any [segregative] official acts or omissions." 
Brown II, 349 u.s. 294, at 300, made it clear that a DC 
SAL qJ~ ~is 1/, .S~J ~·sri~J '"/c)z.. <), ~. 1~1 1? 
··~ w..U..Y.._ • p.f ~ ,U.s~e~·~ f'AAA. ;r ;f.s 
-2- e.~;-ee-I.·J~~~. ") .. 
is to remain flexible and sensitive, to the end that any 
obstanles to desegregation may be re oved "in a systematic 
~~~ 
and effective manner." (Emphasis added.) iC was certainly 
A 
reasonable that both constitutional tortfeasors--the State 
and the Board--should take part in remedying the violations. 
The DC undertook tms task--a very difficult one in 
w-{...c...-a.. 
light of the realities of the Detroit situation, ~ almost 
~ -rt.-..a. 'be: ,A 
80% of the schoolchildren htiR8 black. W. showed, in my 
/'- A 
view, admirable restraint, especially with respect to busing 
as a remedy. The pup61 .. a••••~ reassignment part of the remedy 
concentrated on realigning attendance zones to achieve maximum 
results, even I if this meant crossing "region" boundaries. It 
f~··""' 
thought those eight~boundaries had to yield in the interest of 
helping assure that children would attend schools near their 
homes. There was some transportation, but it is minimized 
by the DC's decision ..-.to concentrate .. its attention on 
unchanged the population of 
those schools that were identifiably white, leaving/~ several 
overwhelmingly black schools in the core city.HR«kaRgea 
This failure to make changes in the core city was troubling 
to the CA~and is somewhat troubling for m~~ but I am think 
it probably was a wise decision a in light f ¥hi ,lt"tg 
of Detroit demographics. The DC was right that added busing 
in and out of th~ore city would mean a heavy burden on the 
people involved for a relatively small gain in statistical 
desegregation at each school affected; there simply are not 
that many white students available in Detroit. In any event, 
issue 
there is no «kaiiaRge~here now concerning the pupil reassign-
ment decision. 
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The other part of the DC's order concerned various "educa-
tional components" that the DC considered essential if the 
remedy were to be effective. Many of those components akft 





in-service training for teachers and staff, 
4W£ .....--.... 
expanded counseling~ guidance program, an 
te: ting prog:::, an~medial reading efforts. 
might digress to say that the DC, in many respects, 
acted very "Powellian" in crafting the remedy. It worked 
hard to minimize transportation as a cmmponent of xkexxamea~ 
its order, displaying keen awareness of the toll that busing 
takes of the innocent individuals involved. At the same time 
it showed sensitivity to the importance of assuring that 
a school undergoing desegregation is m not made to suffer 
educationally--hmce the educational components. Cf. ~e~ 
(your opinion), 413 U.S. , at 250, 253 (emphasizing "the 
with respect to 
paramount goal of quality in education"). Moreover,/the 
education components,axaexeaxamaHRXxxax "the major burden 
of remedial action falls on offending state officials" not 
on "children and parents who did not participate in any 
constitutional violation." A tds@l 5 id at 249-250.) 
The state challenges the four listed education components, 
arguing first that the DC exceeded its powers under the 
Constitution or at least abused its discretion when it included 
them in the remedy. The state seems to contend that the 
remedy must be limited xaxx~ simply to pupil reassignment--
~) redrawing attendance zones and busing. Second,the 
~~~~ 
State argues that ixXHaxxexxaRaaHx even if theAcompo~ents were 
proper, the DC had no authority to order the State to shoulder 
-4-
50% of the added cost. The first argume~tl is by far the 
more important. aRaxlxwiiixaexaxexmasxxsfxmJxaxkKRki«R 
The qustion presented by the State's first contention .. .. .. -is essentially whether the educational components were reasonably 
necessary to accomplishment of the accepted purposes of 
a school desegregation remedy--the two goals listed on 
p. 1, supra. I will consider them separately. 
(1) Accomplishing desegregation (eliminating the dual 
school system). The educational components clearly are not 
needed for moving bodies around. If that is all that is 
contemplated by "desegregation," then the DC's educational 
components are superfhous and HRReeaea should not have been 
ordered. But even if desegregation means little more than 
~~ 
moving bodies around, Brown II still commande that that 
A 
process be made effective. No one could say that the process 
is 
~Has effective if, once the children arrivef at their new 
school, that school's educational mission is •I tlwtzly 
obscured by tensions and difficulties associated with the 
change. It's not just am a matter of desegregating, but 
of desegregating schools, and it is important that those 
institutionS remain schools of at least equal quality after 
desegregation. Inevitably this means that some preparation 
of the students, staff, teachers and parents is HR&fHi reasonably 
necessary to make the desegregation process effective. 
I might approach it from another angle. The great strength 
of your opinions in the school desegregation cases, especially 
Keyes and Austin perhaps, has been sensitivity to the human 
dynamics at work in the course of any remedy process. 
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It is this sensitivity which has caused you to emphasize 
that busing be kept to a reasoned minimmm. Obviously 
another part of the human dymamics concerns what will 
happen at the schools wkaxax£kaRgax being desegregated. 
There will be students who have never attended classes with 
students of another race--or from another part of town or 
perhaps 
another socjo-economic group. There will/be teachers who 
have never taught whites before, or placks, or who have 
never taught in a mixed classroom. Usually all this will 
take place in a setting of some community controversy and 
tension. Strains are inevitable even when all involved are 
working with the best of intention~ as ekere would be t rr-
aAy campar'QQlQ iAeti:tattunal ehart~e ef aay lfH eyJ.'e. It xi 
seems to me eminently reasonable for a district court to 
be sensitive to these strains and to plan for modest measures 
that can help alleviate them. Indeed, the court would be 
derelict if it acted w~ as though such factors did not 
exist. 
The problem, of course, is that any number of desirable 
programs could conceivably be linked in some fashion to 
~~ .. • strains and making desegregation more 
attractive. Stretching too far to make this connection 
would of course be an abuse. But I do not think that i~the 
case befae us. xxaxamiRaxaa£kxafxxkax£a~as&Rkx The court's 
approach here did not stretch this justification beyond 
G:l se.rw~~y ~ 
recognition. 1/ I eaamine each of the components~ A. In-
service training. This seems to me the most readily 
jxH justifiable. Some modest effort to prepare faculty and 
-6-
staff for the new situations they will face is almost 
indispensable. B. Counseling. I find this closely 
linked also. Where in-service training may help deal with 
some of the teacher's strains, counseling can contribute 
to relieving some of those what will be generated on the 
part of students. c. a 1 1. Testing . nad we4sa g 
8:1!1& tesanainB:tli not too closely related to task (1)~ 
. ) ' J 
,"t'" I ( 
assuring effective desegregation,although tl g ureAnot 
significance. 
totally without/~axxKR£2¥ It is doubtless important 
to assure that students in newly integrated schools are 
treated equally. The changes in the testing program may 
-:o. ~~· 
be seen as serving that end. AThe new reading program ta 
can claim a connection only to the extent that an improved 
educational program helps keep students and parents within 
the Detroit public education system. ( Fostering commitment 
to the Detroit public school system on the part of whites 
is especially important here, since there are so few remaining. -xxx£aHiaxkaxai~x~ex£aHxiaexeaxeffe£xixexaexegxegaxiaRx It wou~d/ ~ 
be difficult to regard the result as effective desegregation 
if the DC's plan were to accentuate the current exit of 
whites to the point where Detroit schools became almost 
totally black. Cf. Keyes, 413 U.S., at 250, and~ Pasaden~ 
City Board v. SRangler, slip op. at 9 (manifesting some 
sensitivity to "white flight").) But having said this, 
I would have to concludefYthat the reading program cannot 
r 1/Wr' O \-1- v-.o. be justified under Pa••••• a ~itr (!)--promoting effective 
A ~~o.v~ 
desegregation--because the only way to tie · ~n is by 
a chain of reasoning so broad as to validate nearly any 
-7-
conceivable DC order. 
Raxiaxaiex(2) Restoring the victtms of discriminatory 
conduct. Obviously the problem with segregation is not 
simply that it offenasl our aesthetic sense to separate 
white - skinned people from black-skinned people. 'I'lE problem 
is the human toll on the victims of discrimination. !kis 
RaHx One of this Court's finest moments came when it 
announced its full awareness of that fact in Brown I, 
347 U. S. 483. Following axxxkexkeeisxaf Sweatt v. Painter, 
339 U.S. 629, the Court emphasized certain intangible fa«xaxs 
BXHBH burdens generated by a segregated system. It emphasized 
two factors: a "sense of inferiority [that] affects the 
motivation of the child to learn," and some tendency to 
retard educational aevelopment. 347 u.s., at 494, quoting 
from the lower court findings in the Kansas case. Restoring 
the victims of discrimination means dealing with lingering 
problems of motivition and development. Some of the educational 
components are closely related to serving this purpose. 
_., / 
Counseling probably has the closest relationship. A ' 
....._ - -counselor can help the StUdent find the right pxagxamxfax course 
of studies, suggest necessary remedial programs, and help 
HH£BHxage discourage drcpping-out. Depending on how the iHR 
,, 
in-service training is carried out, it too could serve this 
goal well. The DC's testing order required the Board to 
assure that its tests accurately measured students from 
all backgrounds. Having accurate information obviously 
serves the goal of restoration. 
Reading again has the weakest tie to the goal. Or perhaps 
I should say that the connection is strong, but it is a connec-
-8-
tion shared by hundreds of other desirable programs. But 
the DC did seem to take care to select what it regarded as 
the simgle most important program for purposes of restoring 
N.s 
those whose education#i &tLJ · aRb& 1 ac~l\suffered badly 
in aetroit's schools. iiK£&XHiHgx£&XX&iRX8Xkax And there 
was record testimony strongly supporting this finding. 
In sum, I think it possible to say that the four 
educational components were reasonably necessary to achieving 
the two established goals of._. desegregation. The ...-
X&RHSHK only component, in my view, with a questionable 
claim is the reading component. But we do have two courts 
that have expressly found, based on the record made in the 
DC, that these components were R "necessary" or "essential." 
I regard this as far short of an outrageous attempt by 
a court to impose its own educational goals on a school district, 
and so ixxkiHk I would lexxxka not regard this as an appropriate 
occasion to depart from the "two court rule" on fact findings. __."' , 
Even an opinion affirming could contain strong language emphasizing 
that courts are not to impose their own educational desires 
on systems undergoing desegregation. 
. tha#I could well acce t xkax whic 
There is a secon opt~on you may ~n more attractive. Since 
the reading component has the shakiest claim, the ~~Hxx Court 
could reverse as to it but approve the other three. This course 
would adequately convey that this Court is serious about 
performing considerable 
DC's axxHMiRg/ex&x£iKiRg their difficult remedial role with I 
restraint, but still leave room for DC's xsxxx~ at the front 
ba +~~.c•~Jie. '"' e i 
~nes to xx~ non-transpo•tation options toward the end of 
-9-
making desegregation effective. 
There is a further question concerning why the DC's order 
has to be so specific when it is obvious that the Detroit 
Board is fully committed to making desegregation work. That is, 
detailed orders generally make therost sense only when a 
defendant drags his feet and does his best to avoid full 
compliance. The ~ja Board is not such a defendant. 
The answer,liaxxiRxxka in my view, lies in the fact that 
the Board is not the only wrongdoer here. The state X33 
contribu~ed to the segregation, and ix although it has 
cooperated in most of the steps ordered by the DC, it 
help 
obviously is not willing to/fund all of them. Detroit cannot 
a 
fKRa meet the full cost because of ixxx3MR/financial plight 
not entirely of its own making (Detroit citizens have the 
~1-es.r 
state's highest tax rate, but~41 low per-student funding). 
A detailed order is one way to assure that both wrongdoers 
contribute to a reasonable remedy. The DC's course 
£BHiBxXRaxxkaxxagaxaaaxaxxaRxahHX&X3f does not strike me as 
an abuse of discretion. It is familiar doctrine to require 
contribution from joint tortfeasors. Moreover, the funding 
required by the DC closely parallels the usual sharing of 
costs betwean state and Board. (I think the state usually 
pays 47%.) A detailed order also permits the DC to ride 
herd on some of the more extreme 2HXRHxiaxmx ideas of the Board 
(like many x&£.1!11k11converts," occasicnally its enthusiasms 
V'-0 
.. know~boundstr-especially when the State might foot the bill). 
A more important reason for a detailed order despite the 
-10-
Board's xilliRgRaxx attitude arisesfrom last terms decision 
in Spangler. R:va!.x't?w:;.: I :: a l eeara t!:heF 8 'iu2 s re] aei 0 e~ 
CCa@25Fti~ Because violations of court orders may carry 
~-t- ~S'~e.~n. o't'd.Avs 
heavy penalttes, the CourtAstressed that~~·~• e~eere 1~ust 
in compliance with Rule 65 be specific and reasonably detailed." 
Slip op. at 13. 
What I have done in this memo is to state the kaxk strongest 
--the course I favor 
arguments on behalf of at least a part1a That's 
not what I usually do in a bench memo, but here I think it 
appropriate since I know you are closely familiar with 
the arguments &R pointing toward reversal. 
--Dave 
7'-'1'1-7 ~.:rr 3/'L-tf/77 
'(;J~-~.,e~c..(... ~) 
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Milliken v. Bradley 
If I write in this case I should make use of Rodriguez, 
especially 411 U.S., at p. 42. 
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June 1, 1977 
· No. 76-447 Milliken v. 
Dear Chief: ~ " 
A first reading of your opinion in this case prompts 
me to write at once because of the importance, as I view 
it, of clearly preserving the sba;pness and force of the 
central holding in Bill Rebnquist's opinion in Dayton. 
We took Dayton, as you will recall, to give us the 
opportunity to afford specific guidance to tne lower courts 
on the "scope of the remedy" issue. Swann Milliken I and 
Gatreaux have repeated the familiar generai rule. BUt, as 
you bave often commented, some of our District and Court of 
Appeals courts have given the rule lip-service only in 
ordering system-wide remedies and massive busing. 
Bill Rehnquist's opinion in Dalton articulated specifically 
for the first time a standard that s appropriate. See 
specifically pp. 12-14. The key sentence in Bill's opinion 
is to the effect that a District Court in the first instance 
"must determine bow much incremental segregative effect" "-:the A/ 
specific constitutional violations have bad "on the make up ----~· 
• • • of the school population as presently constituted, when 
that population is compared to what it would have been in 
the absence of such constitutional violation." (pp. 13, 14) 
Although your opinion recognizes the general principal 
Ul•&•• i• 17), it may be read • I am afraid - as undercutting 
wnat Bi 1 has written. I am disturbed by the paragraph 
the first few sentences of which read as follows: 
, "The 'condition' offensive to the Constitution 
is a de iure segregated school system. This condition 












Green v. Coun~ School Board (citation) is not, 
under the hold ngs of the COurt, necessarily or 
invariably cured completely by simply establishing 
schools on a nonracial basis, although that is the 
key step in the remedial process. Our cases 
recognize that the evil is, more broadly, a dual 
school system infected with long-standing inequities." 
(pp. 17 t 18). 
The finding simply of a "de jure segregated school system~• 
without more, does not justify in every case a system-wide 
remedy involving, as in the Dayton case, some degree of racial 
balance in every school plus system-wide busing. As Bill's 
opinion indicates, the District Court must ask whether the 
segregative conduct causedthe degree of racial segregation 
in the schoo~or whether a significant part of it resulted 
from demographic conditions over which the school board bad 
not the slightest influence or control. 
We can be totally certain, for example, that the full 
extent of segregation in the Detroit school system was not 
occasioned by governmental action. To be sure, some of it 
was and rather sweeping generalizations (claimed to be 
findings) have been made to this effect. But to a large 
extent, Detroit is similar to Washington, D. c. Because of 
employment opportunities there, it has attracted hundreds 
of thousands of black citizens who more or less inevitably 
settled in predominantly black neighborhoods, with consequent 
and obvious results in the schools. The local board of educa-
tion bad no more to do with this than you or I. 
Your opinion cites Green v. County School Board, 391 
u.s. 430. As:7ou will recall, however! this is an inapposite 
case. I know New Kent County intimate y, having hunted in 
it for years. There are only two school buiadings in the 
::!i~:st~~~!~kr,o~~~a~~! ~~:; ~~~~".an~!tr!::d~i~d~~egri:n 
Green was appropriate, but its language is wholly inappropriate 
to the city of Detroit as it would be to Chicago, New York, 
Washington, Newark, St. Louis and a host of other cities. 
Believing - based on our several conversations over 
the years - that you and I are in accord on this issue, I 
hope you will consider favorably the conforming of your 
language to that of Bill Rehnquist's. This can be done with-
out weakening your analysis or the conclusion you reach. I 
am afraid that if the paragraphs mentioned above (co11111encing 
>. 
, . . 
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at the bottom of page 17) remains unchanged, tbe lower courts 
will feel free • in spite of Bill's opinion - to continue to 
impose system-wide remedies (with the accompanyiag busing) 
just as they bave in the past, without regard to the scope 
of the constitutional viblation and to the detriment of 
children of both races. 
Perhaps I lack "standing•• to write you, as I voted 
"the other way." I will write something separately but, in 
view of the approval by the Detroit Schoo.l Board itself of 
the remedial action at issue, I may well end up joiniag the 
result. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
'lfp/as 
cc: Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
,, 
June 2, 1977 
No. 76-447 Milliken v. Bradley 
Dear Chief: 
In due time I will circulate something 
in this case. 
It may concur in the results, but for 
quite different reasons from those expressed in 
" your opinion. 
Sincerely, 
~·· 






' . )j. ~. 
J,' 
<. 
• .. ........ 
C HAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR. 
;§u:p-rtntt ~llltrl ttf Urt ~tlt ~hdts 
.asfrington. ~. ~· 2llgt'1~ 
June 2, 1977 
No. 76-447 Milliken v. Bradley 
Dear Chief: 
After spending several hours last night on this case, 
I now see it in a different perspective from the way the case 
was argued and discussed at the Conference. I had not pre-
viously read the several meandering decisions of the District 
Court in which it virtually assumes the role of School 
Superintendent of the Detroit school system. 
In the context of conventional desegregation litigation, 
this is a noncase. The School Board, rather than opposing 
the extensive desegregation orders of the District Court, is 
enthusiastic about them. Indeed, the District Court's opinion 
of August 15, 1975, notes: 
"The Defendant Board of Education Plan. The 
Detroit Board of Education, unlike the boards in 
other school desegregation cases, is willing to 
assume its constitutional duty to desegregate the 
Detroit School System. The President of the Board 
and ·the members of the bi-racial administrative 
staff have convinced the court they will willingly 
implement any desegregation order the court may 
issue." (App. 49a) 
There were differences of opinion below between the 
School Board and original plaintiffs, as the former wanted 
more busing and a somewhat more sweeping racial balance decree. 
But the real contest before us is between the School Board 
and the State of Michigan over funding certain aspects of 
the wide-ranging programs ordered by the District Court. 
Not unexpectedly, the School Board is delighted to improve 
the quality of education provided it can do so at State 
expense. 
- 2 -
Thus, it is the State- not the~h~ Board- that makes 
the argument with respect to the "scope of the remedy". I 
am not even sure the State has standing beyond arguing that 
whatever constitutional violations may have been committed 
by the School Board, a district court cannot order the State 
to pay for enhanced educational programs. In addition, it 
has the 11th Amendment issue. 
But whatever may be said as to the standing point (which 
I merely mention in passing), this is indeed a unique case 
and could be written as such. I am therefore concerned that 
the Court should write a rather sweeping desegregation decision 
(similar to Swann) that will be applied by the lower courts in 
different circumstances when school boards are resisting the 
assumption by federal courts of the duties and authority vested 
by law in elected school boards and professional educators. 
It would be extraordinary for the average school board to be 
willing - if not eager - to surrender its educational 
responsibilities to the extreme degree that is evidenced 
by the wide-ranging opinions of the District Judge in this 
case. 
I realize that my new perception of the case comes rather 
late in the day. In any event, I now let you know, with 
apologies for not having done my homework carefully at a more 
appropriate time. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
P.S. Potter and Bill Rehnquist discussed this case when 
we happened to be at lunch today. I expressed these 
views to them. I do not know to what extent, if any, 
that they share them. 
CHAMI!IERS 0,-
..JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.Snvrtnu <lf~url ~f tlrt ~tt~ ~hdts 
~ulfingfon. ~. Of. 2.0.;t'l~ 
June 2, 1977 
Re: 76-447 - Milliken v. Bradley 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
~~qrrtmt <!Jtrttrt of t4t 'J§tniteb' ~!:atts 
~aslrt:nghrn:. ~. <!J. 2LT~.J.1.2 
CHAMBERS 0 F 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
June 2, 1977 
Re: No. 76-447 - Milliken v. Bradley 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 




JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
..§u:prttttt <!fcmi qf t4t ~b- ~htttg 
'Jliludpn:gtott. ~. <.!f. 2llp'l-~ 
Re: No. 76-447 - Milliken v. Bradley 
Dear Chief: 
June 3, 1977 
If you can see your way clear to omit the citation of 
Rizzo v. Goode on page 28 of the typed copy circulated June l, 
I shall be glad to join your opinion. If you feel that it is neces-
sary to include that citation, please note me as concurring in 
the result. 
I do not wish to be "picky" about this, but I do not agree 
with the characterization of the Rizzo decision, and it is for 
this reason that I make the request. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 




j)u:vutttt <!fcn.rt cf tltt 'J~Ittittb .;§taft a 
'IJaglfhtgtcn,liJ. Qt. 2l.T~Jt.;,t 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL June 7, 1977 
Re: No. 76-447, Milliken v. Bradley 
Dear Chief: 




The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
.. lfp/ss 6/~177 ,. 
~ ~·-f-U ~ 
/vv~. . 
Milliken -: ~ t.c,__, .-/ _ 
~·~-"'-L. 
Dear Chief: 4~ .I.Ac--:;__J 
Although I voted the other way at Conference, I am prepared 
at least to concur in the result in your cas~d~~fficient 
inducement could perhaps even be persuaded to join youropinion. 
The inducement would co~sist primarily of changes that 
would clearly distinguish this case from the Dayton case in 
which I now have a Court. Unless so distinguished, the confused 
situation that prompted us to take these two cases could even 
be confounded. We have been concerned by the tendency of 
District Courts to make a general finding of de jure segregation, 
and then perceive no limitation on the scope of the remedy. 
The cases that have anguished so many people in our country 
(and often been seriously detrimental to public education itself) 
have been those in which extensive, long-distance busing - even 
of elementary childre~ - has been decreed without any considera-
tion ofwhether such a ~emedy exceeds the scope of the particular 
constitutional violations. 
Our Dayton decision should clarify the law in that type 
of situation. Your Milliken opinion deals, however, with a 
different aspect of the same general problem. Apparently 
desegregation in Detroit was pervasive, and no one is now 
2. 
challenging the conventional desegregation remedies - including 
reassignment and busing. The only challenge (and this by the 
state rather than the school board) is to four of about a dozen 
so-called "educational components". I am frank to say that 
the record is by no means clear to me that there was discrimina-
tion with respect to these components, but your opinion reaches 
a different conclusion and you may well be more familiar with 
the record than I am. 
But there does seem to be a gap or hiatus in the opinion 
that could be confusing to the District Court, and indeed could 
be viewed as confining Dayton to rather narrow limits. Beginning 
on page 12 (printed draft No. 1) you properly identify the three 
principal factors to be considered in. determining appropriate 
remedies. One of these is that the extent of the remedy must 
be determined by the "nature and scope of the constitutional 
violation". Another is that the remedy must be designed "to 
restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position 
they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct." 
(p. 12). 
The opin~on then moves to the educational components, and 
the second paragraph beginning on page 14 commences as follows: 
"The 'condition' offending the Constitution 
is Detroit's de jure segregated school system. This 
condition, which the District Court was obliged to 
correct, is not, under our holdings, necessarily or 
invariably cured completely by simply establishing 
schools on a nonracial basis, although that is the 
•, 
key step in the remedial process. Our cases 
recognize that the evil is,more broadly, a dual 
school system with all its attending inequities." 
3. 
It seems to me that further elaboration of these three 
sentences is necessary to clarify the opinion, by tying the 
violations more specifically to the remedy. If the only 
"condition" or "evil" found to exist is a de jure segregated 
system, it is entirely possible that there was no constitutional 
violation with respect to any one of these educational com-
ponents. For example, testing - universally used - is done 
on the basis of standard tests prescribed by a national testing 
agency that are designed to be non-discriminatory. But your 
opinion views the record as containing findings of discrimina-
tion with respect to these components,, and I will accept this. 
But it is essential, in my view, to tie these to the remedy. 
Accordingly, I suggest something along the following lines 
as a substitute for the first three sentences of this 
paragraph: 
"The 'condition' offending the Constitution 
is Detroit's de jure segregated school system, one 
so pervasively and persistently segregated that the 
District Court found that the need for the educa-
tional components flowed directly from constitutional 
violations. Thus, these educational remedies - although 
normally and properly left to the discretion of the 
elected school board and professional educators -
were deemed necessary to restore the victims of the 
discriminatory conduct to the position educ~tionally 
they would have enjoyed with respect to testing, 
reading, counseling and in-service staff training 
had these components been provided or administered 
in a non-discriminatory manner." 
Absent such a clarification, I would be concerned that 
whenever a District Court finds a segregated school system 
it will feel free - without any specific findings - to move 
in and run the system, as the District Judge in Detroit has 
done to a .large extent with consent of the school board. 
* * * * 
4. 
As to the general finding of systemwide discrimination, 
my clerk has checked the record and found some rather serious 
examples of segregative action. My clerk will be glad to 
talk to your clerk about these with the view, if you think 
it worthwhile, to including these in a note. 
Finally, with respect to participation by a state in 
the maintaining of a segregated system, it may prevent abuse 
by other District Judges if you were disposed to add a sentence 
to this effect: 
"When the Detroit school board attempted 
to voluntarily initiate an intra-district 
remedy to ameliorate the effect of the past 
segregative practices, the Michigan Legislature 
enacted a law forbidding the carrying out of 
this remedy." 338 F. Supp. at 589. 
Potter and Lewis, at my request have reviewed this letter 
and have authorized me to say that they agree generally with 
my suggestionS, Lewis, however, is writing separately although 
he presently would be willing to join in the judgment if changes 
along the foregoing lines are made. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
Re: 
Dear Chief: 
$iltllt"tmt (!J{tttrlllf t4t ~th $itw.a 
jtcwJrittghm.lB. <!J. Zll&iJ-12 
No. 76-447 - Milliken v. Bradley 
Although I voted the other way at Conference, I am 
prepared at least to concur in the result in your case and 
with sufficient inducement could perhaps even be persuaded 
to join your opinion. 
The inducement would consist primarily of changes 
that would clearly distinguish this case from the Dayton 
case in which I now have a Court. Unless so distinguished, 
the confused situation that prompted us to take these two 
cases could even be confonnded. We have been concerned by 
the tendency of District Courts to make a general finding 
of de jure segregation, and then perceive no limitation on 
the scope of the remedy. The cases that have anguished so 
many people in our country (and often been seriously 
detrimental to public education itself) ha~e been those in 
which extensive, long-distance busing -- even of elementary 
children -- has been decreed without any consideration of 
whether such a remedy exceeds the scope of the particular 
constitutional violations. 
Our Dayton decision should clarify the law in that 
type of situation. Your Milliken opinion deals, however, with 
a different aspect of the same general problem. Apparently 
&segregation in Detroit was pervasive, and no one is now 
challengini the conventional desegregation remedies --
£,": 
·' ... , .. 
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including reassignment and busing. The only challenge (and 
this by the state rather than the school board) is to four 
of about a dozen so-called "educational components". I am 
frank to say that the record is by no means clear to me that 
there was discrimination with respect to these components, but 
your opinion reaches a different conclusion and you may well 
be more familiar with the record than I am. 
But there does seem to be a gap or hiatus in the 
opinion that could be confusing to the District Court, and 
indeed could be viewed as confining Dayton to rather narrow 
limits. Beginning on page 12 (printed draft No. 1) you 
properly identify the three principal factors to be considered 
in determining appropriate remedies. One of these is that 
the extent of the remedy must be determined by the "nature 
and scope of the constitutional violation". Another is that 
the remedy must be designed "to restore the victims of 
discriminatory conduct to the position they would have 
occupied in the absence of such conduct." (p. 12.) 
The opinion then moves to the educational components, 
and the second paragraph beginning on page 14 commences as 
follows: 
"The 'condition' offending the Constitu-
tion is Detroit's de jure segregated school 
system. This condition, which the District 
Court was obliged to correct, i~ not, under 
our holdings, necessarily or invariably cured 
completely by simply establishing schools on 
a nonracial basis, although that is the 
key step in the remedial process. Our cases 
recognize that the evil is, more broadly, 
a dual school system with all its attending 
inequities." 
It ~eems to me that further elaboration of these three 
sentences is necessary to clarify the opinion, by tying the 
violations more specifically to the remedy. If the only 
"condition" or "evil" found to exist is a de jure segregated 
·. 
- 3 -
system, it is entirely possible that there was no rnnstitutional 
violation with respect to any one of these educatio~al 
components. For example, testing -- universally used- -..,. 
is done on the basis of standard tests prescribed by a --, 
national testing agency that are designed to be non-discrimina-v 
mry. But your opinion views the record as containing 
findings of discrimination with respect to these components, 
and I will accept this. But it is essential, in my view, 
to tie these to the remedy. Accordingly, I suggest something 
along the following lines as a substitute for the first 
three sentences of this paragraph: 
"The 'condition' offending the Constitu-
tion is Detroit's de jure segregated school 
system, one so pervasively and persistently 
segregated that the District Court found that 
the need for the educational components 
flowed directly from constitutional violations. 
Thus, these educational remedies -- although 
normally and properly left to the discretion 
of the elected school board and professional 
educators -- were deemed necessary to restore 
the victims of the discriminatory conduct 
to the position educationally they would have 
enjoyed with respect to testing, reading, 
counseling and in-service staff training had 
these components been provided pr administered 
a non-discriminatory manner." 
Absent such a clarification, I would be concerned 
that whenever a District Court finds a segregated school 
system it will feel free -- without any specific findings 
to move in and run the system, as the District Judge in 
Detroit has done to a large extent with consent of the 
school board. 
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As to the general finding of systemwide discrimination, 
my clerk has checked the record and found some rather serious 
examples of segregative action. My clerk will be glad to 
talk to your clerk about these with the view, if you think 
it worthwhile, to including these in a note. 
Finally, with respect to participation by a state in 
the maintaining of a segregated system, it may prevent abuse 
by other District Judges if you were disposed to add a 
sentence to this effect: 
"When the Detroit school board attempted 
to voluntarily initiate an intra-district 
remedy to ameliorate the effect of the past 
segregative practices, the Michigan legislature 
enacted a law forbidding the carrying out of 
this remedy." 338 F. Supp., at 589. 
Potter and Lewis, at my request, have reviewed this 
letter and have authorized me to say that they agree generally 
with my suggestions. Lewis-, however, }-s writing separately 
although he presently would be willing to join in the judg-
ment if changes along the foregoing lines are made. 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to: Mr. Justice Stewart 








Although I voted the other way at Conference, I am prepared · 
at least to concur in the result in your case and with sufficient 
inducement could perhaps even be persuaded to join youropinion. 
The inducement would co~sist primarily of changes that 
would clearly distinguish this· case from the Dayton case in 
which I now have a Court. Unless so distinguished, the confused 
situation that prompted us to take these two cases could even 
be confounded. We have been concerned by the tendency of 
District Courts to make a general finding of de jure segregation, 
and then perceive no limitation on the scope of the remedy. 
The cases that have anguished so many people in our country 
(and often been seriously detrimental to public education itself) 
have been those in which extensive, long-distance busing - even 
~,/ 
----· ' of elementary children - has been decreed without any considera-
tion ofwhether such a ~emedy exceeds the scope of the particular 
constitutional violations. 
Our Dayton decision should clarify the law in that type 
of situation. ·Your Milliken opinion deals, however, with a 
different aspect of the same general problem. Apparently 



























challenging the conventional desegregation remedies - including 
reassignment and busing. The only challenge (and this by the 
state rather than the school board) is to four of about a dozen 
so-called "educational components". I am frank to say that 
the record is by no means clear to me that there was discrimina-
tion with respect to these components, but your opinion reaches 
a different conclusion and you may well be more familiar with 
the record than I am. 
But there does seem to be a gap or hiatus in the opinion 
that could be confusing to the District Court," and indeed could 
be viewed as confining Dayton to rather narrow limits. Beginning 
on page 12 (printed draft No. 1) you properly identify the three 
principal factors to be · considered in, determining appropriate 
remedies. One of these is that the extent of the remedy must 
be determined by the "nature and scope of the constitutional 
violation". Another is that the remedy must be designed "to 
restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position 
they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct." 
(p. 12). 
The opini_on then moves to the educational components, and 
the second paragraph beginning on page 14 commences as follows: 
"The 'condition' offending the Constitution 
is Detroit's de jure segregated school system. This 
condition, which the District Court was obliged to 
correct, is not, under our holdings, necessarily or 
invariably cured completely by simply establishing 
schools on a nonracial basis, although that is the 
j , . .. , .. , .. ,, . 
.. t; 










Absent such a clarification, I would be concerned that 
whenever a District Court finds a segregated school system 
it will feel free - without any specific findings - to move 
in and run the system, as the District Judge in Detroit has 
done to a _large extent with consent of the school board. 
* * * * 
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As to the general finding of systemwide discrimination, 
my clerk has checked the record and found some rather serious 
examples of segregative action. My clerk will be glad to 
talk to your clerk about these with the view, if you think 
it worthwhile, to including these in a note. 
Finally, with respect to participation by a state in 
the maintaining of a segregated system, it may prevent abuse 
by other District Judges if you were disposed to add a sentence 
to this effect: 
"When the Detroit school board attempted 
to voluntarily initiate an intra-district 
remedy to ameliorate the effect of the past 
segregative practices, the Michigan Legislature 
enacted a law forbidding the carrying out of 
this remedy." 338 F. Supp. at 589. 
Potter and Lewis, at my request have reviewed this letter 
and have authorized me to say that they agree generally with 
my suggestion$. Lewis, however, is writing separately although 
he presently would be willing to join in the judgment if changes 
along the foregoing lines are made. 
CHAM BER S OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
;§u.pnme Q}anrlllf t!rt ~t~ .§ta.bg 
~aslfhtghm, ~. <!f. 2Ilgt11,;J 
June 8, 1977 
Re: No. 76-447 - Milliken v. Bradley 
Dear Potter: 
Herewith is a revised proposed letter to the Chief, 
which includes some suggestions by Lewis. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copy to Mr. Justice Powell 
Sincerely,. ~"' / 













Re: No. 76-447 - Milliken v. Bradley 
Dear Chief: 
Although I voted the other way at Conference, I am 
prepared at least to concur in the result in your case and 
with sufficient inducement could perhaps even be persuaded 
to join your opinion. 
The inducement would consist primarily of changes 
that would clearly distinguish this case from the Dayton 
case in which I now have a Court. Unless so distinguished, 
the confused situation that prompted us to take these two 
cases could even be confounded. We have been concerned by 
the tendency of District Courts to make a general finding 
of de jure segregation, and then perceive no limitation on 
the scope of the remedy. The cases that have anguished so 
many people in our country (and often been seriously 
detrimental to public education itself) have been those in 
which exten~ive, long-distance busing -- even of elementary 
children -- has been decreed without any consideration of 
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whether such a remedy exceeds the scope of the particular 
constitutional violations. 
Our Dayton decision should clarify the law in that 
type of situation. Your Milliken opinion deals, however, with 
a different aspect of the same general problem. Apparently 
desegregation in Detroit was pervasive, and no one is now 
challenging the conventional desegregation remedies --
including reassignment and busing. The only challenge (and 
this by the state rather than the school board) is to four 
of about a dozen so-called "educational components". I am 
frank to say that the record is by no means clear to me that 
there was discrimination with respect to these components, but 
your opinion reaches a different conclusion and you may well be 
more familiar with the record than I am. 
But there does seem to be a gap or hiatus in the 
s 
opinion that could be confusing to i=fte District Court,:and 
indeed could be viewed as confining Dayton to rather narrow 
limits. Beginning on page 12 (printed draft No. l) you 
properly identify the three principal factors to be considered 
in determining appropriate remedies. One of these is that 
·. 
- 3 -
the extent of the remedy must be determined by the "nature 
and scope of the constitutional violation". Another is that 
the remedy must be designed "to restore the victims of 
discriminatory conduct to the position they would have 
occupied in the absence of such conduct." (p. 12.) 
The opinion then moves to the educational components, 
and the second paragraph beginning on page 14 commences as 
follows: 
"The 'condition' offending the Constitu-
tion is Detroit's de jure segregated school 
system. This condition, which the District 
Court was obliged to correct, is not, under 
our holdings, ~ecessarily or invariably cured 
completely by simply estaolishing schools on 
a nonracial basis, although that is the 
key step in the remedial process. Our cases 
recognize that the evil is, more broadly, 
a dual school system with all its attending 
inequities." 
It seems to me that further elaboration of these three 
sentences is necessary to clarify the opinion, by tying the 
violations more specifically to the remedy. If the only 
"condition" or "evil" found to exist is a de jure segregated 
system, it is entirely possible that there was no constitutional 
violation with respect to any one of these educational ·'· 
.. 
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components. For example, testing -- universally used --
is done on the basis of standard tests prescribed by a 
national testing agency that are designed to be non-discrimina-
'~' tory. ~ our opinion views the record as containing 
" ~44.J.~~ 
findings of discrimination with respect to~\~~~e components, 
and I will accept this. But it is essential, in my view, 
to tie these to the remedy. Accordingly, I suggest something 
along the following lines as a substitute for the first 
three sentences of this paragraph: 
"The 'condition' offending the Constitu-
tion is Detroit's de jure segregated school 
system, one so pervasively and persistently 
segregated that the District Court found that 
the need for the educational components 
flowed directly from constitutional violations. 
Thus, these educational remedies -- although 
normally and properly left to the discretion 
of the elected school board anQ professional 
educators -- were deemed necessary to restore 
the victims of the discriminatory conduct 
to the position educationally they would have 
enjoyed with respect to testing, reading, counsel-
ing and in-service staff training had these 
components been provided or administered in 
a non-discriminatory manner." 
Abs~nt such a clarification, I would be concerned 





system it will feel free -- without any specific findings 
to move in and run the system, as the District Judge in 
Detroit has done to a large extent with consent of the 
school board. 
* * * 
As to the general finding of systemwide discrimination, 
my clerk has checked the record and found some rather serious 
examples of segregative action. My clerk will be glad to 
talk to your clerk about these with the view, if you think 
it worthwhile, to including these in a note. 
Finally, with resp~ct to participation by a state in 
the maintaining of a segregated system, it may prevent abuse 
by other District Judges if you were disposed to add a 
sentence to this effect: 
"When the Detroit school board attempted 
to voluntarily initiate an intra-district 
remedy to ameliorate the effect of the past 
segregative practices, the Michigan legislature 
enacted a law forbidding the carrying out of 
this remedy." 338 F. Supp., at 589. 
Potter and Lewis, at my request have reviewed this 
letter and have authorized me to say that they agree generally 
' . 
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with my suggestions. Lewis, however, ~s writing separately 
although he presently would be willing to join in the judg-
ment if changes along the foregoing lines are made. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
•I' 




,., . . ' 
·' ' 
'· 
~u:prtm:t <!fo-urt of tlrt 'J!;tnittb ,Statts 
JrasJringhttt. ~. ~· 2llb''!-~ ' 
CHAMBERS Of" 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
June 9, 1977 
Re: 76-447 - Milliken v. Bradley 
Dear Bill: 
Thank you for your memorandum of June 8 on this 
case. As you know, I urged Lewis to let me have com-
ments particularly as to his stance as "detached" from 
both Milliken and Dayton. I am glad to have your 
collective observations. As I have a focus on Milliken, 
you have it on Dayton, and I agree on the need to 
harmonize to avoid more confusion to other courts. 
I believe most, if not all your positions can be 
accommodated, but you will be the judge of that when I 
get back to you. 
As with predecessor cases in this area, it is 
important we make every effort to present the "maximum 
front" possible, without, of course, sacrifice to 
substantive views. 
More to follow. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
cc: Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Regards~; 
June 11, 1977 
No. 76-447 Milliken v. Bradley 
Dear Chief: 
Your letter to Bill Rehnquist refers to your having 
requested me "to let [you] have conments particularly" as 
to the tension between Milliken and Dayton. 
I had thought that Bill's letter served this purpose. 
But I am happy to supplement it. 
My profound concern about your first draft (that you 
commented to me was quite preliminary) is that it can be 
read far more broadly than necessary. It is likely to be 
read as holding that whenever a District Court makes a 
generalized finding of a de jure segregated school system, 
it then would have authority - without further specific 
findings - to order any "remedial educational" programs that 
it may think have educational merit. There would be no 
necessity to find a constitutional violation with respect 
to the particular programs. 
You and I agree,· I think, that before a court should 
assume the educational functions of the school board it 
must have found a constitutional violation with respect to 
the manner in whicht.Mdle particular function had been d.onducted 
in the past. Bill's letter mentioned "testing". The same 
can be said for many other educational pomponents. 
The District Court in this case required that five new 
vocational centers pe oprdvdided, and prescribed the curriculum 
for such. This extraordinary action was not challenged before 
us. Yet, unless the court had found discrimination in the 
way vocational education had been taught ~·&·, depriving 
black students of the same quality and amount of vocational 
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for usurping the legislative function of deciding how many 
vocational schools were needed and prescribing the cirriculum 
therefor. 
If this is made clear, I will concur in the judgment. 
If you adopt the language Bill suggests (or its substance) 
this will harmonize the two cases. 
I also will write in support of my view that we should 
DIG this case, as it is not a segregation case in the normal 
sense. It is simply a "row" over money between Detroit and 
the state. 
I appreciate your willingness to consider suggestions. 
At this season of the year, I hesitate to make them even to 
the most tolerant of my Brothers. 
Sincerely, 






CHAM BER S OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
~ltpTtlttt Qfllttrl !tf tlrt ~tb ~ta±fg 
jjftut!p:ttgtcn.lS. <!f. 2ll&f~~ 
June 15, 1977 
Re: No. 76-447 - Milliken v. Bradley 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me in your second draft opinion, which 
was circulated on June 14th. 
Sincerely, 
• -· ._1 , 
The Chief Justice 










JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
$5u:prrntt Qfllltt± .of tftt %rifth ~tait.s 
}lfa.aoJrtngtan. tiJ. <If. 2!1gtJ.l,~ 
June 17, 1977 
76-447, Milliken v. Bradley 
Dear Chief, 
I am glad to join your opinion for 
the Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
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June 18, 1977 
"'"''' 
No. 76-447 Milliken v. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
This is a note that I intended sending with the circula-
tion yesterday of my opinion concurring in the judgment. 
In the last paragraph, I refer to not being able to 
r.ersuade my Brothers to DIG this case. There is a bit of 
'poetic license" in the statement, as I did not urge this 
result at our Conference. Although I was not entirely at 
rest, I was then inclined to agree with the state. 
Further study persuaded me that I had not understood 
the case, which seems to me to be a "sport" in every respect. 
As all of the votes were in except Harry's, I assume 
there is no great likelihood of a "Court" agreeing with me. 













JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~nprtmt <!}curt ~f Urt ~ta ~bttts 
~ihtsfringhm. J. <!}. 2!lbf'1~ 
PERSONAL 
June 17, 1977 
Re: No. 76-447 Milliken v. Bradley 
Dear Lewis: 
I am writing you this in letter form since I plan to 
leave early this afternoon, and might not be able to see 
you before leaving. I think your concurring opinion is 
excellent, and properly serves to focus the attention of 
those who read the court•s opinion on how unusual a case 
this is. Indeed, with only the most minor changes, I 
think you could conclude the opinion by actually JO~n~ng 
the Chief•s opinion, though I realize you do not wish 
to do that. 
If you want to talk about this, I will be at home 




















THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
Re: 76-447 - Milliken v. Bradley 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
In an abundance 
attention to changes 
attached. 
aution I call your 
pages 19 and 20, as 
Absent dissent, these changes will be made 
in the hope that this case, Dayton and Hazelwood 
will all be ready ten Lolhorrow. If Hazelwood is 
not ready, I would opt to let the other two come 
down. I see no nexus. 
Regards, 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
Re: 
~u:p-rtmt OJaurt af tfrt 'J!ittitt~ ~tafts , 
';Wasfringftm. 15. OJ. 2!lgtJI..;t 




In an abundance of caution I call your 
attention to changes on pages 19 and 20, as 
attached. 
Absent dissent, these changes will be made 
in the hope that this case, Dayton ' and Hazelwood 
will all be ready for tomorrow. If Hazelwood is 
not ready, I would opt to let the other two come 
down. I see no nexus. 
Regards, 
.:§u:prtutt <!fttttrl of tltt ~tt:ilib j)fattg 
'J,t~tSJrhtghm. l9. <!f. 2llpJ!..;l 
CHAMBE:RS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
June 20, 1977 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 76-447 - Milliken v. Bradley 
There is, I believe, a misunderstanding in Lewis 1 
memorandum of June 18 about my vote being still "out. 11 On 
June 3 I advised the Chief (with copies to the Conference) that 
I would join his opinion if he would remove the citation to 
Rizzo v. Goode. He immediately did so, and so my joinder 
became effective and my vote is not still outstanding. 
I write this note to straighten out any confusion that 





JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
~u:p-rtm.t ~ourl of tlrt ~ttittb ~hdtg 
2.taslrittgtcn, ta. ~· Z!l.;t'-1~ 
June 20, 1977 
No. 76-447 Milliken v. Bradley 
Dear Chief: 
In view of your comment this morning that some 
minor changes were being made in the language of this 
troublesome case, I hope you will forgive me for making a 
suggestion. 
One of the aspects of your opinion that troubles me 
particularly is the extensive citation of lower court 
decisions in desegregation cases, including some rather 
broad and sweeping excerpts from several .of their opinions. 
I refer particularly to part C, page 15, et ~· 
Would it not be prudent to add a footnote, keyed to 
the first sentence in the second paragraph on page 19, 
along the following lines: 
"The citation above of numerous cases in which 
remedial education remedies have been decreed, 
including quotations from some of these, is not to 
be viewed as necessarily approving any of these cases. 
The facts and circumstances in desegregation cases 
tend to vary widely, and of-course we have had no 
occasion to consider whether the remedies ordered 
in any one of these cases were in fact justified by 
the constitutional violations. We do think these 
cases are relevant, however, as demonstrating that--
where the evidence supports the requisite findings--
educational remedies are entirely appropriate." 
Unless we include such a caveat, I am afraid the lower 
courts will assume that we approve the holdings in the 
various decisions cited and relied upon. We can be 
reasonably certain that in many of these cases there were 
2. 
no specific findings of violations other than a general 
conclusion that a unitary system did not exist. Also, 
it is likely that none of these cases involved such a massive 
intrusion into the legislative and administrative functions 
of a school board as was ordered in Detroit. 
For the r e asons stated in your opinion, this degree 
of intrusion may have been justified in Detroit, especially 
where the School Board requested it. Even so, the Board 
emphasized that without additional state funding the remedies 
ordered by the District Court could "destroy" public edu-
cation in Detroit. This possibility suggests the wisdom 
of not giving the lower courts a broad invitation to take 
charge. 
This really is my last word in this case. You have 
been tolerant and patient. But my understanding--from 
what you have said both recently and in the past--is 
that you share my view that lower courts often have been 
too eager to impose remedies beyond any proven specific 
violation. The Detroit situation was unique, and your 
opinion reaches the correct result. My concern goes only 
to the way it may be read by our brothers in the lower 
f e deral courts. 
In view of the relationship of Dayton to Bradley, 




June 20, 1977 
,, ' 
1: 
No. 76-447 Milliken v. Bradley 
MEMORANDUMTTO THE CONFERENCE: 
• • 
This refers to the Chief's memorandum to the effect that 
the above case is ready, so A: far as. he is concerned, for 
tomorrow • · ?'< • ' .• 
' 
As I mentioned at the Conference, 
some changes in my concurring opinion. 
yet had available a printed ·copy of my 
I am considering making 




Also, ·I may circulate this afternoon a brief concurring 






circumstances, I would appreciate the cases 
over. I will do my best to be finally "at rest" 
-~ .': ~ 
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J1.w t Lc8 
l 
We grantedE certi rari in this;!ase t~~:~two , 
/();,:;~7;~~ ~44'11'•««~ -~ - ~~ ~ 
~ questi~n~c rning the remedial powers of federal district . 
~ ~ courts in school desegregation cases, namely, whethe~ I 
' 
l District Court can, as a part of a desegregation decree, 
~ order compensatory or remedial educational and administrative 
-;t; 
~ programs for school children subjected to past acts of de jure 
~segregation, and whether, consistent with the Eleventh 
~~ Amendment, federal courts can require state officials found 
! l responsible for constitutional violations to bear part o~he 
~ costs of thos~ programs. 
Jto .ur.· ~~ ~ ~-l,r 
This case is before the Court for the second time 
following our remand, 418 U.S. 717(1974); it marks the 
culmination of seven years of litigation over de jure school 
segregation in the Detroit Public School System. For almost 
six years, the litigation has focused exclusively on the 
appropriate remedy to correct official acts of racial 
- 2 -
discrimination committed by both the Detroit School Board 
1/ 
and the State of Michigan.-
A 
In the first stage of the remedy proceedings, the 
District Court, after reviewing several "Detroit-only" 
desegregation plans, concluded that "'relief of segregation 
in the Detroit public schools cannot be accomplished within 
the corporate geographical limits of the city' .... " 345 
F.Supp. 914, 916 (E.D. Mien. 1972). Based on that conclusion, 
the District Court ordered the parties to submit plans for 
"metropolitan desegregation" and appointed a nine-member panel 
to formulate a desegregation plan, which would encompass a 
"desegregation area" consisting of 54 school districts. 
In June 1973, a divided Court of Appeals, sitting en 
bane, upheld the District Court's determination that a 
metropolitan-wideplan was essential to bring about what the 
District Court had described as "the greatest degree of actual 
1/ 
- The violations of the Detroit Board of Education, which 
included~ use of optional attendance zones, racially-
based transportation of school children, improper creation and 
alteration of attendance zones, grade structures, and feeder 
school patterns, are described in the District Court's initial 
"Ruling on Issue of Segregation." 338 F.Supp. 582, 587-588 (ED 
Mich. 1971). The District Court further found that "[t]he State 
and its agencies •.. have acted directly to control and maintain 
the patternof segregation in the Detroit schools." Id., at 589. 
Those conclusions as to liability were affirmed on appeal, 484 
F.2d 215, 221-241 (CA6 1973), and were not challenged in this 




desegregation to the end that, upon implementation, no school, 
grade or classroom [will be] substantially disproportionate to 
overall pupil racial composition." 345 F.Supp., at 918. 
This Court reversed, holding that the order exceeded appro-
priate limits of federal equitable authority by concluding that 
"as a matter of substantive constitutional right, [a] 
particular degree of racial balance" is required, and by 
subjecting other school districts, uninvolved with and unaf-
fected by constitutional violations, to the Court's remedial 
powers. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). Relying upon the principle 
enunciated in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educ., 
402 u.s. 1, 16 (1971), that the scope of the remedy is deter-
mined by the nature and extent of the constitutional violation, 
we held that, on the record before us, there was no inter-
district violation calling for an interdistrict remedy. 
Because the District Court's "metropolitan remedy" went beyond 
the constitutional violation, we remanded the case for further 
proceedings "leading to prompt formulation of a decree directed 
to eliminating the segregation found to exist in the Detroit 




-Five separate opinions were filed in Milliken I. Mr. 
Justice Stewart, in concurring, stated that the metropolitan-
wide remedy contemplated by the District Court was "in error 
for the simple reason that the remedy ... was not commensurate 
with the constitutional violation found." Id., at 754. 
Dissenting opinions were filed by Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. 
Justice White, and Mr. Justice Marshall. The dissenting 
opinions took the position, in brief, that the remedy was 
appropriate, given the State's undisputed constitutional 
violations, the control of local education by state authorities, 
and the manageability of any necessary administrative modifi-
cations to effectuate a metropolitan-wide remedy. 
tYJ .-r f'l ? I 
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B 
On remand, due to the intervening death of Judge Stephen 
J. Roth, who had presided over the litigation from the outset, 
the case was reassigned to Judge Robert E. DeMascio. Judge 
DeMascio promptly ordered respondent Bradley and the Detroit 
Board to submit desegregation plans limited to the Detroit 
school system. On April, 1975, both parties submitted their 
proposed plans. Respondent Bradley's plan was limited solely 
to pupil reassignment; the · proposal called for extensive 
transportation of students to achieve the plans ultimate goal 
of assuring that every school within the district reflected, 
within 15 percentage points, the racial ratio of the school 
3/ 
district as a whole.- In contrast to respondent Bradl:E:~.y' s 
proposal, the Detroit Board's plan provided for sufficient 
pupil reassignment to eliminate "racially identifiable white 
schools," while ensuring th,at; "every child will spend at least 
a portion of his education in either a neighborhood elementary _,. 
' ~/ 
school or a neighborhood junior and senior high school." Id., at ' 
1116. By eschewing racial ratios for each school the Board's plan 
contempf:t~~ tra~;;~~;:i:n>of f: w: r s~~~~ shorter distances T?;· 
. I. :;_/ ___ _ 
yr~~ 3/ 
~~ - According to the then-most recent statistical data, 
as of Sept. 27, 1974, 257,396 students were enrolled in the 
Detroit public schools, a figure which reflected a decrease of 
28,116 students in the system since the 1960-1961 school year. 
402 F.Supp. 1096, 1106-1107. Of this total student population, 
71.5% were Negro and 26.4% were white. The remaining 2.1% 
was comprised of students of other ethnic groups. Id., at 1106. 
- 5 -
4/ 
than respondent Bradley's proposal.-
In addition to student reassignments, the Board's 
plan called for implementation of 13 remedial or compensatory 
programs, referred to in the record as "educational components." ...___ -. 
These compensatory programs, which were proposed in addition 
to the plan's provisions for magnet schools and vocational 
high schools, included three of the four components at issue 
in this case -- in-service training for teachers and administra-
tors, guidance and counseling , programs, and revised testing 
5/ 
procedures.- Pursuant to the District Court's direction, ' the 
6/ 
State Department of Education- on April 21, 1975 submitted a 
!/ 
Under respondent Bradley's proposed plan, 71,349 
students would require transportation; the Detroit Board's plan, 
however, provided for transportation of 51,000 students, 20,000 
less than the Bradley plan. The Board's ~an, which th~ District 
Court found infirm because of an "arb1trary" use of racial quotas, 
con temP'lcrted achieving a 4'0' - · % repr entation of Negro s uaents 
in the identifiably white schools, while leaving untouched,in 
terms of pupil reassignmen4 schools in three of the Detroit system's 
eight regions. Those three regions were located in the central 1 ./ 




-The fourth component, a remedial ~eading and communications 
skills program, was proposed later and was ~ndorsed by the Bradley 
respondents in a critique of the Detroit Board's proposed plan. 
Seen. 7, infra. The Board's plan also called for the following 
~ 'educational components": School-community relations, parental 
involvement, student rights and responsibilities, accountability, 
curriculum design, bilingual education, multi-ethnic curriculum, 
and co-curricular activies. 402 F.Supp., at 1118. 
§_/ 
In addition to the State Board of Education, the state 
defendants include the Governor of Michigan, the Attorney General, 
the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the State 
Treasurer. 
critique ofj the Detroit Board's desegregation plan; in its 
report, the Department op~ned that, although "[i]t is possible 
that none of the thirteen 'quality education' components is 
essential .•. to correct the constitutional violation ••.• ", 
eight of the 13 proposed programs nonetheless deserved special 
consideration in the desegregation setting. Of particular 
relevance here, the State Board said: 
"Within the context of effectuating a 
pupil desegregation plan, the in-service training 
[and] guidance and counseling ••. components appear 
to deserve special emphasis." Id., at 38-39. 7/ 
- 8/ -
After receiving the State Board's critique, -the 
-~ 
District Court conducted extensive hearings on the two plans 
over a two-month period. Substantial testimony was adduced 
with respect to the proposed educational components,including 
9/ 
testimony by petitioners'expert witnesses.- Based on this 
1/ 
Two months later, the Bradley respondents also sub-
mitted a critique of the Board's plan; while criticizing the _, ./ 
Board's proposed educational components on several grounds, ' 
respondents nonetheless suggested that a remedial reading program 
was particularly needed in a desegregation plan. See n.S., supra. 
The Bradley respondents claimed more generally that the Board 1 s 
plan failed to inform the court of the then-current extent of 
such programs or components in the school system and that the 
plan failed to assess "the relatedness of the particular component 
to desegregation." 
8/ 
- The other state defendants likewise filed objections to 
the Detroit Board's plan on April 21, 1975. They contended, in 
brief, that the court's remedy was limited to pupil reassignment 
to achieve desegregation; hence, the proposed inclusion of 
educational components was, under their view, excessive. 
2/ 
For example, Dr. Charles P. Kearney, Associate 
Superintendent for Research and School Administration for the 
Michigan Department of Education gave the following testimony: 
{Footnote ~/ continued) 
- 7 -
evidence and on reports of experts, the 
District Court on g • 111 in principle, the 
Detroit Board's inclusion of remedial and compensatory 
10/ 
educational components in the desegregation plan.--
"We find that the majority c:if the educational 
components included in the Detroit Board plan are 
essential for a school district undergoing desegregation. 
While it is true that the delivery of quality desegre-
gated educational services is the obligation of the school 
board, nevertheless this court deems it essential to 
mandate educational components where they are needed to 
~ remedy effects of past segregation, to assure a success-
ful desegregative effort and to minimize the possibility 
of resegregation." 402 F.Supp., at 1118. 
2./ Continued 
"[T]he State Board and the Superintendent 
indicated that guidance and counselling appeared 
to deserve special emphasis in a desegregation 
effort." 
* * * * 
"We support the notion of a guidance and counselling 
effort. We think it certainly does have a relation-
ship in the desegregation effort, we think it 
deserves special emphasis." 
As to in-service train1ng, Dr. Kearney testified that, in his 
opinion, such a program was required to implement effectively a 
desegregation plan in Detroit. Transcript Vol. XXX, at 179, 
187. Finally, even though the State's critique did not deem 
testing as des~rving of "special emphasis" in the desegregation 
plan, Dr. Kearney stated as follows: 
10/ 
"Q: [D]o you see a direct relationship between 
testing and desegregation? 
"A: If test results were inappropriately used, 
••. I think it would have certainly a discri-
minatory affect [sic] and it would have a 
negative affect, I'm sure on any kind of 
desegregation plan being implemented." Id., 
at 184. 
-- The District Court did not approve of all aspects of 
the Detroit Board's plan. With respect to educational components, 
the court said: "The plan as submitted •.• does not distinguish 
between those components that are necessary to the successful 






The District Court expressly found that the two c:m- ·~ 
ponents of testing and counseling, as then administered in 
il \1 
Detroit's schools, were infected with the discriminatory 
bias of a segregated school system: 
system many techniques deny 
black students, such as dis-
t/6 
"In a segregated 
equal protection to 
criminatory testing 
Ibid. 
[and] discriminatory counseling .•.• " 
The District Court also found that, to make desegregation work, r 
it was necessary to include remedial reading programs and in-
' service training for teachers and administrators: 
"In a system undergoing desegregation, teachers 
will require orientation and training for desegregation. 
***Additionally, we find that ... comprehensive reading 
programs are essential ..• to a successful desegregative 
effort." Ibid. 
Having established these general principles, the Distric 
Court formulated several "remedial guidelines" to govern th~ 
Detroit Board's development of a final plan. Declining "to 
I 
substitute its authority for the authority of elected state 
~ and local officials to decide which educational components are 
beneficial to :the school community," id., at 1145, the court 
laid down the following guidelines with respect to each of the 
- / _.., .......--- ~ . lA_) 
four educati?nal components at issue here: ~ ~~ 
(a) Reading. Concluding that "It]here is no educational 
component more directly associated with the process of deseg-
regation than reading," id., at 1138, the District Court 
directed the General Superintendent of Detroit's schools to 
institute a remedial reading and communications skills program 
"[t]o eradicate the effects of past discrimination .•.• " Ibid. 
- 9 -
The content of the required program was not rescribed by 
the court; rather, formulation and implement tion of the 
program was left to the. Superintendent and o a committee 
to be selected by him. 
(b) In-Service Training. The court lso directed the 
Detroit Board to formulate a comprehensi~e in-service teacher 
training program, an element "essentia to a system under-
going desegregation." Id., at 1139. hn the District Court's 
view, an in-service training program~or teachers and administra-
tors, to train professional and in~fructional personnel to 
cope with the desegregation process in Detroit, would tend to 
I 
ensure that all students in a desegragated system would be 
treated equally by teachers and administrators able, by 
virtue of special training, to cope with special problems 
presented by desegregation, and thereby facilitate Detroit's 
conversion to a unitary system. 
(c) Testing. Because it found, based on record evidence, 
that Negro children "are lr pecially affected by biased 
testing procedures," the District Court determined that, 
frequently, minority students in Det~it were adversely 
---,;,;, ... -
affected by discriminatory testing procedures. Unless the 
school system's tests were administered in a way "free from 
racial, ethnic or cultural bias," the District Court concluded 
that Negro children in Detroit might thereafter be impeded in 
their educational growth. Id., at 1142. Accordingly, the 
court directed the Detroit Board and the State Department 
~~ 
- 10 -
of Education to ' institute a testing program along the lines 
proposed by the local school board in its original desegregation 
plan. Ibid. 
{d) Counseling and Career Guidance. Finally, the 
District Court addressed what expert witnesses had described 
as psychological pressures on Detroit's students in a system 
undergoing desegregation. Counselors were required, the 
court concluded, both to solve the numerous problems and 
tensions arising in Detroit's .dismantling its dual system, 
and, more concretely, to counsel students concerning the 
vocational and technical schools created under the plan 
11/ 
through the cooperation of state and local officials.--
\3 
Nine months later, ~ ll~the District Court 
entered its final order. Emphasizing that it had "been careful 
to order only what is essential for a school district undergoing 
desegregation," Appendix, at 117a, the court ordered the 
Detroit Board ~nd the state defendants to institute comprehensive 
._____ ... --<...~ ~ ..._ - ) / 
programs as to the four educational components by the start of .--; ------ -...._ --......_ 
the September 1976 school term. The cost o these four programs, 
11/ 
In contrast to their position before the District 
Court with respect to the four educational components at issue 
here, the state defendants, through the State Deapartment of 
Education, voluntarily entered into a stipulation with the 
Detroit Board on Feb. 24, 1976, under which the State agreed 
to provide 50% of the construction costs of five vocational 
centers which the District Court ordered to be · estab_lished. 
Appendix, at 14la. 
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the court concluded, was to be equally borne by the Detroit 
School Board and the State. Accordingly, the court directed 
the local board to calculate its highest budget allocation 
in any prior year for the several educational programs and, 
from that base, any excess cost attributable to the desegregation 
plan was to be paid equally by the two groups of defendants 
responsible for prior constitutional violations, i.e., the 
Detroit Board and the state defendants. 
c 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed the District Court's order concerning the implementation 
12/ 
of and payment for the four educational components.-- The 
Court of Appeals expressly approved the District Court's 
findings as to the necessity for these compensatory programs: 
"This finding ... is not clearly erroneous, but 
to the contrary is supported by ample evidence. 
"The need for in-service training of the 
educational staff and development of non-discriminatory 
- Ees ing 1s obv1ous The former is needed to insure 
that the teac ~~nd administrators will be able to 
work effectively in a desegregated environment. The --'-1"" 
latter is needed to insure that students are not 
evaluated' unequally because of built-in bias in the 
tests adminstered in formerly segregated schools. 
"We agree with the District Court that the 
reading and counseling programs are essential to 
the effort to combat the effects of segregation.*** 
Without the reading and counseling components, black 
students might be deprived of the motivation and 
achievement levels which the desegregation remedy 
is designed to accomplish." 540 F.2d 229, 241 (CA6 1976). 
12/ 
-- The Court of Appeals disapproved, however, of the 
District Court's failure to include three of Detroit's eight 
regions in the pupil assignment plan. See n.4, supra. The 
Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court for 
furthe r consideration of the three ommitted regions, but 
declined to set forth guidelines, given the practicabilities 
(Footnote 12/ continued) 
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After reviewing the record, the Court of Appeals 
concluded: 
"This is not a situation where the District 
Court 'appears to have acted solely according to its 
own notions of good educational policy unrelated to the 
demands of the Constitution.'" Id., at 241-242, quoting 
Keyes v. School District, 521 F.2d 465, 483 (CAlO 1975), 
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976). 
After upholding the remedial-components portion of 
the plan, the Court of Appeals likewise sustained the District 
Court's allocation of costs between the state and local 
officials. Analyzing this Court's decision in Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), which reaffirmed the rule that 
the Eleventh Amendment provides a bar against an ordinary 
suit for money damages against the State without its consent, 
the Court of Appeals held that the District Court's order 
" ... imposes no money judgment on the State 
of Michigan for past de jure segregation 
practices. Rather, the order is directed 
toward the State defendants as a part of 
a prospective plan to comply with a 
constitutional requirement to eradicate 
all vestiges of de jure segregation." 
540 F.2d, at 245. (Emphasis supplied.) 
The Court of Appeals remanded the case for further consideration 
of the three central city regions untouched by the District 
12/ (continued) .. . 
-- of the situation, for the District Court's benefit. 
Further proceedings were deemed appropriate, however, particularly 
since the Bradley respondents had previously been granted 
leave to file a second amended complaintto allege interdistrict 




Court's pupil reassignment plan. Seen. 12,supra. 
The state defendants then sought review in this 
Court, challenging only those portions of the District 
~~-------------------------------Court's comprehensive remedial order dealing with the 
four educational components providing compensatory educational 
programs and with the State's obligation to defray the costs 
of those programs. We granted certiorari, 429 U.S. 
and we affirm. 





This Court has never addressed directly the question 
whether federal courts can order remedial education programs 
13/ 
as part of a school desegregation decree.-- However, the 
general principles governing our resolution of this issue 
are well settled by the prior decisions of tills Court. In 
the first case concerning'· federal courts' remedial powers 
in eliminating de jure school segregation,the Court laid 
down the basic rule which governs to this day: . "In fashioning 
and effectuating the [desegregation] decrees, the courts will 
be guided by equitable principles." Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (Brown II) 
A 
Application of those "equitable principles", we have 
held, requires federal court~ to focus upon three factors. 
~ :· 
In the first place, like other equitable remedies, the nature 
·.· 
of the desegregation remedy is to be determined by the 
nature and scope of the constitutional violation. Swann v. 
13/ 
-- In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 
402 U.S. 1 (1971), the Court affirmed an order of the District 
Court which included a requirement of in-service training 
programs. 318 F.Supp. 786, 803 (W.D.N.C. 1970). However, 
this Court's opinion did not treat the precise point. In 
Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 u.s. 
189 (1973), the Court expressly avoided passing on the District 
Court's holding that called for, among other things, "com-
pensatory education in an integrated environment." Id., 






~ u.s. 1, 16 Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 
(1971). The remedy must therefore be related to "the con-
dition alleged to offend the Constitution .•.•• " Milliken v. 
14/ 
Bradley, 418 u.s. 717, 738 (1974) .-- Second, the decree 
must indeed be remedial in nature, that is, it must be 
designed "to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct 
the position they would have occupied in the absence of 
15/ 
conduct." Id., at 746.- Third, the federal courts in 
14/ 
Thus, the Court has consistently held that the 
Constitution is not violated by racial imbalance in the 
schools, without more. Pasadena City Board of Educ. v. 
Spangler, 427 u.s. 424, 434 (1976); Milliken I, supra, at 763 
(White, J., dissenting); Swann, supra, at 26. An order 
contemplating the "'substantive right [to a] particular degree 
of racial balance or mixing'" is therefore infirm as a 
matter of law. Spangler, supra, at 434. 
15/ 
-- Since the purpose of the remedy is to make whole 
the victims of unlawful conduct, this Court declared nine 
years ago that federal courts are obliged to implement 
plans that promise "realistic'ally to work now." Green v. 
Count School Board of New Kent Count , 391 U.S. 430, 439 
19 6 8) • At the same tJ.me, -the Court has carefully stated that, 
to ensure that federal court decrees are characterized by the 
flexibility and sensitivity required of equitable decrees, 
consideration must be given to burdensome effects resulting 
from a decree that could "either risk the health of the children 
or si nifica 1 impinge on the educational process." 
at 3 - Our unct1on, as state by Mr. Justice 
White, is "to desegregate an educational system in which the 
races have been kept apart without, at the same time, 
losing sight of the central educational function of the schools. 
Milliken I, supra, at 764 (dissenting opinion) (Emphasis in 
original) • In a word, "There are undoubted practical as well 
as legal limits to the remedial powers of federal courts in school 
desegregation cases." Id., at 763. Compare Austin Independent 
School Dist. v. United states, U.S. (1976) (Powell, 
J. (concurring)) • 
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devising a remedy must take into account the interests of 
state and local authorities in managing their own affairs, 
~~---------------------~,--------~------~,~------------~~ 
consistent with the Constitution. In Brown II the Court 
squarely held that "[s]chool authorities have the primary 
responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these 
problems •••• " 349 u.s., at 299. It, however, "school author-
ities fail in their affirmative obligations ••• judicial authority --may be invoked." Swann, supra, at 15. Once invoked, "the 
scope of a district court'· s equitable powers to remedy past 
I 
wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in 
equitable remedies." Ibid. 
B 
In challenging the order before us, petitioners do not 
specifically question that the District Court's mandated 
programs are designed, at least in part, to restore the 
schoolchildren of Detroit to the position they would have ----enjoyed absent constitutional violations by state and local 
,_ 
officials. And, petitioners do not contend, nor could they, 
,-
~ at the prerogatives of the Detroit School Board have been 
brogated by the decree, since of course the Detroit School 
Board itself proposed incorporation of these programs in the -- -- ----.... ---.... __ ~ ______ _, __________ ,~ .... --------....----~--~· 
~- --- - --
first place. Petitioners' sole contention is that, under 
Swann's teaching, the District Court's order exceeds the scope 
of the constitutional violation. Invoking our holding in 
Milliken I, supra, petitioners claim that, since the constitu- · 




segregation of students on the basis of race, the c urt's 
decree must be limited to remedying un1aw~ ~1 assignments. 
This contention misconceives the principle they seek to 
invoke, and we reject ther argument. 
The well-settled principle that the nature and scope of 
the remedy is to be determined by the violation means simply 
that federal court decrees must directly address and relate 
to the constitutional violation itself. Because of this inherent 
limitation upon federal judicial authority, federal court 
decrees exceed appropriate limits if they are aimed at 
eliminating a condition that does not violate the Constitution 
or does not flow from such a violation, see Pasadena City 
Board of Education v. Spangler, supra, or if they are imposed 
upon governmental units that were neither involved in nor 
affected by the constitutional violation, as in Milliken I, 
supra. Hills v. Gautreaux ~ 425 u.s. 284, 292-296 (1976). 
But where, as here, a constitutional violation has been found, 
the remedy imposed upon the violators does not "exceed" the 
violation, if the remedy is tailored to cure the "condition 
that offends the Constitution." 
The "condition" offensive to the Constitution is a de 
jure segregated school system. This condition, which the 
District Court was obliged to eliminate, Green v. County 
School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968), 
is not, under the holdings of this Court, necessarily or 
- 18 -
invariably cured completely by simply establishing schools 
on a nonracial basis, although that is the key step in the 
remedial process. Our cases recognize that the evil is, 
more broadly, a dual school system infected with long-standing 
inequities. Twenty-three years ago a unanimous Court speaking 
through Chief Justice Warren held in Brown I: "Separate 
educational facilities are inherently unequal." Brown v. 
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). And in 
United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 395 
U.S. 225 (1969), the Court concerned itself not with pupil 
assignment,but with the desegregation of faculty and staff. 
In doing so, the Court, there speaking through Mr. Justice 
Black, focused on the reason for judicial concerns going beyond 
pupil assignment: "The dispute .•• deals with faculty and staff 
desegregation, a goal that we have recognized to be an impor-
tant aspect of the basic task of achieving a public school 
system wholly free from racial discrimination." 395 U.S., 
at 231-232 (Emphasis supplied). 
Montgomery County therefore stands firmly for the proposi-
tion that ·matters other than pupil assignment must on occasion 
by addressed by federal courts to eliminate the effects of 
prior segregation. Similarly, in Swann, we reaffirmed the 
principle laid down in Green v. County School Board, supra, 
that "existing policy and practice with respect to faculty, 
staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities 
were among the most important indicia of a segregated system." 
,. . 
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402 U.S., at 18. In a word, discriminatory student assign-
ment policies can themselves breed and manifest other 
inequalities built into a dual system founded on racial dis-
crimination. Federal courts need not, and cannot, close their 
eyes to inequalities, shown by the record, which flow from a 
long-standing segregated system. 
c 
In light of the mandate of Brown I and Brown II, 
federal courts have, over the years, often required the 
inclusion of compensatory or remedial programs in desegre-
gation plans to overcome the inequalities inherent in dual 
school systems. In 1966, for example, the District Court 
for the District of South Carolina directed the inclusion of 
remedial courses to overcome the effects of a segregated 
system: 
"Because the weaknesses of a dual school 
system may have already affected many children, 
the court would be remiss in its duty if any 
desegregation plan were approved which did not 
provide for remedial education courses. They shall 
be included in the plan." Miller v. School District 
Number 2, Clarendon, S.C., 256 F.Supp. 370, 377 
(D. S.C. 1966) . (Emphasis supplied.) 
In 1967, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, then engaged in 
overseeing the desegregation of numerous school districts in 
the South, laid down the following requirement in an ~n bane 
decision: 
"The defendants shall provide remedial 
education programs which permit students attending 
or who have previously attended segregated 
schools to overcome past inadequacies in their 
education ... United States v. Jefferson County 
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Board of Education, 380 F.2d 385, 394 
{CA 5), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 {1967). 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
See also Stell v. Board of Public Education for City of 
Savannah, 387 F.2d 486, 492, 496-497 (CA 5 1967); Hill v. 
LaFourche Parish School Board, 291 F.Supp. 819, 823 (ED La. 
1967); Redman v. Terrebone Parish School Board, 293 F.Supp. 
376, 379 (ED La. 1967); Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 
267 F.Supp. 458, 489 {MD Ala. 1967); Graves v. Walton 
County Board of Education, 300 F.Supp. 188, 200 {MD Ga. 1968), 
aff'd, 410 F.2d 1153 {CA 5 1969). Two years later, the 
Fifth Circuit again adhered to the rule that District Courts 
could properly seek to overcome the built-in inadequacies 
of an unconstitutionally unequal educational system: 
"The trial court concluded that the school 
board must establish remedial programs to assist 
students who previously attended all-Negro schools 
when those students transfer to formerly all-white 
schools .••• The remedial programs .•• are an integral 
part of a program for compensatory education 
to be provided Negro students who have long been 
disadvantaged by the inequities and discrimination in~ / 
herent in the dual system. The requirement that the~ 1 
School Board institute remedial programs so far as 
they are feasible is a proper exercise of the 
court's discretion.u Plaquemines Parish School 
Bd. v. United States, 415 F.2d 817, 831 {CA 5 
1969). (Emphasis supplied.) 
In the same year the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Louisiana required school authorities 
to come forward with a compensatory educational program as 
part of a desegregation plan. "The defendants shall provide 
remedial education programs which permit students * * * who 




inadequacies in their education." Smith v. St. Tammany Parish 
School Board, 302 F.Supp. 106, 110 (ED La. 1969), aff'd, 
448 F.2d 415 {CA 5 1971). See also Moore v. Tangipahoa 
Parish School Board, 304 F.Supp. 244, 253 (ED La. 1969); 
Moses v. Washington Parish School Board, 302 F.Supp. 362, 
367 {ED La. 1969). 
In the 1970's, the pattern has been essentially the 
same. The Fifth Circuit has, when the fact situation warranted, 
continued to call for remedial education programs in desegre-
gation plans. In 1971, for example, the Fifth Circuit affirmed 
a District Court's order designed, among other things, "to 
compensate for the abiding scars of past discrimination." 
United States v. State of Texas, 447 F.2d 441, 443 (CA 5 
1971), application for stay denied, 404 u.s. 1205 {1971) 
(Black, J. sitting as Circuit Justice). To that end, the 
approved plan required the: fbllowing: 
16/ 
"[C]urriculum offerings and programs 
shall include specific educational programs designed 1 / 
to compensate minority group children for unequal / 
educational opportunities resulting from past or 
presen·t racial and ethnic isolation •.•. " Id., 
at 448.16/ -
- In denying the stay application, Mr. Justice Black 
was untroubled by the underlying order of the District 
Court: 
"It would be very difficult for me to sus-
pend the order of the District Court that, in my 
view, does no more than endeavor to realize the 
directive of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
decisions of this Court that racial discrimination 
in the public schools must be eliminated root and 
branch." 404 U.S., at 1206. 
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See also George v. O'Kelly, 448 F.2d 145, 150 (CA 5 1971). 
And, as school desegregation litigation emerged in other 
regions of the country, federal courts have likewise looked 
in part to compensatory programs, when the record supported 
an order to that effect. See, ~' Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 
F.Supp. 216, 235 (D.Mass. 1975), aff'd, 530 F.2d 401 (CA 1 
1976), cert. denied, u.s. (1976); Hart v. Community 
School Board of Brooklyn, 383 F.Supp. 699, 757 (EDNY 1974), 
aff'd, 512 F.2d 37 (CA 2 1975T,c£Booker v. Special School 
Dist. Number 1, Minneapolis, Minn., 351 F.Supp. 799 (D.Minn. 
17/ 
1972).-
Finally, in addition to other remedial programs, which 
could, of course, if circumstances warranted, specifically 
include programs to remedy deficiencies in reading and communi-
cation skills, federal courts have expressly ordered special 
in-service training for teachers, see, e.g., United States v. --' --- --- ~ State of Missouri, 523 F.2d 885, 887 (CA 8 1975); Smith v. St. 
Tammany Parish School Board, supra, at 110; Moore v. Tanig-
pahoa Parish School Board, supra, at 253, and have altered or -even suspended testing programs employed by school systems 
17/ 
We do not, of course, pass upon the correctness of 
the particular holdings of cases we did not review. We 
simply note that these holdings support the broader propo-
sition that, when the record warrants, remedial or compen-
satory programs may be, in the exercise of equitable discre-
tion, appropriate remedies to treat the condition that offends 
the Constitution. Of course, it must be shown that the 
constitutional violation caused the condition for which 





undergoing desegregation. See, e.g., Singleton v. Jackson 
Municipal Separate School District, 419 F.2d 1211, 1219 
(CA 5 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1032 (1970); Lemon v. 
Bossier Parish School Board, 444 F.2d 1400, 1401 (CA 5 
1971); Arvizu v. Waco Independent School Dist., 373 F.Supp. 
1264 (WD Tex. 1973), rev'd in part on other issues, 495 
F. 2d 4 9 9 ( CA 5 19 7 4) . 
. 
These cases demonstrate that the District Court in the 
case before us did not break new ground in approving the 
School Board's proposed plan. Quite the contrary, acting 
'?" /l ,, 
~ . ~n abundant evidence in this recor~ the District Court approved 
,-- a remedial plan going beyond mere pupil assignments, as ex-
pressly approved by Swann and Montgomery County, supra. 
In so doing, the District Court was adopting specific programs, 
proposed by local school authorities who must be presumed to 
~~- .......____ -~ 
be familiar with the problems and the needs of a system 
18/ 
undergoing desegregation.--
We do not, of course, imply that the order here is a 
blueprint for other cases. That cannot be; in school 
18/ 
-- This Court has from the beginning looked to the 
District Courts in desegregation cases, familiar as they 
are with the local situations coming before them, to appraise 
the efforts of local school authorities to carry out their 
constitutionally required duties. "Because of their 
proximity to local conditions ... the [federal district] courts 
which originally heard these cases can best perform this 
judicial appraisal." Brown II, supra, at 299. 
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desegregation cases, " [ t] •here is no universal answer to 
complex problems .•• ; there is obviously no plan that will 
do the job in every case." Green, supra, at 439. Never-
theless, on this record we are bound to conclude that the j 
remedial decree before us was aptly tailored to fit the 
constitutional violation. Nor do we find any other reason 
to believe that the broad and flexible equity powers of the 
court were abused in this case. The established role of 
local school authorities was maintained inviolate· and, the 
remedy is indeed remedial. Th~ order does not p nish anyone, ~ 
nor does it impair or jeopardize the educational system in ~ 
Detroit. 
19/ 
The District Court, in short, was 
laid down in Brown II: 
"In fashioning and effectuati 
decrees, the courts will be guid by equitable 
principles. Traditionally, equ· y has been charac-
terized by a practical flexibi ty in shaping its 
remedies and by a facility fo adjusting and 
reconciling public and priva needs. These 
cases call for the exercise of these traditional 
attributes of equity power." 349 U.S., at 300. 
-- Indeed, the District Ju e took great pains to devise 
a workable plan. For example, e sought carefully to 
eliminate burdensome transpo ation of Negro children to 
predominantly Negro schools and to prevent the disruption, 
by massive pupil reassign nt, of racially mixed schools in 
stable neighborhoods whi had successfully undergone residen-
tial and educational c 
I 
~ 
" ... . ; 
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III 
Petitioners also contend that the District Court's order, 
even if otherwise proper, violates the Eleventh Amendment. 
In their view, the requirement that the state defendants pay 
one-half the additional costs attributable to the four educa-
tional components is, "in practical effect, indistinguishable 
from an award of money damages against the state based upon 
the asserted prior misconduct of state officials." Brief, 
at 34. Arguing from this premise, petitioners conclude 
that the "award" in this case is barred under this Court's 
holding in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 {1974). 
Edelman involved a suit for money damages against the 
20/ 
State,as well as for prospective injunctive relief.-- The 
suit was brought by an individual who claimed that Illinois 
officials had improperly withheld disability benefit payments 
to him and to the members of his class. Applying traditional 
Eleventh Amendment principles, we held that the suit was 
barred to the extent the suit sought "the award of an accrued 
monetary liability •.. " which represented "retroactive payments." 
Id., at 663-664. (Emphasis supplied.) Conversely, the Court 
20/ 
-- Although the complaint in Edelman ostensibly sought 
only equitable relief, the plaintiff expressly requested "'a 
permanent injunction enjoining the defendants to award to 
the entire class of plaintiffs all [disability] benefits wrong-
fully withheld.'" 415 U.S., at 656. 
, ..._.. . 
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upheld the suit to the extent it sought "payment of state 
funds ... as a necessary consequence of compliance in the 
future with a substantive federal-question determination •••• " 
Id., at 668. (Emphasis supplied.) 
The decree to share the future costs of educational 
components in this case fits squarely within the prospective-
compliance exception reaffirmed by Edelman. That exception, 
which had its genesis in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), 
permits federal courts to enjoin state officials to conform 
their conduct to requirements of federal law, notwithstanding 
a direct and substantial impact on the state treasury. 415 
U.S., at 15. The order challenged here does no more than 
that. The decree requires state officials, held responsible 
for unconstitutional conduct in findings which are not challen-
ged, to eliminate a de jure segregated school system. More 
precisely, the burden of state officials is that set forth 
in .§_wann -- to take the necessary steps "to eliminate from 
the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation." ..- 1"" 
402 U.S., at 15. The educational components, which the District 
Court ordered into effect prospectively, are plainly designed 
to wipe out continuing conditions of inequality produced by 




- No bright line can be drawn for Eleventh Amendment 
purposes on the basis that these programs were "compensatory" 
in nature. Unlike the award in Edelman, the injunction 
entered here could not instantaneously restore the victims of 
unlawful conduct to their rightful condition. Thus, the 
(footnote continued next page) 
'. 
' J. 
, - .. -
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These programs were not, and as a practical matter could 
not be, intended by one bold stroke to wipe the slate clean, 
22/ 
as could a retroactive award of money in Edelman.-- Rather, 
by the nature of the antecedent violation, the victims of 
Detroit 1 s de pre segregated system presently experience 
some of the effects of segregation and will continue to do 
so until such future time as the remedial programs make 
amends to dissipate those continuing effects of past miscon-
duct. Reading and speech deficiencies cannot be eliminated 
by judicial fiat; they will require time, patience, and the 
skills of specially trained teachers. That the programs are 
also "compensatory" in nature does not change the fact that they 
are part of a plan that operates prospectively to bring about 
the benefits of a unitary school system. Prospective relief 
23/ 
of this nature is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.--
21/ (continued) injunction here looks to the future, not 
simply-to presently compensating victims for conduct and 
consequences completed in the past. 
In contrast to Edelman, there was no money award here 
in favor of respondent Bradley or any members of his class. 
This case simply does not involve individual citizens 1 con-
ducting a raid on the state treasury for accrued monetary 
liability. It is wholly prospective in the same manner that -the 
decree mandates vocational schools and assignments, for example. 
23/ 
Because of our conclusion, we do not reach either 
of the two alternative arguments in support of the District 
Court 1 s judgment, namely that the State of Michigan expressly 
waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity by virtue of Mich. 
Stat. Annot. § 15.1023(7), and that the Fourteenth Amendment, 
ex proprio vigore, works a pro tanto repeal of the Eleventh 
Amendment. Cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
Neither question was addressed by the Court of Appeals, and 
we therefore do not pass on either issue. 
- 28 -
Finally, there is no merit to petitioners' claims that 
the relief ordered here violates the Tenth Amendment and 
general principles of federalism. The Tenth Amendment's 
reservation of non-delegated powers to the States is not 
implicated by a federal court judgment enforcing the express 
prohibitions of unlawful state conduct enacted by the Four-
teenth Amendment. Cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 
(1976). Nor are principles of federalism abrogated by 
the decree. The District Court has neither attempted to 
restructure local governmental entities, compare Rizzo v. 
Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1972), nor to mandate a particular method 
or structure of state or local financing. Cf. San Antonio 
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
The District Court has, instead, properly enforced the consti-
tutional guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment consistent 
with our prior holdings,and in a manner that does not jeopar-
dize the integrity of the structure or functions of state and 
local government. ~ 
' 1 / 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment. 
, 
The Court's opinion addresses this as if it were 
conventional desegregation litigation. The wide-ranging 
opinion reiterates the familiar general principles ar. awn 
from the li rie .of ~recedents commencing with !?~ow~. 
One has to read the opinion closely to understand that the 
case, as it finally reaches us, is wholly unique. Indeed, 
it is largely a non-case in terms of desegregation 
principles. 
f\01.~~~~~$ 
Normally, the/\in this type of litigatjon are 
students, parents and supporting organizations who desire 
to oesegregate a school system alleged to be the product, 
in whole or in part, of de_j_!:l_£~ segregative action by the 
public school ·authorities . 
...parents ai"'ttJ sappot t 1ng organ i zai! i:-eAY The principal 
defendant is the l ocal board of enucation or school 
board. Occasionally, the state board of education and 
public officials are joined as defendants. This 
protracted litigation commenced in 1970 in this 
conventional mold. In the interven i ng 
years, however, the posture of the litigation has changed 
so drasticall~ as to J.eave it largely a friendly suit 
( reseo~ ov-o..elllbf 1 e.+ !:1·) 
between the plaintiffs and the original principal 
1\. 
defendant, the Detroit School Board. These parties~ 
) 
antagonistic for years, have now joined forces apparentJy 
for the purpose of extracting funds from the state 
2. 
treasury. As between the original principal parties - the 
plaintiffs and the Detroit School Board - no case or 
controversy remains. The Board enthusiastically supports 
the entire desegregation decree even though the decree 
intrudes deeply on the Board's own decisionmaking powers. 
The plaintiffs favored a desegregation plan that would 
have required more extensive transportation of pupils, but 
they did not oppose the remedial educational components 
once they were proposed by the School Board. 1/ In -\..L 
this Court~hey, J ike the School Board, now support the 
decree of the District Court as affirmed by the Court of 
Appeals. 
The only complaining party here is the State of 
Michigan (acting through state officials), and its basic 
3. 
Co"\;\ Ct. n\S 
compJ aintA~s G¥€~ money, not~ deseg-regation. It has 
' been ordered to pay about $5,800,000 to the Detroit School 
Board. This is one half the estimated "excess cost" of 
four of the eleven educational components included in the 
desegregation decree: remedial reading, in-service 
training of teachers, testing, and counseling (see 
Appendix hereto). The State, understandably anxious to 
preserve the state budget from federal court control or 
interference, now contests the decree on two grounds. 
First, it is argued that the order to pay state 
funds violates the Eleventh Amendment and prjnciples of 
federalism. Ordinarily a federal court's order that a 
...,/ 
• 
state pay unappropriated funds to a locality would raise 
the gravest constitutional issues. See generally 
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodgriguez, 411 
U.S. 1, 40-42 (1973); National League of Cities v. !]~ery, 
426 U.S. 833 (1976). But here, in a finding no longer 
subjec~o review, the State has been adjudged a 
participant in the constitutional violation, and the State 
therefore may be ordered to participate prospectively in a 
remedy otherwise appropriate. 
The State's second argument is one that normally 
would be advanced vigorously by the jchool joard. Relying 
on the established principle that the scope of the remedy 
in a desegregation case js determined and limited by the 
extent of the constituti6nal violation, Milliken v. 
~!_adle_y, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974), the State argues that 
the District Court erred in ordering the system-wide 
expansion of the four educational components mentioned 
d. 
above. It contents that there has been no finding of a 
constitutional vioJ.ation with respect to the past 
operation of any of these programs, and it insists that 
without carefully focused findings of this sort, the 
3 
decree exceeded the court's powe~ ~/ 
This argument is by no means a frivolous one.}/ 
But the context in which it is presented is so unusual 
that it would be appropriate to dismiss the writ as 
improvidently granted . The argument is advanced by the 
State and not by the party primarily concerned. The 
4. 
educational programs at issue are standard and universally 
approved in public education.1/ The State Board 
normally would be enthusiastic over enhancement of these 
programs so long as the local school board could fund them 
without requiring financial aid from the State. It is 
equally evident that the State probably would resist a 
federal court order requiring it to pay unappropriated 
state funds to the Jocal school board regardless of 
whether violations by the local board justified the 
remedy. The State's interest in protecting its own budget 
- limited by legislative appropriations - is a genuine 
5. 
one. But it js not an interest that arises, or exists, 
because the desegregation remedy may have exceeded the 
extent of the violations. 
The State's reliance on the remedy jssue contains 
a further weakness making this case a sport, the decision 
of which hardly can have general application. There is no 
• 
indication that the State objected - certainJy, it does 
not object here - to the inclusion in the District Court's 
decree of the seven other educational components.~/ 
Inoeed, the State expressly agreed to one of the most 
expensive components, the establishment of vocatjonal 
education centers, in a stipulation obligating it to share 
the cost of construction equally with the Detroit Board. 
Mo'feove.~ 
See App. 139a-141a. Jince the District Court ' .s decree 
1\ 
largely embodies the original recommendation of the 
Detroit Board, and since local school boards "have the 
primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and 
solving [the] problems" generated by "[f]ull 
implementation of . 
Q., ,, 
. constitutional principljs in the 
local setting, Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 
299 (1955), the State's limited challenge here is 
particularly lacking in force. 
There are other aspects of this case ignored by 
the Court but which, in my opinion, undercut the relevancy 
6. 
of most of its opinion. First, a look at the District 
Court's perception of its problem. It found the structure 
of the Detroit school system "chaotic and incapable of 
effective administration." App. 124a. Its "general 
superintendent has little direct authority." Ibid. Each 
of the eight regional boards may be preoccupied 
# 
wit~'distribut[ing] local board patronage." App: J25a. 
The "local boards have diverted resources that would 
otherwise have been available for educational purposes to 
build new offices and other facilities to house this 
administrative overload~ Ibid. The District Court 
continued: 
"In addition to the administrative chaos, we 
know of no other school system that is so 
enmeshed in politics. *** Rather than devoting 
themselves to the educational system and the 
desegregative process, board members are busily 
engaged in politics not only to assure their 
own re-election but also to defeat others with 
whom they disagree." App. 125a-126a~ 
(footnote omitted). ~ 
Referring again to the "political paralysis" and 
"inefficient bureaucracy" of the system, the court also 
noted - discouragingly - that the election then 
approaching "may well [result in] a board of education 
consisting of members possessing no experience in 
education." App. 1 26a. Yet, it was a compliant Board. 
The District Court had complimented its rl::.lingness~ 
~ :Bozn~ to "implement any desegregation order the court 
may issue." App. 49a. 
7. 
·,f. is ~~!., 
In these quite remarkable circumstances~~~ere i• 
~'Y .M)t- ~ M- k>Hi~ 1~7 _ju~-h~c4tle, 
.t-itG-L e wonae~Athat the District Court virtuaJly assumed 
the role of school superintendent and, with the four 
"expert advisers" vJhom .it engaged, preempted major 
segments of the School Board's responsibility. The 
Appendix to this opinion summarizes the 11 principal 
educational elements in the court's oesegregation plan. 
Clearly they constitute a deep intrusion upon the lawful 
duties and responsibilities of elected school board 
members. It is the 150 printed pages of 
opinions and 15, 1975, through May Jl, 
1976, App. Ja-150a, that the Distrjct Court felt compelled 
_..-/ 
' 
to fill the void created by the "political paralysis," 
"inefficient bureaucracy," and "administrative chaos" 
found to exist in the Detroit school system at this 
critical juncture. ihe District Court 
::::: -
moved strongly and broadly to rehabilitate what it viewed 
as a school system in serious disarray. In so acting the 
-------=--:-:---=-~y courtE Judge DeMasico ~may well have made a major 
contribution to public education in Detroit. But the 
constitutional authority for assuming legisl~tive and 
administrative functions was dubious. The court made only 
the most generalized and tenuous findings of 
constitutional default as to the eleven remedial 
8. 
programs. The default, one of Jarge proportions as 
outlined by fhe District Court, was politjcal and 
bureaucratic. 
There is, however, a document in the record 
making clear that at one point the Detroit School Board 
was conscious of the possible consequences of abdicating 
• 
its responsibility. In its brief in the Court of Appeals, 
the Board expressed grave concern as to what the District 
Court's assumption of the Board's powers would do to the 
school system financially: 
" [ 0] n May 11 , 19 7 6 , . • . < ~ 
the District Court ordered equalization of 
all school facilities and buildings preparatory 
to the 1976-77 school term; continuance of the 
comprehensive construction and renovation ""' 
program; the institution of a reading and ' 
communication skills program together with the 
necessary in-service training therefor0 the 
institution of the testing program with the 
accompanying in-service training; institution 
of the counseling and career guidance program 
with the accompanying in-service training; the 
application of a formula for equal sharing of 
excess cost of implementing the educational 
components by the Detroit Board and the State 
Defendants; institution of the vocational 
education program; institution of a compre-
hensive program for bi-lingual/multi-ethnic 
studies; and institution of the in-service 
training program for implementation of the 
Uniform Code of Conduct. 
"Even without actual dollar figures, the 
financial impact of these orilers could easi!X 
oestroy the educational program of t~etroit 
School system. The financing of these compo-
nents by the Detroit school system would only 
mean a concomitant elimination of existing 
programs. 
"It is virtually impossible for the Detroit 
Board of Education to re-order its priorities 
when it is already operating on a woefully 
inadequate budget that cannot provide a minimal 
quality educational program. Any attempt to 
redistribute available resources will cause 
"fUrther deterioration 1n on-going educational 
programs and will merely result in robbing Peter 
to pay Paul." App. 189a (emphasis added)() 
9 . 
This is an extraordinary statement as to the 
potential consequences of the DistrJct Court ' s actions . 
Only one consideration can account for its presence in a 
brief filed by a party supporting the decree : the 
financially pressed Detroit Board evidently was willing to 
surrender a substantial portion of its decisionmaking 
• 
authority in return for the prospect of enhanced funding -
even while recognizing that the decree could endanger the 
city's educational program . The District Court had 
exercised its power to do what the state legislature has 
chosen not to do - appropriate funds from the state 
treasury for these particular programs of the Detroit 
~/ 
~ 
~-~· ;{chools . The statement quoted above was par.t of the 
Board's effort to persuade the Court of Appeals that it 
should sustain that portion of the District Court ' s 
order. Also there was hope for more financial aid . Only 
about $5,800,000 are at issue on this appeal, but the 
Distrlct Court retained jurisdiction and the Court of 
Appeals specified that its affirmance of the decree was 
"without prejudice to the right of the District Court to 
require a larger proportionate payment by the State of 
Michigan if found to be required by future developments." 
App. 180a. 
10. 
Given all these ususual circumstances, it seems 
to me that th~ proper disposition of this case is to 
dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. 
But being unable to persuade my Brothers to this 
prudential view, I join in the judgment as a result less 
likely to prolong the disruption of education in Detroit 
than a reversal or remand. In doing so, I emphasize the 
irrelevance of much of an opinion that for the most part 
addresses a case "that never was." 
Milliken footnotes 
N-1 
~pparentl~e plaintif~did not view~nlil;l 
ehe ca~~~ached-t~~~-€0tt~ the educational components as 
necessary or even important elements of a desegregation 
plan. These components were never included in plans 
submitted by the plaintiffs, and in briefs filed below 
there were indications that the plaintiffs viewed some -
if not all - of these components as being "wholly 
-~ 
unrelated toAsegregation of students and faculty in 
schools." See plaintiff's brief in the Court of Appeals, 
..... 
p. 5, 6. 
A 
2. The Court's opinion states that the District 
Court "expressly found that the two components of testing 
and counseling, as then administrered in Detroit's 
schools, were infected with the discriminatory bias of a 
segregated school system4Y Ante)at~ But the statement 
of the District Court relied upon did not make such a 
finding with respect to this case. It merely observed: 
The Distr~Court indulged in similar generalizations as 
justification for each of the educational components. I 
have been unable to identify a single, s pecific finding of 
de jure discrimination in the testing, counseling, 
guidance or in-service training programs of the Detroit 
system. Certainly none has been identified that would 
justify the extent of the remedies ordere~had those 
) 
N-2 
remedies been imposed by the court sua sponte, rather than 
at the suggestion of the local school board. 
3. There is language in the Court's opinion to 
the effect that the general finding, made in the initial 
stage of this litigation, of a de jure segregated school 
system is sufficient to justify the ordering of the 
educational components summarized in the Appendix hereto. 
If so read, it would be difficult to limit the authority 
of a court - once a school system was found to be 
~/ 
f 
segregated - to substitute its judgment for that of the 
school authorities as to all aspects of school 
operations. In this case, for example, 
~ 
the District ~~~ 
has assumed control over the and 
curriculum of five vocational technical 
schools. There was no finding of any specific 
constitutional violation with respect to Detroit's 
programs in vocational and tehnical education. Those 
programs may have been inadequate, but that does not make 
them unconstitutional. If the Court could assume this 
'· ' N-3 
educational role with respect to vocational and technical 
education, would there be any less justification for 
restructuring the entire curriculum? 
Once federal courts are allowed to enter the 
thicket of educational policy and practice, where can a 
principled line be drawn? The answer, I suggest, may be 
found in today's opinion in Dayton Board of Education v. 
Brinkman, No. 76-539, ante,at , which reiterates the 
settled doctrine that specific violations must be found, 
and that the Court must attempt to determine "how much 
incremental segregative effect these violations [have] 
had" on the particular school function at issue. Slip 
op., at 13-14. 
- 4. It is clear that the four educational 
., / 
I 
components at issue had not been neglected. The Detroit 
Board's budget allocations for the 1975-76 school year 
included a total of $75,989,000 for the four programs. 
The additional cost of the expanded programs was estimated 
to be $11,645,000, an increase of only 15%. Brief of 
Petitioners 12, 13. 
5. The appendix to this opinion identifies the 
degree to which the District Court assumed responsibility 
N-4 
for operating the school system. In almost every case, 
the court req~ired tha~ these programs be "comprehensivef.6/ 
and that plans for implementation ~e reviewed by the 
court. As the court retains continuing jurisdiction, 
there is no end ~ight to judicial - rather than 
legislative and administrative - operation of the Detroit 
schools. In my view, this is a denigration and weakening 
of the democratic process. 
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Appendix to Concurring Opinion of POWELL, J. 
This Appendix identifies and summariz~he 
remedial educational and administrative programs ordered 
by the District Court in its desegregation decrees of 
August 11, 1975, November 4 and 20, 1975, and May 11, 
1976. !/ The order appealed from is that of May 11, 
1976, but it specifically provides that "all previous 
orders of the court, not inconsistent with this judgment, 
shall remain in full force and 
effect • . . " App. 148a. These "educational 
components" were ordered in addition to the customary 
/JI/ 
./ 
elements of a desegregation decree, including pupil 
reassignment the transportation of some 22,000 pupils (to 
achieve a figure of not less than 30% black students in 
each school, with two minor exception~agnet schools, 
and provisions with respect to faculty. 
1. Reading. A "comprehensive program of 
reading instruction," including "in-service training of 
reading instructors, the necessary administrative staff to 
supervise a comprehensive reading program, and the 
evaluation, monitoring, record-keeping, and reporting 
!/rn addition to the reported decisions, 
referred to in the Court's opinion, all of the District 
Court's opinions and orders discussing and setting forth 
~these ~emedies® are contained in the Appendix filed with 
this case. References herein are to that Appendix. 
necessary to ensure the successful functioning of such a 
program." App. 127a. 
The foregoing program was supplemented in 
accordance with a recommendation from a "Monitoring 
Commission" previously appointed by the Court. As 
supplemented, it provided for "means to deal with the 
discovery 
children, 
of perceptual difficulties among school 
~adequate professional vision and hearing 
screening, and in-service training enabling teachers, 
first, to determine, whether such screening is necessary 
for students and second, to apply appropriate teaching 
strategies to accommodate perceptual difficulties." 
Ibid. The Court further ordered "the Board to specify 
how the mass media and community components will be 
utilized to reinforce the reading process . • • • Ibid. 
2. In-service Training. A "comprehensive 
in-service training program" was ordered, requiring "in-
service training in such fields as teacher expectations, 
human relations, minority culture, testing, the student 
code of conduct and the administration of discipline in a 
desegregated system for all school personnel," including 
staff. App. 73a, 128a. 
2. 
3. 
3. Counseling and Career Guidance. In its 
opinion and order of August 15, 1975, the Court ordered 
the school board to develop a "comprehensive program" for 
counselling and career guidance services "to the junior 
and senior high students in the Detroit system." App. 
8la, 95a. A plan was submitted and, although not fully 
described except by reference, was ordered by the decree 
of May 11, 1976, to "be implemented by the joint efforts 
of the defendants Detroit Board of Education and the State 
Board of Education." App. 128a, 146a. 
4. Testing. The Court ordered that the 
.., ~' 
Detroit Board "shall ~hwith review all tests curren~ly 
in use in the Detroit public schools, shall determine 
whether such tests are 'culture~ir,' and shall eliminate 
any racial, ethnic and/or cultural bias inherent in any 
testing apparatus used in the Detroit school system." 
App. 130a. In addition, the Board was ordered to 
"review and revise all instructions and procedures" to 
assure nondiscriminatory testing: to "develop and 
institute a program to train teachers and administrators 
in test administration procedures designed to ensure 
-+o 
nondiscriminatory treatment of students'~tablish ,, 
evaluation programs with systemwide 
A 
4. 
performance objectives and the development of objective 
testing procedures to measure growth for each performance 
objective." Ibid; see App. 78a-79a. 
5. Vocational Education Centers. The city 
and state Boards were ordered to "create [five] vocational 
centers devoted to in-depth occupational preparation in 
the construction trades, transportation and health 
services." App. 75a. ~/ In order to hasten 
implementation, two existing facilities were ordered to be 
converted promptly to use as vocational centers. App. 
75a-78a; 139a; 142a. 
6. Vocational Education. In connection with 
the new centers, the Detroit Board was ordered to 
"institute a vocational education program consistent with 
all of the memoranda and orders heretofore issued by the 
court and pursuant to the stipulations and resolutions 
~" ~c.ool.o.~ .._ t.Af '~ '"fka. C4) v...rt's o v-rJ.u.s. . 
submitted" :u•t•~~ ee ee.,rt 8•1ie~ App. 147a. See App. 
74a, 75a-7~ With respect to the two existing facilities 
~.c . to be converted to vocational centers, the jourt required 
2. The August 15, 1975, opinion speaks of 
the creation of four vocational centers. Ap rently these 
plans were modified, for all later papers to 
construction of five such centers. See, ~·~· App. 117a. 
u 
5. 
that the plan "contain detailed curricula": that the two 
centers operate on a "city-wide" basis, with a "racial mix 
. approach[ing] a ratio of 60% black and 40% white." 
App. 76a. Each of the vocational centers was ordered by 
J· t' · the l ourt to add an additional "grade 13 providing 
advanced offerings both for those students presently 
enrolled and for other students who have left the system 
within the past three years." Ibid. 
7. Technical Schools. The city and state 
Boards also were ordered to "create two new technical high 
schools in which business education will be the central 
part of the curriculum." App. 75a. The Detroit Board was .. / 
f 
required to "commission a study of the curricula to be 
established at the two technical high schools." App. 77a. 
Upon experts, ' 
, the Board 
App. 
77a-78a. 
8. Bilingual/Multi-ethnic Studies. Finding 
that "[m]ulti-ethnic studies are essential elements of the 
curriculum of any outstanding school system," the court's 
deseg~ion order provided for the inclusion of such 
6. 
studies in the school curriculum. The Board was "directed 
to reapply" to the federal government for funds, the 
application to "include provisions for in-service training 
for teachers involved in such programs." App. 82a, ]47a. 
9. Uniform Code of Student Conduct. The 
Board was directed in some detail to develop and implement 
a "Uniform Code of Conduct" relating to student rights and 
responsibilities. App. 79at;_ 148a. 
10. Co-Curricul The court's 
order required "the Board [to] develop for the court's 
approval a specific plan for co-curricul~ctivities 
.., _,/ 
! 
including an analysis of the costs involved." It was said 
that such a program "can acquaint students with the many 
fine institutions available in the Detroit area, which 
have indicated their interest in aiding the court in 
)) 
providing quality education to Detroit school children~ 
App. 82a. 
11. School-Community Relations. Viewed as 
an important remedial component of the desegregation 
program, the Board was ordered "to submit a detailed 
7. 
plan for a community relations program." App. 80a. In 
its May 11, 1976, opinion and decree, the court outlined 
in some detail the structure of the community relations 
program that it required the Board to implement. A "local 
school community relations committee [must be established] 
in each school." App. 132a (emphasis in original). Careful 
not to leave ~ortat~matters to chance, the court 
further required that "each committee shall elect a 
chairperson and develop procedural rules to govern its 
sessions." Ibid. In addition to the 20-member committee 
in each school, with its racial composition paralleling 
that of the school population, the court ordered a 
"regional school-community relations committee to 
coordinate the efforts of the local committees." These 
committees also must have a chairperson; "[m]eetings shall 
be held monthly in a facility selected by the regional 
board, and the regional board shall provide a secretary." 
App. 133a. Then, a "city-wide school-community relations 
council" was ordered by the court to "oversee the entire 
program." Ibid. In addition to prescribing the 
responsibilities, the court made sure that the citywide 
council was appropriately structured. It ordered 
subcommittees to be created as follows: 
8. 
(i) Public Information; (ii) Monitoring; (iii) Local 
Commit tee Liaison; ( i v) Community Liaison; (v) Parental 
Involvement; and (vi) Executive Committee. These 
subcommittees were ordered to convene twice a month, and 
the council must "meet in open session at least once a 
month." App. 13la-135a. 
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_1_1 Apparently the plaintiffs did not view, until 
the case reached this Court, the educational components 
cy 
as necessary or even important elements of a deseregation 
A 
plan. These components were never included in plans 
submitted by the plaintiffs, and in briefs filed below 
'1:' 
there were indications that the plaintiff viewed some -
1\ 
if not all - of these components as being "wholly unrelated 
to desegr egation of students and faculty in schoolJ.(} 




The ~ate asserts that the District 
ma~~of constitutional violation 
(i.e., discriminatory de ~action) with respect 
Court 
tour educational components at ~ssue. ) 
My reading of the record comports with the State's 
J 
position. 1 The Court's opinion~ states that 
the District Court "expressly found that the two 
components of testing and counseling, as then 
administered in Detroit's schools, were infected 
with the discriminatory bias of a segregated school 
system" Ante at !l._ . But the statement of the 
District Court relied upon did not make such a 
finding with respect to this case. It merely 
observed: 
"In a segregated system many tech-
nique~ deny equal protection of black 
students, such as discriminatory 
testing [and] discriminatory counseling ... " 
See ~ a is ==:/ /tr(· 3(.4 1 ezcJofe.,( ~) evf ft. 
~ 
The District Court indulged in similar generalizations 
as justification for each of the educational components. 
~ have been unable to identify a single, specific 
finding of de jure discrimination in the testing, 
counseling, guidance or in-service training programs 
of the Detroit system. Certainly none has been 
•' • 
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2 . 
identified that would j ustify the extent of the I 
I 
[1 ~~ "~e~ ~ ' ""t'"~ b-
remedies order o. _, s'l::l}9-r:-~ . 
~ c.o "' .... -{ Qf p,f.e.. ) ~ ... ~ J fl.-._ 
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:3 ; 
-There is language in the Court's opinion to 
the effect that the general finding, made in the initial 
stage of this litigation, of a de jure segregated school 
·' 
system is sufficient to justify the ordering of the 
educational components summarized in the Appendix 
hereto. If so read, it would be difficult to limit 
the authority of a court--once a school system was 
found to be segregated--to substitute its judgment 
for that of the school authorities as to all aspects 
of school operations. In this case, for example, 
the District Court has assumed control over the 
+-;"~ , -1 / 
creation, operation, and curriculum of ~~vocational 
education and two technical schools. There was 
no finding of any specific constitutional violation 
'J)4~,ts l .si~ 
with respect t oA vocat1onal and technical education. 
-rt. 0~ f'<"~ ~ 
~~may hav~ been inadequate, but that does not make 
~ 
~ unconstitutional. If the Court could assume this 
" 
educational role with respect to vocational and 
technical education, would there be any less justifi-
cation for restructuring the entire curriculum? 
6/6/77 LFP/tap Milliken--FN 
2. 
teaching of the social sciences, 
I 
be viewed as supportive of 
I 
regation process. And if a thirteenth 
grad/ is properly added in vocational education (as 
the court decreed) , could the court not have 
added grades in other courses as well? The District 
Court was dissatisfied with the counseling and ordere 
a more comprehensive program. Educators differ 
as to the appropriate ratio of counselors to pupils, 
just as they do as to teacher-pupil ratio. Are 
these professional judgments now to be made by 
federal courts? 
Once federal courts are allowed to enter the 
2"::: Y . ·e·· >--thicket of educat1onal policy and pract1ce) eciSIOii 
~here can a principled line be drawn? The 
\. yN..I kt to~ I I'\ ) 
answer, I suggest, ~today's opinion in Dayton Board 
No.7(, .. ~~'J 
of Education v. Brinkman, ante at , which reiterates A - -
the settled doctrine that specific violations must be 
found, and that the Court must attempt to determine 
"how much incremental segregative effect these 
violations [have] had" on i!:he i!l8mpQ&i.t.ieR gf --t!he 
s e~eei ~p~JQXjpQ Q~ ~n the particular school function 
Jl c1· cd 11· I&/ V 
at iSSUe • ~~ ~ I e C) r • ) ·~ ~ 
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§:{ It is clear that the four educational components 
J>~-\-f'oi t 
at issue had not been neglected. The~ Board's budget 
allocations for the 1975-76 school year included a total 
of $75,989,000 for the four programs. The additional 
cost of the expanded programs was estimated to be 
8"<"\e~ ~ Pe.~~~ 
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~The appendix to this opinionJr:dentif~ 
~the 11 "educational components" ~ icates the 
expansive degree to which the District Court assumed 
responsibility for operating the school system. 
In addition to the four programs at issue in this 
counseling and esting) , the Distr ct Court has 
assumed eff ctive operational 
educatio (including the c~ riculum and the add'tion 
of a ~h grade); bi-li gual and multi-ethn'c 
I 




and two technical hool~(o~ 
notably de ailed instructio s as to schoo 
~v:z "'1!<:"'---':!l:)...~ In almost" case, the court required that 
these programs be "comprehensivef.lJ and that plans 
for implementation be reviewed by the court. As the 
1 
6/6/77 lfp/ss/tap Milliken--FN 
2. 
court retains continuing jurisdiction, there is no 
end in sight to judicial -- rather than legislative 
and administrative--operation of the Detroit schools. 
In my view, this is a denigration and weakening 
of the democratic process. 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
.:§ltprtmt Qfltttrlltf tltt ~ttiftb ~ta±ttl 
~asfringtan. :!B. <!f. :!!JpJ!..;l 
June 7, 1977 
Re: No. 76-447 Milliken v. Bradley 
Dear Potter: 
I am sending to you and Lewis herewith a proposed 
rough draft of a ~etter to the Chief suggesting fairly 
modest changes in his present circulating opinion in 
Mjlliken v. Bradley. My main object has been to differ-
entiate the two cases from one another, and to make the 
Chief's opinion in Milliken less subject to over-broad 
construction by overly eager District Judges. I shall 
be available at almost any time on Wednesday, Thursday, 
or Friday to jointly discuss these or any counter pro-
posals you may have. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copy to Mr. Justice Powell 
WHRoRougho6/7/77 I 
Dear Chief: 
Although I v ted the other way at Conference in this 
case, I am prepared to at least concur in the result of your 
opinion in Milliken v. Bradley, and with sufficient· inducement 
could perhaps be 
~ 
consist of se~ee changes -.wb..ich would 
from the Dayton case~ 
from one another may cause confusion coming down about the 
same time. I think my purpose could be served by adding a 
sentence or two in text or footnote to your present opinion 
setting out a little more of the factual background of the 
"gory details" as originally found by the District Court, 
so as to show that in Detroit we have the "system-wide" vio-
lation which was not proven in Dayton. I would also like to 
- 2 -
see a sentence or two of explicit reference to the actions 
taken by the state in perpetuating the discriminatory system 
----------~--------
in Detroit. 
You refer briefly to these violations in your footnote 
1, on p. 2, and summarize accurately the extent of what was 
found. But I wo~ld appreciate seeing you add, either to this 
footnote or some other place you deem more appropriate, explicit 
reference to the District Court's language describing these 
violations: 
(1) Extensive use of racially significant 
optional attendance zones. 338 F.Supp at 
587, 593; 
(2) The practice of busing black students 
past - white schools to a black school further 
away, and vice verse. Id., at 588, 593. 
{3) The various construction decisions which 
certainly had the effect, and permitted the 
inference of an intent, to maintain the "dual" 
school system in Detroit. ~' a.t SS~-S~q.; ~2.-r;t:tJ .. 
I think it would be helpful if in the same footnote, or 
- 3 -
somewhere else, you could expressly say that these findings, 
together with those to which you already refer, described by 
the District Court as "a de jure segregated public school 
system", id., at 594, w~ere a classical example of 
a "system-wide" violation within a school district, in contrast 
to the findings of the District Court in the Dayton case. 
With reEpect to the participation of the state in the 
maintenance of the segregated system, I think it would not 
only strengthen the opinion, but make it less subject to misuse 
by District Judges, if you used a sentence to this effect: 
' • 
"When the Detroit school board attempted 
to voluntarily initiate an intra-district 
remedy to a~eliorate the effect of the past 
segregative practices, the Michigan legislature 
enacted a law forbidding the carrying out of 
this remedy." 338 F. Supp. at 589. 
Sincerely, 
To: Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. JusticE:· St . , \rt 
Mr. Jmtic"' ','11; t' 
Mr. Jl'c L" nn ' t i I 
Mr. Juc ' '' 
Mr. 
'I r'. ..; 
Mr. Ju .I J. (.. r ~ ' \, 
From: The Chief Jur, v teo 
Circulated: 
RN' il'culated: JUN 7 1977 
1st PRINTED DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 76-447 
William G. Milliken, Governor of 
the State of Michigan, et al., 
Petitioners, 
v. 
Ronald Bradley et al. 
On Writ of Certiora• to the 
United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit. 
[June -, 1977] 
MR. C:HIE;F JuSTICE BuRGER announced the opinion of the 
Court. 
We granted certiorari in this case to consider two questions 
concerning the remedial powers of federal district courts in 
school desegregation cases, namely, whether a District Court 
can, as part of a desegregation decree, order compensatory or 
remedial educational programs for schoolchildren who have I 
been subjected to past acts of de jure segregation, and 
whether, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, a federal 
c·ourt can require state officials found responsible for consti-
tutional violations to bear part of the costs of those programs. 
I 
This case is before the Court for the second time following 
our remand, Mill·iken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717 (1974) 
t Milliken I) ; it marks the culmination of seven years of 
litigation over de JUre school s0gregation in the Detroit Public 
School System. For almost six years, the litigation has 
foeusC'd exclusively on the appropriate remedy to correct offi-
C'ial acts of racial discrimination committed by both the 
Dc• troit School Board and the State of Michigan. No chal-f 
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lcnge is now made by the State or the local school board to J 
the prior findings of de jure segregation.1 
A 
In the first stage of the remedy proceedings, which we re- j 
viewed in Milliken I, supra, the District Court, after reviewing 
srveral "Detroit-only" desegregation plans, concluded that 
an interdistrict plan was required to "'achieve the greatest 
degree of actual desegregation ... [so that] no school, grade 
(J l' classroom [would be] substantially disproportionate to the 
overall pupil racial composition.'" 345 F. Supp. 914, 918 (ED 
Mich. 1972), quoted in Milliken I, supra, at 734. On those I 
premises, the District Court ordered the parties to submit 
plans for "metropolitan desegregation" and appointed a nine-
lllrmber panel to formulate a desegregation plan, which would 
encompass a "desegregation area" consisting of 54 school 
t I istricts. 
In June 1973, a divided Court of Appeals, sitting en ~anc, 
upheld the District Court's determination that a metropolitan-
wide plan was essential to bring about what the District Court 
had described as "the greatest degree of actual desegrega-
tion ... .'' 345 F. Supp., at 918. We reversed, holding that 
the order exceed appropriate limits of federal equitable au-
thority as defined in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board I 
of Educ., 402 U. S. 1, 24 (1971), by concluding that "as a 
1 The violation" of thr Detroit Board of Education, which included 
the improprr use of optional attendance zones, racially based transporta-
lion of ~c hoolchildrrn, improprr creation and alteration of attendance 
zone~, grade structure~. and feeder school patterns, are described in 
tlw Di~trict Court'~ initial "Ruling on Issue of Segregation." 338 F. 
~upp. 582, 587-588 (ED Mich. 1971). The District Court further found 
t hat , '·rt]he Statr and its agencies ... have acted directly to control 
and rna intain t hr pat trrn of ~(·grcgation in the Detroit schools." I d., 
;t( 589. Tho~e conclu~ion::; as to liability were affirmed on appeal, 484 
]i 2d 215, 221-241 (CA6 1973) , and were not challenged in this Court. 
UH U. S. 717 (1974) (Milfiken 1) . 
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matter of substantive constitutional right, [a] particular 
drgree of racial bala.nce" is required, and by subjecting other 
school districts, uninvolved with and unaffected by any con-
stitutional violations, to the court's remedial powers. 418 
C ~. 717 ( 1974). Proceedillg from the Swann standard 
''that the scope of the remedy is determined by the 
nu.ture and extent of tlw constitutional violation," we held 
that, on the record before us, there was no interdistrict viola-
tion calling for an interclistrict remedy. Because the District 
( 'ourt's "metropolitan remedy" went beyond the constitutional 
violation, we remanded the case for further proceedings "lead-
ing to prompt formulation of a decree directed to eliminating 
the segregation found to exist in the Detroit city schools, a 
r<>medy whirh has been delayed since 1970." Id., at 753.~ 
B 
DuP to the intervening death of Judge Stephen J. Roth, 
\\'ho had prcsic!Pd over the litigation from the outset, the case on 
rc'maud was rf'assigned to Judge Robert E. DeMascio. Judge 
DeMascio promptly ordered respondent Bradley and the 
Detroit Board to submit desegregation plans limited to the 
DPtroit school system. On April 1, 1975, both parties sub-
tnitted their proposed plans. Respondent Bradley's plan was 
limited solely to pupil reassignment; the proposal called for 
l'Xtensive tra11sportation of students to achieve the plan's 
~ SC'par:t1<' opinion,; wrn' fii<'CI in Milliken 1. MR. JusTICE STEWART, 
<'oncurring. ~tittC'd that thr metropolitan-wide rrmedy contemplated 
IJy thr Di~t rict C'ourt wa~ ··in rrror for the simple reason that the 
n•mrd.1· . .. was not rommemmrat<:> with the constitutional violation 
l<>lllld." !d., at 7.54. Di~><rnt ing opinions were filed by Mr. Justice 
Dungln><, :VIR .. lu"Trc~> \YH ITt•:, nne! Mu. JusTICE MARSHALL. The dis-
.-<C'nl ing opinion" took the posit ion, in brid, that the remedy was appro-
priatr, giwn thl' i:'taH· '~ umli~putrd constitutional violations, the control 
or local rduration by ~tatr authorities, and the manageability of any 
tt<'''''>Ntr.l· :l<linim~tmtiYl' modifications to effectuate a mc1ropolitan-wido 
ro•mt•d,·. 
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ultimate goal ·of assuring that every school within the district 
reflected, within 15 percentage points, the racial ratio of the 
school district as a whole.3 In contrast to respondent Brad-
ley's proposa1, the Detroit Board's plan provided for sufficient 
pupil reassignment to eliminate "racially identifiable white 
schools," while ensuring that "every child will spend at least a 
portion of his education in either a neighborhood elementary 
school or a neighborhood junior and senior high school." !d., 
at 1116. By eschewing racial ratios for each school, the 
Board's plan contemplated transportation of fewer students 
for shorter distances than respondent Bradley's proposal.4 
In addition to student reassignments, the Board's plan 
called for implementation of 13 remedial or compensatory 
programs, referred to in the record as "educational compo-
nents." These compensatory programs, which were proposed 
in addition to the> plan's provisions for magnet schools and 
vocational high schools, included three of the four components 
at issue in this case-in-service training for teachers and 
administrators, guidance and counseling programs, and re-
vised testing procedures.5 Pursuant to the District Court's 
:J ArC'ording to the then most rerent statistical data, as of September 27, 
1974, 257 ,;~96 studrnts were enrolled in the Detroit public schools, a 
rignrr which rcHectrd a decrease of 28,116 students in the system since 
thr 1960- 1961 tithool year. 402 F. Supp. 1096, 1106-1107. Of this total 
~ turlrnl population, 71.5% wrrr Negro and 26.4% were white. The re-
maining; 2.1% was eomprised of studentti of other ethnic groups. !d., 
af 1106. 
' l ' ndrr rc·~]l(ll1dC'nt Brndley'H proposrd plan in the remand proceedings, 
71,;349 ~fudrnts would havr rrquired transportation; the Detroit Board's 
plnn, howewr, proYidrd for tnlll~portation of 51,000 students, 20,000 less 
than thr Bradle~· pla11. Thr Board's plan, which the District Court found 
1nfirm brratN' of an irnprrmii:'i:iible usr of ' ':lrbitrary" racial quotas, con- I 
trmplatrd arlurving; a 40C;{-60% repr<'.-;Pnlation of Negro students in the 
1drntifiahl~· while school~ . whil e• !PaYing untouched in terms of pupil re-
. ,,~ignnH'nt . srhoob in t h rec• of f hr DPt roit systrm's eight regions. Those 
till'!'(' n•gion:-; , which wrr<' locat!'d in the central city, were overwhelmingly 
'-'<'gro in rnf'ial compo~ilion 
r. Tlw fourth ('omporwnf , n rrnwdial reading and communciations skills 
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direction, the State Department of Education 1) on April 21, 
1975, submitted a critique of the Detroit Board's desegregation 
plan; in its report, the Department opined that, although 
"[i] t is possible that none of the thirteen 'quality education' 
components is essential ... to correct the constitutional vio-
lation .... ", eight of the 13 proposed programs nonetheless 
deserved special consideration in the desegregation setting. 
Of particular relevance here, the State Board said: 
"Within the context of effectuating a pupil desegrega-
tion plan, the in-service training [and] guidance and 
counseling ... components appear to deserve special 
emphasis." Id., at 38-39.7 
AftC'r receiving the State Board's critique,8 the District 
Court conducted extensive hearings on the two plans over a 
program, \,·as proposed later and was endorsed by the Bradley respondents 
in :t critique of the Detroit Board's proposed plan. See n. 7, infra. 
The Board's plan also called for the following "educational components": 
ti<'hool-communit~· relations, parental involvement, student rights and 
responsibilities, accountability, curriculum design, bilingual education, 
multicthuic curriculum, and cocurricular activities. 402 F . Supp., at 
1118. 
n I11 addition to the State Board of Education, the state defendants 
mclude the Governor of Michigan, the Attorney General, the State Super-
intendent of Public Instruction, and the State Treasurer. 
'Two months later, the Bradley respondents also submitted a critique 
of the Board's plan ; while criticizing the Board's proposed educational 
components on several grounds, respondents nonetheless suggested that 
a remedial reading program was particularly needed in a desegregation 
plan. See n. 5, sup1·a. The Bradley respondents claimed more generally 
that the Board'~:> phm failed to inform the court of the then current extent 
of such programs or components in the school system and that the 
plan failed to assess "the relatedness of the particular component to 
desegregation." 
s The other ::;tate defendants likewise filed objections to the Detroit 
Board's plan on April 21, 1975. They contended, in brief, that the 
court's remrd~· was limited to pupil reassignment to achieve desegregation; 
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two-month period. Substantial testimony was adduced with 
respect to the proposed educational components, including 
testimony by petitioners' expert witnesses.9 Based on this 
evidence and on reports of court-appointed experts, the Dis-
trict Court on August 11, 1975, approved, in principle, the 
Detroit Board's inclusion of remedial and compensatory edu-
cational components in the desegregation plan.10 
"We find that the majority of the educational com-
ponents included in the Detroit Board plan are essentia] 
for a school district undergoing desegregation. While it is 
true that the delivery of quality desegregated educational 
u For example, Dr. Charles P. Kearney, Associate Superintendent for 
Research and School Administration for the Michigan Department of 
Educ;ilion, gavE> the following; te~timony: 
.. [T]he State Board and the Superintendent indicated that guidance 
and counselling nppeared to deserve special emphasis in a desegregation 
dl'ort." 
"We support the notion of a guidance and counselling effort. We think 
it certainly does have a relationship in the desegregation effort, we 
\hink it de~Prves special emphasis." 
As to in-srrvice trnining, Dr. Kearney testified that, in his opinion, 
>'11Ch a program was required to implement effectively a desegregation 
plan iu Detroit. Trnn~cript, Vol. XXX, at 179, 187. Finally, even 
I hough thr State's critiqtH' did not deem testing as deserving of "special 
empha;;is" in the cleHrgrrgation plan, Dr. Kearney stated as follows: 
"Q: ... LD]o you sec a direct relationship between testing and 
drsrgrcgation '? 
''A: If te::;t result;; wrre inappropriatdy used, ... I think it would 
havr rertainly a discriminatory affect [sic] and it would have a negative 
affect , I'm sure on any kind of desegregation plan being implemented." 
/d., at 184. 
1 (}The DiHtrict Comt did not approve of all aspects of the Detroit 
Board's plan. With re,.:prct to rducational components, the court said: 
''The plan a~ :oulnnitted ... dors not distinguish between those eompo-
nrnt~ that are neri'Nsary lo the successful implementation of a desegrega-
tion plan and thn:Je ore not." 402 F . Supp., at 1118. (Emphasis 
.-.upplird.) 
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services is the obliga.tion of the school board, nevertheless 
this court deems it essential to mandate educational com-
ponents where they are needed to remedy effects of past 
segregation, to assure a successful desegregative effort and 
to minimize the possibility of resegregation." 402 F. 
Supp., at 1118. 
The District Court expressly found that the two components 
t>f testing and counseling, as then administered in Detroit's 
schools, were infected with the discriminatory bias of a segre-
gated school system: 
"In a segregated system many techniques deny equal 
protection to black students, such as discriminatory test-
ing [and I discriminatory counseling ... . " Ibid. 
The District Court also found that, to make desegregation 
\\'Ork, it was necessary to include remedial reading programs 
and in-service training for teachers and administrators: 
"In a system undergoing desegrega.tion, teachers will 
require orientation and training for desegregation. . .. 
Additioually, we find that ... comprehensive reading 
programs are essential ... to a successful desegregative 
effort." Ibid. 
Having established these general principles, the District 
Court formulated several "remedial guidelines" to govern the 
Detroit Board 's development of a final plan. Declining "to 
substitute its authority for the authority of elected state and 
local officials to decide which educational components are 
beneficial to the school community," id., at 1145, the District 
Judge laid down the following guidelines with respect to each 
of the four educational components at issue here : 
(a) Reading. Concluding that "[t]here is no educational 
component more directly associated with the process of deseg-
regation than reading," id., at 1138, the District Court directed 
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It remedial reading and commuuications skills program "[t]o 
~radicate the effects of past discrimination .... " Ibid. Th~ 
content of the required program was not prescribed by 
the court; rather, formulation and implementation of the 
program was left to the Superintendent and to a committee 
to be selected by him. 
(b) In-Service Training. . The court also directed the 
Detroit Board to formulate a comprehensive in-service teacher 
training program, an element "essential to a system under-
going desegregation." I d., at 1139. In the District Court's 
view, an in-service training program for teachers and adminis-
trators, to train professional and instructional personnel to 
cope with the desegregation process in Detroit, would tend to 
ensure that all students in a desegregated system would be 
treated equally by teachers and administrators able, by virtue 
of special training, to cope with special problems presented by 
rlesegregation, and thereby facilitate Detroit's conversion to a 
unitary system. 
(c) Testing. Because it found, based on record evidence, 
that Negro children "are especially affected by biased testing 
procedures," the District Court determined that, frequently, 
minority students in Detroit were adversely affected by dis-
criminatory testing procedures. Unless the school system's 
tests were administered in a way "free from racial, ethnic or 
cultural bias," the District Court concluded that Negro chil-
dren in Detroit migh't thereafter be impeded in their educa-
tional growth. !d., at 1142. Accordingly, the court directed 
the Detroit Board and the State Department of Education to 
institute a testing program along the lines proposed by the 
local school board in its original desegregation plan. Ibid. 
(d) Counseling and Career Guidance. Finally, the Dis-
trict Court addressed what expert witnesses had described as 
psychological pressures on Detroit's students in a system 
undergoing desegregation. Counselors were required, the 
court concluded, both to deal with the numerous problems and 
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tensions arising in the change from Detroit's dual system, and, I 
more concretely, to counsel students concerning the new voca• 
tional and technical school programs available under the plan 
through the cooperation of state and local officials.11 
Nine months later, on May 11, 1976, the District Court 
entered its final order. Emphasizing that it had "been care-
ful to order only what is essential for a school district under-
going desegregation," Appendix, at 117a, the court ordered the 
Detroit Board and the state defendants to institute compre-
hensive programs as to the four educational components by 
the start of the September 1976 school term. The cost of 
these four programs, the court concluded, was to be equally 
borne by the Detroit School Board and the State. To carry ) 
out this cost-sharing, the court directed the local board to 
calculate its highest budget allocation in any prior year for 
the several educational programs and, from that base, any 
excess cost attributable to the desegregation plan was to be 
paid equally by the two groups of defendants responsible for 
prior constitutional violations, i. e., the Detroit Board and the 
·tate defendants. 
c 
On appeal, the Court of Appeais for the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed the District Court's order concerning the implemen-
tation of and cost-sharing for the four educational com- l 
ponents.12 The Court of Appeals expressly approved the 
11 In contrast to their position before the District Court with respect 
Lo the four educational components at issue here, the state defendants, 
I hrough the State Department of Education, voluntarily entered into 
<l stipulation with the Detroit Board on February 24, 1976, under which 
th<' Stat(' agreed to provide 50% of the construction costs of five vocational 
centers which the District Court ordered to be established. Appendix, 
at 14la. 
12 The Court of Appeals disapproved, however, of the District Court's 
failure to include three of Detroit's eight regions in the pupil assignment 
plan . Ser n. 4, supra. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to 
the Di~trirt Court for further consideration of the three ommitted regions, 
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District Court's findings as to the necessity for these com-
pensatory programs: · 
"This finding . . . is not clearly erroneous, but to the 
contrary is supported by ample evidence. 
"The need for in-service training of the educational 
staff and development of non-discriminatory testing is 
obvious. The former is needed to insure that the teach-
ers and administrators will be able to work effectively in 
a desegregated environment. The latter is needed to 
insure that students are not evaluated unequally because 
of built-in bias in the tests administered in formerly 
segregated schools. 
"We agree with the District Court that the reading and 
counseling programs are essential to the effort to combat 
the effects of segregation. . . . Without the reading and 
counseling components, black students might be deprived 
of the motivation and a.chievement levels which the 
desegregation remedy is designed to accomplish." 540 F. 
2d 229, 241 (CA6 1976). 
After reviewing the record. the Court of Appeals confirmed 
that the District Court relied largely on the Detroit School 
Board in formulatillg the decree: 
"This is not a situation where the District Court 
'appears to have acted solely according to its own notions 
of good educational policy unrelated to the demands of 
the Constitution.'" !d., at 241-242, quoting Keyes v. 
School District, 521 F. 2d 465, 483 (CAlO 1975), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976). 
After upholding the remedial-components portion of the 
I JUt clcclinPd to ~E't fori h guid<:>lines, given the practicabilities of the 
s it un t.ion, for the Dis I rict Court's benefit. Further proceedings were 
dt·emed appropriate, however, particularly since the Bradley respondents 
hnd pr(•viou~l~· lJpcn g;nwt eel leave to file a 8econd amended complaint to 
ullcge intPrdi~trirt viol:tfions on the part of the st.o'tte and local defendants. 
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p1an, the Court of Appeals went on to affirm the District/ 
Court's allocation of costs between the state and local officials. 
Analyzing this Court's decision in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 
F. S. 651 ( 1974), which reaffirmed the rule that the Eleventh 
Amendment bars an ordinary suit for money damages against I 
thr State without its consent, the Court of Appeals held that 
the District Court's order 
11 
••• imposes no money judgment on the State of 
Michigan for past de jure segregation pra.ctices. Rather, 
the order is directed toward the State defendants as a 
part of a prospective plan to comply with a constitutional 
requirement to eradicate all vestiges of de jure segrega-
tion." 540 F. 2d, at 245. (Emphasis supplied.) 
The Court of Appeals remanded the case for further considera-
tion of the three central city regions untouched by the 
District Court's pupil reassignment plan. See n. 12, supra. 
The state defendants then sought review in this Court, 
challenging only those portions of the District Court's com-
prehensive remedial order dealing with the four educational 
components and with the State's obligation to defray the costs 
of those programs. We granted certiorari, 429 U. S. -
(1976), and wr affirm. 
II 
This Court has not previously addressed directly the ques-1 
tion whether federal courts can order remedial education pro-
grams as part of a school desegregation decree.13 However, 
B In Swann Y. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 
1 ( 1971), the Court affirmed an order of the District Court which 
includrd a rrquirrment of in-;;rrvice training programs. 318 F. Supp. 
7R6, 800 (WDNC 1970) . Howevrr, this Court's opinion did not treat the 
prrcisr point . In Keyes Y. Sr·hool District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 
.J-1:3 U.S. 189 (1973), the Court expressly avoided passing on the 
, District C'oun ';; holding that callrd for, among other things, "compensa-
tory education in an integrated environment." ld., at 214 n. 18. 
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the general principles governing our resolution of this issue 
are well settled by the prior decisions of this Court. In the 
first case concerning federal courts' remedial powers in elimi-
nating de jure school segregation, the Court laid down the 
basic rule which governs to this day : "In fashioning and 
effectuating the [desegregation] decrees, the courts will be 
guided by equitable principles." Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 349 U. S. 294, 300 (1955) (Brown II) . 
A 
Application of those "equitable principles," we have held, 
requires federal courts to focus upon three factors. In the 
first place, like other equitable remedies, the nature of the 
desegregation remedy is to be determined by the nature and 
scope of the constitutional violation. Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, supra, at 16. The remedy 
must therefore be related to "the condition alleged to offend 
the Constitution .... " Milliken I, supra, at 738.14 Second, 
~he decree must indeed be remedial in nature, that is, it 
must be designed as nearly as possible "to restore I 
the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they 
would have occupied in the absence of such conduct." !d., at 
746. 1" Third, the federal courts in devising a remedy must 
t 4 Thus, the Court has con::;i:;l ently held that the Constitution is not 
,·tolntrcl br racial imbalancr in thr schools, without more. Pasadena City 
/Jvard of Educ. v. 0pangler, 427 U. S. 424, 434 (1976) ; Milliken I, 
~upra, at 76:3 (Wn t•n;, .T ., di::;::;enting) ; Swann, supra, at 26. An order 
9ontrmplatinp; thr "·~ub:;tantive right [to a] particular drgree of racial 
l>:tlancr or mixing'" is therefore infirm as a matter of law. Spangler 
.;npra, at 4:3-t 
'r. Since tlw ultimate objectivr of the remedy is to make whole the 
1·ictimti of tmlawful conduct, fedrral court;:; are authorized to implement 
plan~ that promi~e "rPali,;tically to work now." Green v. 
Count.IJ 8rhool Board of New Kent County, 391 U. S. 430, 
l:lg (196H) At th<' ~nnw timr, the Comt has carefully stated 
1 hat. to rn~urp t hal frderal eo111'1 decrees are characterized by the flexibility 
·11 td srn~itivi t y rrqlllred of rquilable decrers, considrration must be given 
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take into account the interests of state and local authorities 
in managing their own affairs, consistent with the Constitu-
tion. In Brown II the Court squarely held that " [ s] chool 
authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, 
assessing. and solving these problems ... .'' 349 U. S., at 299. 
(Emphasis supplied.) If, however, "school authorities fail in 
their affirmative obligations ... judicial authority may be 
invoked." Swa·nn, supra, at 15. Once invoked, "the scope of 
a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is 
broad. for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable 
rf'J'nedies. '' Ibid. 
B 
Ill challenging the order before us, petitioners do not spe-
cifically question that the District Court's mandated programs 
are designed, as nearly as practicable, to restore the school- I 
children of Detroit to the position they would have enjoyed 
absent constitutional violations by state and local officials. 
And, petitioners do not contend, nor could they, that the 
prerogatives of the Detroit School Board ha.ve been abrogated 
by the decree, since of course the Detroit School Board itself 
proposed incorporation of these programs in the first place. 
Petitioners' sole contention is that, under Swann, the 
District Court's ord0r exceeds the scope of the constitu-
tional violation. Invoking our holding in Milliken I, supra, 
petitioners claim that, since the constitutional violation found 
to bnrd('ll~om r dTrct;; rrsulting from a decree that could "either risk 
thP health of the children or significantly impinge on the educational 
proceHH... 8wann , suwa. at 30-31. Our function, as stated by MR. 
Jr:-;'I'ICE vVH T'l'E , i~ ·•to dr~egregate an educational system in which the 
races havr !wen kept apart without, at the sa,me time, losing sight of 
til<• crntral educational fun('(ion of the schools ' ' Milliken I, supra, at 
;ti I (di~.-TJJ I ing opmion) . (Fmph:-t~is in original.) In a word, "There 
·1r<' undoubt<·d prart irn l a~ well as legal limits to the remedial powers 
<lf fc>drr:ll rourt~ in ~rhool de~egregation cases." Id., at 763. Cf. Austin 
Independent Schoof Dist . v. United States, - U. S. - (1976) 
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by the District Court was the unlawful segregation of students 
on the basis of race. the court's decree must be limited to 
remedying unlawful pupil assignments. This contention 
misconceives the principle petitioners seek to invoke, and we 
reject their argument. 
The well-settled principle that the nature and scope of 
the remedy is to be determined by the violation means simply 
that federal court decrees must directly address and relate to 
the constitutional violation itself. Because of this inherent 
limitation upon federal judicial authority, federal court 
decrees exceed appropriate limits if they are aimed at elimi-
nating a condition that does not violate the Constitution or 
does not flow from such a violation, see Pasadena City Board 
of Educat·ion v. Spangler, supra, or if they are imposed upon 
governmental units that were neither involved in nor affected 
by the constitutional violation, as in Milliken I, supra. Hills 
\'. Gautreaux, 425 U. S. 284, 292-296 (1976). But where, as 
here, a constitutional violation has been found, the remedy I 
does not "exceed" the violation, if the remedy is tailored to 
cure the "condition that offends the Constitution." Milliken I, 
supra, at 738. (Emphasis supplied.) 
The "condition" offending the Constitution is Detroit's de 
i'u.re segregate-d school system. This condition, which the 
District Court was obliged to correct, is not, under our hold- f 
ings, necessarily or invariably cured completely by simply 
establishing schools on a nonracial basis, although that is the 
key step in the remedial process. Our cases recognize that the 
evil is, more broadly, a dual school system with all its attending \ 
mequities. A unanimous Court speaking through Chief Justice 
Warren held in Bratvn I: "Separate educational facilities are 
inherently unequal." Brow·n v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 
483, 495 (1954). And in United States v. Montgomery 
County Board of Educatiun, 395 U. S. 225 (1969), the Court 
concerned itself not with pupil assignment, but with the 
riesegregation of faculty and staff. In doing so, the Court, 
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there speaking through Mr. Justice Black, focused on the 
reason for judicial concerns going beyond pupil assignment: 
"The dispute ... deals with faculty and staff desegregation, a 
goal that we have recognized to be an important aspect of 
the basic task of achieving a public school system wholly free 
from racial discrimination." 395 U. S., at 231-232. (Empha-
SIS supplied.) 
Montgomery County therefore stands firmly for the propo-
sition that matters other than pupil assignment must on occa-
sion be addressed by federal courts to eliminate the effects of 
prior segregation. Similarly, in Swann, we reaffirmed the 
principle laid down in Green v. County School Board, supra, 
that "existing policy and practice with respect to faculty, 
taff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities 
were among the most important indicia of a segregated sys-
tem." 402 U. S., at 18. In a word, discriminatory student 
assignment policies can themselves breed and manifest other 
inequalities built into a dual system founded on racial dis-
crimination. Federal courts need not, and cannot, close their 
eyes to inequalities, shown by the record, which flow from a 
longstanding segregated system. 
c 
In light of the mandate of Brown I and Brown II, federal 
courts have, over the years, often required the inclusion of 
remedial programs in desegregation plans to overcome the 
inequalities inherent in dual school systems. In 1966, for 
example, the District Court for the District of South Carolina 
directed the inclusion of remedial courses to overcome the 
effects of a segregated system: 
"Because the weaknC'sses of a dual school system may 
have already affected many children, the court would be 
remiss in its rluty if any desegregation plan were approved 
which did not provide for remedial education courses. 
They shall be included in the plan " Miller v. School 
16 
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District Number 2, Clarendon, S. C., 256 F. Supp. 370, 
377 (D. S.C. 1966). (Emphasis supplied.) 
In 1967, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, then engaged in 
overseeing the desegregation of numerous school districts in 
the South, laid down the following requirement in an en bane 
decision: 
"The defendants shall provide remedial education pro-
grams which permit students attending or who have 
previously attended segregated schools to overcome past 
inadequacies in their education." United States v. Jef-
ferson County Board of Education, 380 F. 2d 385, 394 
(CA5), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 840 (1967). (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
• ee also Stell v. Board of Public Education for City of Savan-
nah, 387 F. 2d 486, 492, 496-497 (CA5 1967); Hill v. 
LaFourche Parish School Board, 291 . F. Supp. 819, 823 (ED 
Ln. H)67); Redman v. Terrebone Parish School Board, 293 F. 
Supp. 376, 379 (ED La. 1967); Lee v. Macon County Board 
nf Education, 267 F. Supp. 458, 489 (MD Ala. 1967); Graves 
v. Walton County Board of Education, 300 F. Supp. 188, 200 
(MD Ga. 1968), aff'd, 410 F. 2d 1153 (CA5 1969). Two years 
Iuter. the Fifth Circuit again adhered to the rule that District 
C'ourts could properly seek to overcome the built-in ina.de-
q uneies of a past segregated educational system: 
"The trial court concluded that the school board must 
establish remedial programs to assist students who previ-
ously attended all-Negro schools when those students 
transfer to formerly all-white schools . . . . The remedial 
j)rograms . . . are an integral part of a program for 
CO?npensatory education to be provided Negro students 
who have long been disadvantaged by the inequities and 
discrimination inhere11t in the dua.l system. The require-
ment that the School Board institute remedial programs 
so far as they are feasible is a proper exercise of the 
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court's discretion." Plaquemines Parish School Bd. v. 
United States, 415 F. 2d 817, 831 (CA5 1969). (Empha-
sis supplied.) 
In the same year the United States District Court for the 
Rastern District of Louisiana required school authorities to 
eome forward with a remedial educational program as 
part of a desegregation plan. "The defendants shall provide 
!"('medial education programs which permit students ... who 
have previously attended a.ll-Negro schools to overcome past 
inadequacies in their education." Smith v. St. Tammany 
1-'arish School Board, 302 F. Supp. 106, 110 (ED La. 1969), 
aff'd. 448 F. 2d 415 (CA5 1971). See also Moore v. Tangi-
pahoa Parish School Boa.rd, 304 F. Supp. 244, 253 (ED La. 
1969); Moses v. Washington Parish School Board, 302 F. 
:-lupp. 362, 367 (ED La. 1969). 
In the 1970's, the pattern has been essentially the same. 
The Fifth Circuit has, when the fact situation warranted, 
continued to call for remedial education programs in desegre-
gation plans. E. g., United States v. State of Texas, 447 F. 2d 
441, 443 ( CA5 1971), application for stay denied, 404 U. S. 
1205 ( 1971) (Black, J .. sitting as Circuit Justice). To that 
l'ml. the approved plan in United States v. Texas required: 
"[Cl urriculum offerings and programs shall include 
specific educational programs designed to compensate 
minority group children for unequal educational oppor-
tunities resulting from past or present racial and ethnic 
isolation .... " I d., at 448.16 
. ee also George v. O'Kelly, 448 F. 2d 145, 150 (CA5 1971). 
tn In denying the :;lay application, Mr. Justice Black was untroubled 
by the underlying order of the District Court: 
"It would be very difficult for me to suspend the order of the District 
Conrt that, in m)· view, does no more than endeavor to realize the 
directive of the Fourteen1h Amendment and the decisions of this Court 
that rncial di:;crimination in the public schools must be eliminated root 
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And, as school desegregation litigatiOu emerged in other 
regions of the country, federal courts have likewise looked in 
part to remedial programs, when the record supported 
an order to that effect. See, e. g., Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 
F. Supp. 216, 235 (Mass. 1975), aff'd, 530 F. 2d 401 (CAl 
1976), cert. denied,- U.S.- (1976); Hart v. Community 
School Board of Brooklyn, 383 F. Supp. 699, 757 (EDNY 
1974), aff'd, 512 F. 2d 37 (CA2 1975); cf. Booker v. Special 
School Dist. Nurnbe1· 1, Minneapolis, Minn., 351 F. Supp. 799 
(Minn. 1972).17 
Finally, in addition to other remedial programs, which 
could, if circumstances warranted, include programs to 
rrmedy deficiencies particularly in reading and com-
munication skills, federal courts have expressly ordered special 
m-service training for teachers, see, e. g., United States v. 
tate of Missouri, 523 F. 2d 885, 887 (CA8 1975); Smith v. 
&t. Tamn1-any Parish School Board, supra, at 110; Moore v. 
'fanigpahoa Parish School Board, supra, at 253, and have 
altered or even suspended testing programs employed by 
school systems undergoing desegregation. See, e. g., Single-
ton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 419 F. 2d 
1211, 1219 (CA5 1969), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 1032 (1970); 
lJemon v. Bossier Parish School Board, 444 F. 2d 1400, 1401 
(CA5 1971); Arvizu v. Waco Independent School Dist., 373 
F. Supp. 1264 (WD Tex. 1973), rev'd in part on other issues, 
495 F. 2d 499 (C'A5 1974) . 
These cases demonstrate that the District Court in the case 
before us did not break new ground in approving the School 
Board's proposed plan. Quite the contrary, acting on abun-
H Wr do not, oi' cour::;e, pa:<s upon the corrrctness of the particular 
holdin~;; of cn~e::; we did not rrvirw. We ·imply note that these holdings 
-<npport. i he IJroadN proposition that , when the record warrants, remedial 
pro~l':lm!:i ma~· hr, in t.hr rxNriHr of equitable discretion, appropriate 
n ·mPdir::; to t rrat I he ronrlition that offrnds the Constitution. Of course, 
11 mu~t br ~hown that thr cou~titutional violation caused the condition 
lor whi ch rrmrdinl programs nrr mandatrd , 
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dant evidence in this record, the District Court approved a 
remedial plan going beyond mere pupil assignments, as 
expressly approved by Swann and Montgomery County, supra. 
In so doing, the District Court was adopting specific programs J 
proposed by local school authorities, who must be pres~ to \lm -t. 1 
be familiar with the problems and the needs of a system 
undergoing desegregation.18 
We do not, of course, imply that the order here is a blue-
print for other cases. That cannot be; in school desegrega-
tion cases, "[t]here is no universal answer to complex 
problems . . . ; there is obviously no plan that will do the 
job in every case." Green, supra, at 439. Nevertheless, on 
this record, we are bound to conclude that the degree before us 
was apt1y tailored to remedy the consequences of the constitu- \ 
tional violation. Nor do we find any othet reason to believe 
that the broad and flexible equity powets of the court were 
abused in this case. The established role of local school 
authorities was maintained inviolate, and the remedy is indeed 
remedial. The order does not punish anyone, nor does it 
impair or jeopardize the educational system in Dettoit.19 The 
District Court, in short, was true to the principles laid down 
in Brown II: 
"In fashioning a.nd effectuating the decrees, the courts 
will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, 
'" Thts Court hm; from the beginning looked to the District Courts 
in de~rgregation cases, familiar as they are with the local situations 
('Oming brfore them, to appraise the efforts of local school authorities 
to eaJT~· out their constitutionally required duties. "Because of their 
proximity to local conditions ... the [federal district] courts which 
original!~· heard these cases can best perform this judicial appraisal." 
Hrowu ll , supra, at 299. 
111 Indeed, the District Jud~e took great pains to devise a workable 
plan. For example, he l'iought ('arefully to eliminate burdensome trans-
portal ton of Negro children to predominantly Negro schools and to 
Jlrevent the disruption, by massive pupil reasHignment, of racially mixed 
-r·hooJs in ~tn ble neighborhoodH which had successfully undergone res-
trkntial and edurattonal rbange 
20 
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equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in 
shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and 
reconciling public and private needs. These cases call 
for the exercise of these traditional attributes of equity 
power." 349 U. S., at 300. 
III 
Petitioners also contend that the District Court's order, 
even if otherwise proper, violates the Eleventh Amendment. 
1n their view, the requirement that the state defendants pay 
one-half the additional costs attributable to the four educa-
tional components is, "in practical effect, indistinguishable 
from an award of money damages against the state based upon 
the asserted prior misconduct of state officials." Brief, at 34. 
Arguing from this premise, petitioners conclude that the 
·'award" in this case is barred under this Court's holding in 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
Edelman involved a suit for money damages against the 
'tate, as well as for prospective injunctive relie£.2° The suit 
was brought by an individual who claimed that Illinois officials 
had improperly withheld disability benefit payments to him 
and to the members of his class. Applying traditional 
fi;levcnth Amendment principles, we held that the suit was 
barred to the extent the suit sought "the award of an accrued 
monetary liability ... " which represented "retroactive pay-
ments." ld., a.t 663- 664. (Emphasis supplied.) Conversely, 
the C'ourt held that the suit was proper to the extent it sought 
11 paymeut of state funds ... as a necessary consequence of 
compliance in the future with a substantive federal-question 
cl0tcrmination .... " ld., at 668. (Emphasis supplied.) 
The decree to share the future costs of educational com-
20 Al1 hough 11H' complaint 111 Edelman o~:;trm;ibly ~:;ought only equitable 
rPiirf, thC' plaintiff C'XJH'C'si:il~· rPque~:;ted "'a permanent injunction enjoining 
lhr ddenclan1~ to award to thr rntire cia~" of plaintiffs all [disability] 
hrn Pfit ~ wrongfully wit hhf'ld '" 415 U. S ., at 656 
76-447-0PINION 
MILLIKEN v. BRADLEY 21 
ponents in this case fits squarely within the prospective· 
compliance exception rea.ffirmed by Edelman. That excep-
tion, which had its genesis in Ex pa.rte Young, 209 U. S. 123 
(1908), permits federal courts to enjoin state officials to con-
form their conduct to requirements of federal law, notwith-
standing a direct and substantial impact on the state treasury. 
4:15 U. S., at 15. The order challenged here does no more 
than that. The decree requires state officials, held responsi-
bl(' for unconstitutional conduct, in findings which are not 
challenged, to eliminate a de jure segregated school system. 
:VIore precisely. the burden of state officials is that set forth 
in Swarm-to take the necessary steps "to eliminate from the 
public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation." 402 
r. S., at 15. The educational components, which the District 
C'ourt ordered into effect prospectively, are plainly designed to 
w1pr out continuing conditions of inequality produced by the 
tnherently unequal dual school system long maintained by 
Drtroit. 21 
These programs were not, and as a practical matter could 
not he, intended to wipe the slate clean by one bold stroke, 
as could a retroactive award of money in Edelman.22 Rather, 
by the nature of the antecedent violation, which on this record I 
caused sig11ificant deficiencies in communications skills-
reading and speaking-the victims of Detroit's de jure segre-
gated system will continue to experience the effects of segrega-
"' Unlikr the award in Edelman, the injunction entered here could not 
in;;tanlnneou;;ly re~torr the victims of unlawful conduct to their rightful 
rondition. Thu~, tllC' mjunction here looks to the future, not simply 
1 o prr~rnt I~ · comprnsating victims for conduct and consequences com-
pkt<'d in th<' pa~t . 
22 In contra,;t to Edelman, there was no money award here in favor 
of l'<'Hpondent Bradley or any mrmbers of his class. Thi~ case ~imply 
do<";; not involvr individual citiz('n::;' conducting a raid on the state 
1 rra~ur~ · for :wcru<"d mon<"tary liability. It is wholly prospective in the 
o;:trn<" mamwr that the decree mandate:; vocational schools and assign-
llli.!lllt>, for rxample. 
.. 
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tion until such future time as the remedial programs can help 
dissipate the continuing effects of past misconduct. Read-
ing and speech deficiencies cannot be eliminated by judicial 
fia.t; they will require time, patience, and the skills of specially 
trained teachers. That the programs are also "compensatory" 
in nature does not change the fact that they are part of a 
plan that operates prospectively to bring about the delayed 
benefits of a unitary school system. We therefore hold that f 
. uch prospective relief is not barred by the Eleventh 
.t\mendment.23 
Finally, there is no merit to petitioners' claims that the 
relief ordered here violates the Tenth Amendment and gen-
eral principles of federalism. The Tenth Amendment's reser-
vation of nond0legated powers to the States is not implicated 
by a federal court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions 
of unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976). Nor 
are principles of federalism abrogated by the decree. The 
District Court has neither attempted to restructure local gov-
<'rnmental entities, nor to mandate a particular method or \ 
structure of state or local financing. Cf. San Antonio Inde-
/) endent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973). The 
District C'ourt has, rather, properly enforced the guarantees 
of the Fourteenth Amendment consistent with our prior hold-
lllgs. aud in a manner that does not jeopardize the integrity 
of tlw structure or functions of state and local government. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
"" H<·enu:s<· of our conrhtHion , we do not reach either of the two 
altrrn<~tii'C• arg;umrnts in support of the Di·trict Court's judgment, namely 
t hn t the Statr of Mirhigau rxpre~Kiy waived its Eleventh Amendment 
nnmnnit~· b~· virtur of Mirh. Stat. Annot. § 15.1023 (7), and that the 
Fourtrenth Amenrlnwnt, ex pmpio vigore, works a pro tanto repeal of 
the· Elrvrnth Amendment. Cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 
( 107G) . Nc•ithrr qurRtion was addressed by the Court of Appeals, and 
\\'(• t h1·rPfon• <lo no I pa~~ on Pitlwr i ~~n c. 
.To : Mr . JuBt1ce Brennan 
Mr . Ju~tjoo Stewart 
Mr . JustiGc- \l"'l.lte 
@ 
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0 "" ~lu 1 r- 'f-~() Mr . Jtutic<> :ll t, 11un fq· O(j.,!Y ~~ ,... -Mr. Jn~;tic' _u, ll 
IJ I I .H Mr . .Ttwt ieo q"'"'l. ; ~t 
~ ~ ~ ~~ Mr . Justice Stcv,HlS E!i...r--{t.:i lJ~,~ From• The Chief Justice 
_ ::;-dJ:i -t.l...C ~ :::::::::::d, .JUN 1 l119ZZ 
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• 11 d Petitioners, 
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v. 
Ronald Bradley et al. 
[June -, l977] 
Mit. GHillJF JusTICE Bu~QFJR. announced the opinion of the 
Court. 
We ~ranted certiorari in this case to consider two questions 
concerning the remedial powers of federal district courts in 
school desegregation cases, namely, whether a District Court 
cttn, as part of a desegregation decree, order compensatory or 
remedial educational programs for schoolchildren who have 
been subjected to past acts of de jure segregation, and 
whether, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, a federal 
court can require state officials found responsible for consti-
tutional violations to bear part of the costs of those programs. 
I 
This case is before the Court for the second time following 
our remand, Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717 (1974) 
(Milliken I); it marks the culmination of seven years of 
litigation over de jure school segregation in the Detroit Public 
School System. For almost six years, the litigation has 
focused exclusively on the appropriate remedy to correct offi-
cial acts of racial discrimination committed by both the 
Detroit School Board and the State of Michigan. No chal-
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lenge is now made by the State or the local .school. board to, 
the prior findings of de jure segr~gation.1 
A 
In the first stage of the remedy proceedings, which we r~. 
viewed in Milliken I, supra, the District Court, after reviewing 
several "Detroit-only" desegregation plans, concluded that 
an interdistrict plan was required to "'achieve the greatest 
degree of actual desegregation ... [so that} no school, grade 
or classroom [would be] substantially disproportionate to the 
overall pupil racial composition.'" 345 F. Supp. 914, 918 (ED 
Mich. 1972), quoted in Milliken I, supra, at 734. On those 
premises, the District Court ordered the parties to submit 
pla.ns for "metropolitan desegregation" and appointed a nine-
member panel to formulate a desegregation plan, which would 
encompass a "desegregation area" consisting of 54 school 
districts. 
In June 1973, a divided Court of Appeals, sitting en bane, 
upheld the District Court's determination that a metropolitan-
wide plan was essential to bring about what the District Court 
had described as "the greatest degree of actual desegrega-
tion .... " 345 F. Supp., at 918. We reversed, holding that 
1 The violations of the Detroit Board of Education, which included 
the improper use of optional attendance zones, racially based transporta-
tion of schfolchildren, improper creation and alteration of attendance 
zones, grad structures, and feeder school patterns, are described in 
the District Court's initial "Ruling on Issue of Segregation." 338 F. 
Supp. 582, ~87-588 (ED Mich. 1971). The District Court further found 
that "[t]he State and its agencies ... have acted directly to control 
and maintain the pattern of segregation in the Detroit schools." ld., 
at 589. ImJeed, the court expressly found: "When the Detroit school l 
board attem,Pted to voluntarily initiate an intra-district remedy to ame-
liorate the effect of the past segregation practices, the Michigan legislature 
enacted a law forbidding the carrying out of this remedy." Ibid. Those 
conclusion~ n~ to liability were affirmed on appeal, 484 F. 2d 215, 221~ 
241 (CA6 1973), and were not challenged in this Court. 418 U. S, 717 
(1974) (Milliken l). 
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the order exceeded appropriate limits of federal equitable au-
thority as defined in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board 
of Educ., 402 U. S. 1, 24 (1971), by concluding that "as a 
matter of substantive constitutional right, [a] particular 
degree of racial balance" is required, and by subjecting other 
school districts, uninvolved with and unaffected by any con-
stitutional violations, to the court's remedial powers. 418 
U. S. 717 (1974). Proceeding from the Swann standard 
"that the scope of the remedy is determined by the 
nature and extent of the constitutional violation," we held 
that, on the record before us, there was no interdistrict viola-
tion calling for an interdistrict remedy. Because the District 
Court's "metropolitan remedy" went beyond the constitutional 
violation, we remanded the case for further proceedings "lead-
ing to prompt formulation of a decree directed to eliminating 
the segregation found to exist in the Detroit city schools, a 
remedy which has been delayed since 1970." Id., at 753.2 
B 
Due to the intervening death of Judge Stephen J. Roth, 
who had presided over the litigation from the outset, the case on 
remand was reassigned to Judge Robert E. DeMascio. Judge 
DeMascio promptly ordered respondent Bradley and the 
Detroit Board to submit desegregation plans limited to the 
Detroit school system. On April 1, 1975, both parties sub-
mitted their proposed plans. Respondent Bradley's plan was 
2 Separate opinions were filed in Milliken I . MR. JusTICE STEWART, 
concurring, stated that the metropolitan-wide remedy contemplated 
by the District Court was "in error for the simple reason that the 
remedy . . . was not commensurate with the constitutional violation 
found." Jd., at 754. Dissenting opinions were filed by Mr. Justice 
Douglas, MR. Jus·ricE WHITE, and MR. JusTICE MARSHALL. The dis-
senting opinions took the position, in brief, that the remedy was appro-
priate, given the State's undisputed constitutional violations, the control 
of local education by state authorities, and the manageability of any 
necessary a1ministrative modifications to effectuate a metropolitan-wide 
remedy. 
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limited solely to pupil reassignment; the proposal called for 
extensive transportation of students to achieve the plan's 
ultimate goal of assuring that every school within the district 
reflected, within 15 percentage points, the racial ratio of the 
school district as a whole.3 In contrast to respondent Brad-
ley's proposal, the Detroit Board's plan provided for sufficient 
pupil reassignment to eliminate "racially identifiable white 
schools," while ensuring that "every child will spend at least a 
portion of his education in either a neighborhood elementary 
school or a neighborhood junior and senior high school." Id., 
at 1116. By eschewing racial ratios for each school, the 
Board's plan contemplated transportation of fewer students 
for shorter distances than respondent Bradley's proposaP 
In addition to student reassignments, the Board's plan 
called for implementation of 13 remedial or compensatory 
programs, referred to in the record as "educational compo-
nents." These compensatory programs, which were proposed 
in addition to the plan's provisions for magnet schools and 
vocational high schools, included three of the four components 
at issue in this case-in-service training for teachers and 
8 According to the then most recent statistical data, as of September 27, 
1974, 257,396 students were enrolled in the Detroit public schools, a 
figure which reflected a decrease of 28,116 students in the system since 
the 1960-1961 school year. 402 F . Supp. 1096, 1106-1107. Of this total 
student populat ion, 71.5% were Negro and 26.4% were white. The re-
maining 2.1 % was comprised of students of other ethnic groups. !d., 
at 1106. 
4 Under respondent Bradley's proposed plan in the remand proceedings, 
71 ,349 students would have required transportation; the Detroit Board's 
plan, however, provided for transportation of 51 ,000 students, 20,000 less 
than the Bradley plan. The Board's plan, which the District Court found 
infirm because of an impermissible use of "arbitrary" racial quotas, con-
templated achieving a 40%-60% representation of Negro students in the 
Ident ifiably white schools, while leaving untouched in terms of pupil re.. 
assignment schoob in three of the Detroit system's eight regions. Those 
three regions, which were located in the central oity, were overwhelmingly 
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administrators, guidance and counseling programs, and re-
vised testing procedures.5 Pursuant to the District Court's 
direction, the State Department of Education 6 on April 21, 
1975, submitted a critique of the Detroit Board's desegregation 
plan; in its report, the Department opined that, although 
"[i] t is possible that none of the thirteen 'quality education' 
components is essential ... to correct the constitutional vio-
lation .... ", eight of the 13 proposed programs nonetheless 
deserved special consideration in the desegregation setting. 
Of particular relevance here, the State Board said: 
"Within the context of effectuating a pupil desegrega-
tion plan, the in-service training [and] guidance and 
counseling ... components appear to deserve special 
emphasis." !d., at 38--39.7 
After receiving the State Board's critique,8 the District 
5 The fourth component, a remedial reading and communciations skills 
program, was proposed later and was endorsed by the Bradley respondents 
in a critique of the Detroit Board's proposed plan. See n. 7, infra. 
The Board's plan also called for the following "educational components": 
school-community relations, parental involvement, student rights and 
responsibilities, accountability, curriculum design, bilingual education, 
multiethnic curriculum, and cocurricular activities. 402 F. Supp., at 
1118. 
6 In addition to the State Board of Education, the state defendants 
include the Governor of Michigan, the Attorney General, the State Super-
intendent of Public Instruction, and the State Treasurer. 
7 Two months later, the Bradley respondents also submitted a critique 
of the Board's plan; while criticizing the Board's proposed educational 
components on several grounds, respondents nonetheless suggested that 
a remedial reading program was particularly needed in a desegregation 
plan. See n. 5, supra. The Bradley respondents claimed more generally 
that the Board's plan failed to inform the court of the then current extent 
of such programs or components in the school system and that the 
plan failed to assess "the relatedness of the particular component to 
desegregation." 
8 The other state defendants likewise filed objections to the Detroit 
Board's plan on April 21, 1975. They contended, in brief, that the 
court's remedy was limited to pupil reassignment to achieve desegregation; 
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Court conducted extensive hearings on the two plans over a 
two-month period. Substantial testimony was adduced with 
respect to the proposed educational components, including 
testimony by petitioners' expert witnesses.9 Based on this 
evidence and on reports of court-appointed experts, the Dis-
trict Court on August 11, 1975, approved, in principle, the 
Detroit Board's inclusion of remedial and compensatory edu-
cational components in the desegregation plan.10 
"We find that the majority of the educational com-
ponents included in the Detroit Board plan are essential 
hence, the proposed inclusion of educational components was, under their 
view, excessive. 
9 For example, Dr. Charles P. Kearney, Associate Superintendent for 
Research and School Administration for the Michigan Department of 
Education, gave the following testimony: 
"[T] he State Board and the Superintendent indicated that guidance 
and counselling appeared to deserve special emphasis in a desegregation 
effort." 
"We support the notion of a guidance and counselling effort. We think 
it certainly does have a relationship in the desegregation effort, we 
~hink it deserves special emphasis.'' 
As to in-service training, Dr. Kearney testified that, in his opinion, 
~:~uch a program was required to implement effectively a desegregation 
plan ln Detroit. Transcript, Vol. XXX, at 179, 187. Finally, even 
though the State's critique did not deem testing as deserving of "special 
emphasis" in the desegregation plan, Dr. Kearney stated as follows: 
"Q: ... [D]o you see a direct relationship between testing and 
desegregation? 
"A: If test results were inappropriately used, ... I think it would 
have certainly a discriminatory affect [sic] and it would have a negative 
affect, I'm sure on any kind of desegregation plan being implemented." 
!d., at 184. 
10 The District Court did not approve of all aspects of the Detroit 
Board's plan. With respect to C'ducational components, the court said: 
"The plan as submitted .. . does not distinguish between those compo-
nents that are necessary to the successful implementation of a desegrega-
tion plan and those are not ." 402 F. Supp., at 1118, (Emphasis 
supplied.} 
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for a school district undergoing desegregation. While it is 
true that the delivery of quality desegregated educational 
services is the obligation of the school board, nevertheless 
this court deems it essential to mandate educational com-
ponents where they are needed to remedy effects of past 
segregation, to assure a successful desegregative effort and 
to minimize the possibility of resegregation." 402 F. 
Supp., at 1118. 
The District Court expressly found that the two components 
of testing and counseling, as then administered in Detroit's 
schools, were infected with the discriminatory bias of a segre-
gated school system: 
"In a segregated system many techniques deny equal 
protection to black students, such as discriminatory test-
ing [and] discriminatory counseling .... " Ibid. 
The District Court also found that, to make desegregation 
work, it was necessary to include remedial reading programs 
and in-service training for teachers and administrators: 
"In a system undergoing desegregation, teachers will 
require orientation and training for desegregation. . .. 
Additionally, we find that . . . comprehensive reading 
programs are essential . .. to a successful desegregative 
effort." Ibid. 
Having established these general principles, the District 
Court formulated several "remedial guidelines" to govern the 
Detroit Board's development of a final plan. Declining "to 
substitute its authority for the authority of elected state and 
local officials to decide which educational components are 
beneficial to the school community," id., at 1145, the District 
Judge laid down the following guidelines with respect to each 
of the four educational components at issue here: 
(a) Reading. Concluding that "[t]here is no educational 
component more directly associated with the process of deseg-
regation than reading," id. , at 1138, the District Court directed 
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the General Superintendent of Detroit's schools to institute 
a remedial reading and communications skills program "[t]o 
eradicate the effects of past discrimination .... " Ibid. The 
~ontent of the required program was not prescribed by 
the court; rather, formulation and implementation of the 
program was left to the Superintendent and to a committee 
to be selected by him. 
(b) In-Service Training, The court also directed the 
Detroit Board to formulate a comprehensive in-service teacher 
training program, an element "essential to a 'system under-
~oing desegregation." I d., at 1139. In the District Court's 
view, an in-service training program for teachers and adminis-
trators, to train professional and instructional personnel to 
cope with the desegregation process in Detroit, would tend to 
ensure that all students in a desegregated system would be 
treated equally by teachers and administrators able, by virtue 
of special training, to cope with special problems presented by 
desegregation, and thereby facilitate Detroit's conversion to a 
unitary ~ystem. 
(c) Testing. Because it found, based on record evidence, 
that Negro children "are especially affected by biased testing 
procedures," the District Court determined that, frequently, 
minority students in Detroit were adversely affected by dis-
criminatory testing procedures. Unless the school system's 
tests were administered in a way "free from racial, ethnic or 
cultural bias," the District Court concluded that Negro chil-
dren in Detroit might thereafter be impeded in their educa-
tional growth. !d., at 1142. Accordingly, the court directed 
the Detroit Board and the State Department of Education to 
institute · a testing program along the lines proposed by the 
locaJ school board in its original desegregation plan. Ibid. 
( ci) Counseling and Career Guidance. Finally, the Dis-
trict Court addressed what expert witnesses had described as 
psychological pressures on Detroit's students in a system 
undergoing desegregation. Counselors were required, the 
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tensions arising in the change from Detroit's dual srstem, and, 
more concretely, to counsel students concerning the new voca .. 
tional and technical school programs available under the plan 
through the cooperation of state and local officials.11 
Nine months later, on May 11, 1976, the District Court . 
entered its final order. Emphasizing that it had "been care-
ful to order only what is essential for a school district under-
going desegregation," Appendix, at 117a, the court ordered the 
Detroit Board and the state defendants to institute compre-
hensive programs as to the four educational components by 
the start of the September 1976 school term. The cost of 
these four programs, the court concluded, was to be equally 
borne by the Detroit School Board and the State. To carry 
out this cost-sharing, the court directed the local board to 
calculate its highest budget allocation in any prior year for 
the several educational programs and, from that base, any 
excess cost attributable to the desegregation plan was to be 
paid equally by the two groups of defendants responsible for 
prior constitutional violations, i. e., the Detroit Board and the 
state defendants. 
c 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed the District Court's order concerning the implemen-
tation of and cost-sharing for the four educational com-
ponents.12 The Court of Appeals expressly approved the 
11 In contrast to their position before the District Court with respect 
to the four educational components at issue here, the state defendants, 
through the State Department of Education, voluntarily entered into 
a stipulation with the Detroit Board on February 24, 1976, under which 
the State agreed to provide 50% of the construction costs of five vocational 
centers which the District Court ordered to be established. Appendix, 
at 141a. 
12 The Court of Appeals disapproved, however, of the District Court's 
failure to inch1de three of Detroit's eight regions in the pupil assignment 
plan. See n. 4, supra. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to 
the District Court for further consideration of the three ommitted regions, 
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District Court's findings as to the necessity for these com~ 
pensatory programs: 
"This finding . . . is not clearly erroneous, but to the 
contrary is supported by ample evidence. 
"The need for in-service training of the educational 
staff and development of non-discriminatory testing is 
obvious. The former is needed to insure that the teach-
ers and administrators will be able to work effectively in 
a desegregated environment. The latter is needed to 
insure that students are not evaluated unequally because 
of built-in bias in the tests administered in formerly 
segregated schools. 
"We agree with the District Court that the reading and 
counseling programs are essential to the effort to combat 
the effects of segregation. . . . Without the reading and 
counseling components, black students might be deprived 
of the motivation and achievement levels which the 
desegregation remedy is designed to accomplish." 540 F. 
2d 229, 241 (CA61976). 
After reviewing the record, the Court of Appeals confirmed 
that the District Court relied largely on the Detroit School 
Board in formulating the decree: 
"This is not a situation where the District Court 
'appears to have acted solely according to its own notions 
of good educational policy unrelated to the demands of 
the Constitution.'" ld., at 241-242, quoting Keyes v. 
School District, 521 F. 2d 465, 483 (CAlO 1975), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976). 
After upholding the remedial-components portion of the 
but declined to set forth guidelines, given the practicabilities of the 
situation, for the District Court's benefit. Further proceedings were 
deemed appropriate, however, particularly since the Bradley respondents 
had previously been granted le:tve to file a second amended complaint to 
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plan, the Court of Appeals went on to affirm the District 
Court's allocation of costs between the state and local officials. 
Analyzing this Court's decision in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 
U. S. 651 (1974), which reaffirmed the rule that the Eleventh 
Amendment bars an ordinary suit for money da:mages against 
the State without its consent, the Court of Appeals held that 
the District Court's order 
" ... imposes no money judgment on the State of 
Michigan for past de jure segregation practices. Rather, 
the order is directed toward the State defendants as a 
part of a prospective plan to comply with a constitutional 
requirement to eradicate all vestiges of de jure segrega-
tion." 540 F. 2d, at 245. (Emphasis supplied.) 
The Court of Appeals remanded the case for further considera-
tion of the three central city regions untouched by the 
District Court's pupil reassignment plan. See n. 12, supra. 
The state defendants then sought review in this Court, 
challenging only those portions of the District Court's com-
prehensive remedial order dealing with the four educational 
components and with the State's obligation to defray the costs 
of those programs. We granted certiorari, 429 U. S. -
( 1976), and we affirm. 
II 
This Court has not previously addressed directly the ques-
tion whether federal courts can order remedial education pro-
gra:ms as part of a school desegregation decree.13 However, 
18 In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 
1 (1971), the Court affirmed an order of the District Court which 
included a requirement of in-:service training programs. 318 F. Supp. 
786, 803 (WDNC 1970). However, this Court's opinion did not treat the 
precise point. In Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 
413 U. S. 189 (1973), the Court expressly avoided passing on the 
District Court's holding that called for, among other things, "compensa-
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the general principles governing our resolution of this issue 
are well settled by the prior decisions of this Court. In the 
first case concerning federal courts' remedial powers in elimi-
nating de jure school segregation, the Court laid down the 
basic rule which governs to this day: "In fashioning and 
effectuating the [desegregation] decrees, the courts will be 
guided by equitable principles." Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 349 U. S. 294, 300 (1955) (Brown II). 
A 
Application of those "equitable principles," we have held, 
requires federal courts to focus upon three factors. In the 
first place, like other equitable remedies, the nature of the 
desegregation remedy is to be determined by the nature and 
scope of the constitutional violation. Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, supra, at 16. The remedy 
must therefore be related to "the condition alleged to offend 
the Constitution .... " Milliken I, supra, at 738.14 Second, 
the de-cree must indeed be remedial in nature, that is, it 
must be designed as nearly as possible "to restore 
the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they 
would have occupied in the absence of such conduct." !d., at 
746.15 Third, the federal courts in devising a remedy must 
14 Thus, the Court has consistently held that the Constitution is not 
violated by racial imbalance in the schools, without more. Pasadena City 
Board of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 434 (1976); Milliken I, 
su]Jra, at 763 (WHrrE, J., dissenting); Swann, supra, at 26. An order 
contemplating the "'substantive right [to a] particular degree of racial 
balance or mixing'" is therefore infirm as a matter of law. Spangler 
supra, at 434. 
15 Since t.he ultimate objective of the remedy is to make whole the 
victims of unlawful conduct, federal courts are authorized to implement 
plans that promise "rralistically to work now." Green v. 
County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U. S. 430, 
139 (1968). At the samE' time, the Court has carefully stated 
that, to ensure that federal court decrees are characterized by the flexibility 
and sensitivity required of equitable decrees, con&ideration must be given 
•' 
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take into account the interests of state and local authorities 
in managing their own affairs, consistent with the Constitu-
tion. In Brown II the Court squarely held that "[s]chool 
authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, 
assessing, and solving these problems .... " 349 U. S., at 299. 
(Emphasis supplied.) If, however, "school authorities fail in 
their affirmative obligations ... judicial authority may be 
invoked." Swann, supra, at 15. Once invoked, "the scope of 
a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is 
broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable 
remedies." Ibid. 
B 
In challenging the order before us, petitioners do not spe-
cifically question that the District Court's mandated programs 
are designed, as nearly as practicable, to restore the school-
children of Detroit to the position they would have enjoyed 
absent constitutiona-l violations by state and local officials. 
And, petitioners do not contend, nor could they, that the 
prerogatives of the Detroit School Board have been abrogated 
by the decree, since of course the Detroit School Board itself 
proposed incorporation of these programs in the first place. 
Petitioners' sole contention is that, under Swann, the 
District Court's order exceeds the scope of the constitu-
tional violation. Invoking our holding in Milliken I, supra, 
petitioners claim that, since the constitutional violation found 
to burdensome effects resulting from a decree that could "either risk 
the health of the children or significantly impinge on the educational 
process." Swann, supra, at 30-31. Our function, as stated by Mn. 
JusTICE WHITE, is "to desegregate an educational system in which the 
races have been kept apart without, at the same time, losing sight of 
the central educational function of the schools." Milliken I, supra, at 
764 (dissenting opinion) . (Emph~sis in original.) In a word, "There 
are undoubted practical as well as legal limits to the remedial powers 
of federal courts in school desegregation cases." /d., at 763. Cf. Austin 
Independent School Dist. v. United States, - U . S. - (1976.) 
('PoWELL, J ., concurring). 
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by the District Court was the unlawful segregation of students 
en the basis of race, the court's decree must be limited to 
Pemedying unlawful pupil assignments. This contention 
misconceives the principle petitioners seek to invoke, and we 
reject their argument. 
The well-settled principle that the nature and scope of 
the remedy is to be determined by the violation means simply 
that federal court decrees must directly address and relate to 
the constitutional violation itself. Because of this inherent 
limitation upon federal judicial authority, federal court 
decrees exceed appropriate limits if they are aimed at elimi-
nating a condition that does not violate the Constitution or 
does not flow from such a violation, see Pasadena City Board 
of Education v. Spangler, supra, or if they are imposed upon 
governmental units that were neither involved in nor affected 
by the constitutional violation, as in Milliken I, supra. Hills 
v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 292-296 (1976). But where, as 
here, a constitutional violation has been found, the remedy 
does not "exceed" the violation, if the remedy is tailored to 
cure the "condition that offends the Constitution." Milliken I, 
supra, at 738. (Emphasis supplied.) 
The "condition" offending the Constitution is Detroit's de 
jure segregated school system, which was so peiTVasively and 
persistently segregated that the District Court found that the 
need for the educational components flowed directly from 
constitutional violations by bath state and local officials. 
These specific educational remedies, although normally left 
to the discretion of the elected school board and professional 
educators, were deemed necessary to restore the victims of 
discriminatory conduct to the position they would have en. 
joyed in terms of education had these four components been 
provided in a nondiscriminatory manner in a school system ------.::...--f ee from pervasive de jure racial segre ation 
n e rs case mvalidating a e JUre system, a unanimous 
Court, SJ?eaking through Chief Ju~tice Warren, held in Brown 
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I: "Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 495 ( 1954). 
And in United States v. Montgomery County Board of 
Education, 395 U. S. 225 (1969), the Court concerned itself 
not with pupil assignment, but with the desegregation of 
faculty and staff as part of the process of dismantling a dual I 
system. In doing so, the Court, there speaking through Mr. 
Justice Black, focused on the reason for judicial concerns 
going beyond pupil assignment : "The dispute ... deals with 
faculty and staff desegregation , a goal that we have recognized 
to be an important aspect of the basic task of achieving a 
public school system wholly free from racial discrimination." 
395 U. S., at 231-232. (Emphasis supplied.) 
Montgomery County therefore stands firmly for the propo-
sition that matters other than pupil assignment must on occa-
sion be addressed by federal courts to eliminate the effects of 
prior segregation. Similarly, in Swann we reaffirmed the 
principle laid down in Green v. County School Board, supra, 
that "existing policy and practice with respect to faculty, 
staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities 
were among the most important indicia of a segregated sys-
tem." 402 U. S., at 18. In a word, discriminatory student 
assignment policies can themselves breed and manifest other 
inequalities built into a dual system founded on racial dis-
crimination. Federal courts need not, and cannot, close their 
eyes to inequalities, shown by the record, which flow from a 
longstanding segregated system. 
c 
In light of the mandate of Brown I and Brown II, federal 
courts have, over the years, often required the inclusion of 
remedial programs in desegregation plans to overcome the 
inequalities inherent in dual school systems. In 1966, for 
example, the District Court for the District of South Carolina 
• 
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directed the inclusion of remedial courses to overcome the 
effects of a segregated sysU:m: . 
"Because the weaknesses of a dual school system may 
have already affected many children, the court would be 
remiss in its duty if any desegregation plan were approved 
which did not provide for remedial education courses. 
They shall be included in the plan." Miller v. School 
District Number 2, Clarendon, S. C., 256 F. Supp. 370, 
377 (D. S.C. 1966). (Emphasis supplied.) 
In 1967, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appea.ls, then engaged in 
overseeing the desegregation of numerous school districts in 
the South, laid do~n. the following requirement in an en bane 
decision: 
"The defendants shall provide remedia.l education pro-
grams which permit students attending or who have 
previously attended segregated schools to overcome past 
inadequacies in their education." United States v. Jef-
ferson County Board of Education, 380 F. 2d 385, 394 
(CA5), cert. denied, 389 U. S. 840 (1967). (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
See also Stell v. Board of Public Education for City of Savan-
nah, 387 F. 2d 486, 492, 496-497 (CA5 1967); Hill v. 
LaFourche Parish School Board, 291 F. Supp. 819, 823 (ED 
La. 1967); Redman v. Terrebone Parish School Board, 293 F. 
Supp. 376, 379 (ED La. 1967); Lee v. Macon County Board 
of Education, 267 F. Supp. 458, 489 (MD Ala. 1967); Graves 
v. Walton County Board of Education, 300 F. Supp. 188, 200 
(MD Ga. 1968), aff'd, 410 F. 2d 1153 (CAS 1969). Two years 
later, the Fifth Circuit again adhered to the rule that District 
Courts could properly seek to overcome the built-in inade-
quacies of segregated educational system: 
"The trial court concluded that the school board must 
establish remedial programs to assist students who previ-
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ously attended all-Negro schools when those students 
transfer to formerly all-white schools . . . . The remedial 
programs . . . are an integral part of a program for 
compensatory education to be provided Negro students 
who have long been disadvantaged by the inequities and 
discrimination inherent in the dual system. The require-
ment that the School Board institute remedial programs 
so far as they are feasible is a proper exercise of the 
court's discretion." Plaquemines Parish School Bd. v. 
United States, 415 F. 2d 817, 831 (CA5 1969). (Empha~ 
sis supplied.) 
In the same year the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Louisiana required school authorities to 
come forward with a remedial educational program as 
part of a desegregation plan. "The defendants shall provide 
remedial education programs which permit students . . . who 
have previously attended all-Negro schools to overcome past 
inadequacies in their education." Smith v. St. Tammany 
Parish School Board, 302 F. Supp. 106, 110 (ED La. 1969), 
aff'd, 448 F. 2d 415 (CA5 1971). See also Moore v. Tan(Ji~ 
pahoa Parish School Board, 304 F. Supp. 244, 253 (ED La. 
1969); Moses v. Washin(fton Parish School Board, 302 F. 
Supp. 362, 367 (ED La. 1969). 
In the 1970's, the pattern has been essentially the same. 
The Fifth Circuit has, when the fact situation warranted, 
continued to call for remedial education programs in desegre-
gation plans. E. (f., United States v. State of Texas, 447 F. 2d 
441, 443 (CA5 1971) , application for stay denied, 404 U. S. 
1205 (1971) (Black, J. , sitting as Circuit Justice). To that 
end, the approved plan in United States v. Texas required: 
"[C]urriculum offerings and programs shall include 
specific educational programs designed to compensate 
minority group children for unequal educational oppor-
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tunities resulting from past or present racial and ethnic 
isolation .... " I d., at 448.Hl 
See also George v. O'Kelly, 448 F. 2d 145, 150 (CA5 1971). 
And, as school desegregation litigation emerged in other 
regions of the country, federal courts have likewise looked in 
p,art to remedial programs, when the record supported 
an order to that effect. See, e. g., Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 
F. Supp. 216, 235 (Mass. 1975), aff'd, 530 F. 2d 401 (CAl 
1976), cert. denied,- U.S.- (1976); Hart v. Community 
School Board of Brooklyn, 383 F. Supp. 699, 757 (EDNY 
1974), aff'd, 512 F. 2d 37 (CA2 1975); cf. Booker v. Special 
School Dist. Number 1, Minneapolis, Minn., 351 F. Supp. 799 
(Minn. 1972).17 
Finally, in addition to other remedial programs, which 
could, if circumstances warranted, include programs to 
remedy deficiencies, particularly in reading and com-
munication skills, federal courts have expressly ordered special 
in-service training for teachers, see, e. g., United States v. 
State of Missouri, 523 F. 2d 885, 887 (CA8 1975); Smith v. 
St. Tammany Parish School Board, supra, a.t 110; Moore v. 
Tanigpahoa Parish School Board, supra, at 253, and have 
altered or even suspended testing programs employed by 
school systems undergoing desegregation. See, e. g., Single-
16 In denying the stay application, Mr. Justice Black was untroubled 
by the underlying order of the District Court: 
"It would be very difficult for me to suspend the order of the District 
Court that, in my view, does no more than endeavor to realize the 
directive of the Fourteenth Amendment and the decisions of this Court 
that racial discrimination in the public schools must be eliminated root 
and branch." 404 U. S., at 1206. 
17 We do not, of course, pass upon the correctness of the particular 
holdings of cases we did not review. We simply note that these holdings 
.support the broader proposition that, when the record warrants, remedial 
programs may be, in the exercise of equitable discretion, appropriate 
remedies to treat the condition that offends the Constitution. Of course, 
it must be shown that the const.itutional violation caused the condition 
for which remedial programs are mandated. 
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ton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 419 F. 2d 
1211, 1219 (CA5 1969), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 1032 (1970); 
Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Board, 444 F. 2d 1400, 1401 
(CA5 1971); Arvizu v. Waco Independent School Dist., 373 
F. Supp. 1264 (WD Tex. 1973), rev'd in part on other issues, 
495 F. 2d 499 (CA5 1974). 
These cases demonstrate that the District Court in the case 
before us did not break new ground in approving the School / 
Board's proposed plan. Quite the contrary, acting on abun-
dant evidence in this record, the District Court approved a 
remedial plan going beyond mere pupil assignments, as 
expressly approved by Swann and Montgomery County, supra. 
In so doing, the District Court was adopting specific programs 
proposed by local school authorities, ~e presumed to 
be fami 1ar wi - the problems and the needs of a system 
undergoing desegregation.18 
We do not, of course, imply that the order here is a blue-
print for other cases. That . cannot be; in school desegrega-
tion cases, "[t]here is no universal answer to complex 
problems . . . ; there is obviously no plan that will do the 
job in every case." Green, supra, at 439. On this record, 
however, we are bound to conclude that the decree before us 
was aptly tailored to remedy the consequences of the constitu-
tional viola.tion. Cfiildren who have been thus educationally 
and culturally set apart from the larger community will in-
evitably acquire habits of speech, conduct, and attitudes 
reflecting their isolated environment. They are likely to ac-
quire speech habits, for example, which vary from the envi-
ronmeii't1n which tliey must ultimately function and compete, 
18 This Court has from the beginning looked to the District Courts 
in desegregation cases, familiar as they are with the local situations 
coming before them, to appraise the efforts of local school authorities 
to carry out their constitutionally required duties. "Because of their 
proximity to local conditions . . . the [federal district] courts which 
originally heard these cases can best perform this judicial appraisal." 
Brown Il, supra, at 299. 
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if they are to enter and be a part of that community. Thie 
is not peculiar to race; it can affect any children who, as 
a group, are isolated by force of law from the mainstream. 
Cf. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U. S. 563 (1974). 
Pupil assignment alone does not automatically remedy 
the impact of previous, unlawful educational isolation; the 
consequences linger and can be dealt with only by independ. 
ent measures. In short, the speech habits acquired in a 
segregated system do not banish simply by moving the child 
to a desegregated school. The root condition shown by this 
record must be treated directly by special training at the 
hands of teachers prepared for that task. This is what the 
District Judge in the case drew from the record before him 
as to the consequences of Detroit's de jure system, and we 
cannot conclude tha t tlu~ remedies decreed exceeded the sc®e 
of the violations found . 
... Nor do we find any other reason to believe that the 
broad and flexible equity powers of the court were abused 
in this case. The established role of local school authorities 
was ma.intained inviolate, and the remedy is indeed remedial. 
The order does not punish anyop.e, nor does it impair or 
jeopardize the educational system in Detroit.10 The District 
Court, in short, was true to the principle laid down in 
Brown II : 
"In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts 
will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, 
equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in 
shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and 
reconciling public and private needs. These cases call 
19 Indeed, the District Judge took great pains to devise a workable 
plan. For example, he sought carefully to eliminate burdensome trans-
portation of Negro children to predominantly Negro schools and to 
prevent the disruption, by massive pupil reassignment, of racially mixed 
schools in stable neighborhoods which had successfully undergone rea-
id.ential and educational change. 
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for the exercise of these traditional attributes of equity 
power." 349 U. S., at 300. 
III 
Petitioners also contend that the District Court's order, 
even if otherwise proper, violates the Eleventh Amendment. 
In their view, the requirement that the state defendants pay 
one-half the additional costs attributable to the four educa-
tional components is, "in practical effect, indistingq.ishable 
from an award of money damages against the state based upon 
the asserted prior misconduct of state officials." Brief, at 34. 
Arguing from this premise, petitioners conclude that the 
"award" in this case is ba.rred under this Court's holding in 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
Edelman involved a suit for money damages a.gainst the 
State, as well as for prospective injunctive relief. 20 The suit 
was brought by an individual who claimed that Illinois officials 
had improperly withheld disability benefit payments to him 
and to the members of his class. Applying traditional 
Eleventh Amendment principles, we held that the suit was 
barred to the extent the suit sought "the award of an accrued 
monetary liability .. . " which represented "retroactive pay-
ments." !d. , at 663-664. (Emphasis supplied.) Conversely, 
the Court held that the suit was proper to the extent it sought 
"payment of state funds .. . as a necessary consequence of 
compliance in the future with a substantive federal-question 
determination . ... " !d., at 668. (Emphasis supplied.) 
The decree to share the future costs of educational com-
ponents in this case fits squarely within the prospective-
compliance exception reaffirmed by Edelman. That excep-
tion, which had its genesis in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 
20 Although the complaint in Edelman ostensibly sought only equitable 
relief, the plaint iff expressly requested "'a permanent injunction enjoining 
the defendants to award to the entire class of plaintiffs all [disability] 
benefits wrongfully withheld.' " 415 U. S., at 656. 
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( 1908), permits federal courts to enjoin state officials to con-
form their conduct to requirements of federal law, notwith-
standing a direct and substantial impact on the state treasury. 
415 U. S., at 15. The order challenged here does no more 
than that. The decree requires state officials, held responsi-
ble for unconstitutional conduct, in findings which a.re not 
challenged, to eliminate a de jure segregated school system. 
More precisely, the burden of state officials is that set forth 
in Swann-to take the necessary steps "to eliminate from the 
public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation." 402 
U.S., at 15. The educational components, which the District 
Court ordered into effect prospectively, are plainly designed to 
wipe out continuing conditions of inequality produced by the 
inherently unequal dual school system long maintained by 
Detroit.21 
These programs were not, and as a practical matter could 
not be, intended to wipe the slate clean by one bold stroke, 
as could a retroactive award of money in Edelman. 22 Rather, 
by the nature of the antecedent violation, which on this record 
caused significant deficiencies in communications skills--
reading and speaking-the victims of Detroit's de jure segre-
gated system will continue to experience the effects of segrega-
tion until such future time as the remedial programs can help 
dissipate the continuing effects of past misconduct. Read-
ing and speech deficiencies cannot be eliminated by judicial 
21 Unlike the award in Edelman, the injunction entered here could not 
instantaneously restore the victims of unlawful conduct to their rightful 
condition. Thus, the injunct-ion here looks to the future, not simply 
to presently compensating victims for conduct and consequences com-
pleted in the past. 
22 In contrast to Edelman, there was no money award here in favor 
of respondent Bradley or any members of his class. This case simply 
does not involve individual citizens' conducting a raid on the state 
treasury for accrued monetary liability. It is wholly prospective in the 
same manner that the decree mandates vocational school:;; and assign-
ments, for example. 
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fiat; they will require time, patience, and the skills of specialiy 
trained teachers. That the programs are also "compensatory'' 
in nature does not change the fact that they ara part of a 
plan that operates prospectively to bring about the delayed 
benefits of a unitary school system. We therefore hold that 
such prospective relief is not barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment.28 
Finally, there is no merit to petitioners' claims that the 
relief ordered here violates the Tenth Amendment and gen-
eral principles of federalism. The Tenth Amendment's reser-
vation of nondelegated powers to the States is not implicated 
by a federal court judgment enforcing the express prohibition$ 
of unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976). Nor 
are principles of federalism abrogated by the decree. The 
District Court has neither attempted to restructure local gov-
ernmental entities, nor to mandate a particular method or· 
structure of state or local financing. Cf. San Antonio Inde-
pendent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 ( 1973). The 
District Court has, rather, properly enforced the guarantees 
of the Fourteenth Amendment consistent with our prior hold-
ings, and in a manner that does not jeopardize the integrity 
·of the structure or functions of state and local government. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed. 
Affirmed. 
28 Because of our conclusion, we do not reach either of the two 
alternative arguments in support of the District Court's judgment, namely 
that the State of Michigan expressly waived its Eleventh Amendment 
immunity by virtue of Mich. Stat. Annot. § 15.1023 (7), and that the 
Fourteenth Amendment , ex propio vigore, works a pro tanto repeal of 
the Eleventh Amendment. Cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 
(1976) . Neither question was addressed by the Court of Appeals, and 
we therefore do not pass on either issue. 
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment. 
The Court's opinion addresses this case as if it 
were conventional desegregation litigation. The 
wide-ranging opinion reiterates the familiar general 
pr-inciples drawn from the line of precedents commencing 
with Brown v. Board of Education, 347 u.s. 483 (1954), and 
including today's decision in Dayton Board of Education v. ·;~ 
Brinkman, post, at One has to read the opinion \ 
closely to understand that the case, as it finally reaches 
us, is wholly different from any prior case. I write to 
emphasize its uniqueness, and the consequent limited 
precedential effect of much of the Court's opinion. 
Normally, the plaintiffs in this type of 
litigation are students, parents and supporting 
organizations who desire to desegregate a school system 
alleged to be the product, in whole or in part, of de jure 
segregative action by the public school authorities. 
The principal defendant is usually the local board of 
education or school board. Occasionally, the state board 
of education and public officials are joined as 
defendants. This protracted litigation commenced in 1970 
in this conventional mold. In the intervening years, 
however, the posture of the litigation has changed so 
2 • 
drastically as to leave it largely a friendly suit between 
the plaintiffs (respondents Bradley, et al.) and the 
original principal defendant, the Detroit School Board. 
These parties, antagonistic for years, have now joined 
forces apparently for the purpose of extracting funds from 
the state treasury. As between the original principal 
parties - the plaintiffs and the Detroit School Board - no 
case or controversy remains on the issues now before us. 
The Board enthusiastically supports the entire 
desegregation decree even though the decree intrudes 
deeply on the Board's own decisionmaking powers. Indeed, 
the present School Board proposed most of the educational 
components included in the District Court's decree. The 
plaintiffs originally favored a desegregation plan that 
would have required more extensive transportation of 
pupils, and they did not initially propose or endorse the 
educational components. In this Court, however, the 
plaintiffs also support the decree of the District Court 
1 
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 
Thus the only complaining party is the State of 
Michigan (acting through state officials), and its basic 
complaint concerns money, not desegregation. It has been 
ordered to pay about $5,800,000 to the Detroit School 
Board. This is one-half the estimated "excess cost" of 
j~ 
four of the ~&Jell educational components included in the 
desegregation decree: remedial reading, in-service 
2 
training of teachers, testing, and counseling. The 
3 • 
State, understandably anxious to preserve the state budget 
from federal court control or interference, now contests 
the decree on two grounds. 
First, it is argued that the order to pay state 
funds violates the Eleventh Amendment and principles of 
federalism. Ordinarily a federal court's order that a 
state pay unappropriated funds to a locality would raise 
the gravest constitutional issues. See generally 
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodgriguez, 411 
U.S. 1, 40-42 (1973); National League of Cities v. Usery, 
426 u.s. 833 (1976). But here, in a finding no longer 
subject to review, the State has been adjudged a 
participant in the constitutional violations, and the 
State therefore may be ordered to participate 
prospectively in a remedy otherwise appropriate. 
The State's second argument is one that normally 
would be advanced vigorously by the school board. Relying 
on the established principle that the scope of the remedy 
in a desegregation case is determined and limited by the 
4. 
extent of the identified constitutional violations, Dayton 
Board of Education, supra, at ; Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 
u.s. 284, 293-294 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 u.s. 
717, 744 (1974); Austin Independent School Dist. v. United 
States, 97 S. Ct. 517 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring), the 
State argues that the District Court erred in ordering the 
system-wide expansion of the four educational components 
mentioned above. It contends that there has been no 
finding of a constitutional violation with respect to the 
past operation of any of these programs, and it insists 
that without more specifically focused findings of this 
sort, the decree exceeded the court's powers. 
This argument is by no means a frivolous one. 
But the context in which it is presented is so unusual 
that it would be appropriate to dismiss the writ as 
improvidently granted. The argument is advanced by the 
State and not by the party primarify concerned. The 
educational programs at issue are standard and widely 
approved in public education. The State Board normally 
would be enthusiastic over enhancement of these programs 
so long as the local school board could fund them without 
requiring financial aid from the State. It is equally 
evident that the State probably would resist a federal 
court order requiring it to pay unappropriated state funds 
to the local school board regardless of whether violations 
by the local board justified the remedy. The State's 
5. 
interest in protecting its own budget - limited by 
legislative appropriations - is a genuine one. But it is 
not an interest that is related, except fortuitously, to a 
claim that the desegregation remedy may have exceeded the 
extent of the violations. 
The State's reliance on the remedy issue contains 
a further weakness, emphasizing the unusual character of 
this case. There is no indication that the State objected 
- certainly, it does not object here - to the inclusion in 
the District Court's decree of the seven other educational 
components. See n. 2, supra. Indeed, the State expressly 
agreed to one of the most expensive components, the 
establishment of vocational education centers, in a 
stipulation obligating it to share the cost of 
construction equally with the Detroit Board. See App. 
139a-14la. Furthermore, the District Court's decree 
largely embodies the original recommendation of the 
Detroit Board. Since local school boards "have the 
primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and ~ ~ / 
solving [the] problems" generated by "[f]ull 
implementation of .•. constitutional principles' in the 
local setting, Brown v. Board of Education, 349 u.s. 294, 
299 (1955), the State's limited challenge here is 
particularly lacking in force. 
Moreover, the District Court was faced with a 




structure of the Detroit school system "chaotic and 
incapable of effective administration." App. 124a. The 
"general superintendent has little direct authority." 
Ibid. Each of the eight regional boards may be 
preoccupied with "distribut[ing] local board patronage." 
App. 125a. The "local boards have diverted resources that 
would otherwise have been available for educational 
purposes to build new offices and other facilities to 
house this administrative overload." Ibid. The District 
Court continued: 
"In addition to the administrative chaos, we 
know of no other school system that is so 
enmeshed in politics .... Rather than devoting 
themselves to the educational system and the 
desegregative process, board members are busily 
engaged in politics not only to assure their 
own re-election but also to defeat others with 
whom they disagree." App. 125a-126a 
(footnote omitted). 
Referring again to the "political paralysis" and 
"inefficient bureaucracy" of the system, the court also 
noted - discouragingly - that the election then 
approaching "may well [result in] a board of education 
consisting of members possessing no experience in 
education." App. 126a. In this quite remarkable 
situation, it is perhaps not surprising that the District 
Court virtually assumed the role of school superintendent 
3 
and school board. 
Given the foregoing unique circumstances, it 
seems to me that the proper disposition of this case is to 
dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. 
But being unable to persuade my Brothers to this 
prudential view, I join in the judgment as a result less 
likely to prolong the disruption of education in Detroit 
than a reversal or remand. The District Court did, after 
all, make findings relating the educational remedies 
directly to specific constituational violations. In my 
view, it is at least arguable that the findings in this 
respect were too generalized to meet the standards 
prescribed by this Court. See Dayton Board of Education, 
supra. But the majority views the record as justifying a 
finding that "the need for the educational components 
7. 
flowed directly from the constitutional violations by both 
4 
state and local officials." Ante, at 14. On that 
view of the record, our settled doctrine requiring that 
the remedy be carefully tailored to fit identified 
constitutional violations is not disturbed by today's 
result. I therefore concur in the judgment. 
Milliken footnotes 
~ Until the case reached this court the 
plaintiffs apparently did not view the educational 
components as necessary or even important elements of a 
N-1 
desegregation plan. These components were not included in 
plans submitted by the plaintiffs, and in briefs filed 
below there were indications that the plaintiffs viewed 
1 
some - if not all - of these components as being "wholly 
unrelated to desegregation of students and faculty in 
schools." See plaintiff's brief in the Court of Appeals, 
at 5~ n. 6. 
~In addition to these four components, there 
were some seven other educational directives that are not 
contested here. Perhaps the most expansive was the 
District Court's order that the City and State Boards 
create five vocational centers "devoted to in-depth 
occupational preparation in the construction trades, 
transportation and health services." App. 75a. As noted 
in the text infra, a compromise was reached as to these 
centers and the State entered into a stipulation 
obligating it to share the cost of providing them. See 
App. 139a-142a. The other · educational components ordered 
by the District Court included: (i) "two new technical 
high schools in which business education will be the 
central part of the curriculum" (App. 75a); (ii) a new 
curriculum prescribed by the court in some detail for the 
vocational education courses in the Detroit schools, 
N-2 
including the requirement that an additional "grade 13" be 
added to afford expanded educational opportunities (App. 
76a); (iii) the inclusion of "multi-ethnic studies" in the 
curriculum, with a request for federal funds to support 
"in-service training for teachers involved in such 
programs" (App. 82a, 147a); (iv) a "Uniform Code of 
Conduct," which the Board was ordered to develop pursuant 
to guidelines established by the court (App. 79a, 148a); 
(v) a specific plan for "co-curricular activities" with 
other artistic and educational institutions in the area, 
to be developed by the Board and submitted for court 
approval (App. 82a); and (vi) a "community relations 
program" prescribed in remarkable detail by the court. 
(App. 80a, 132a). 
Jn most, if not all, instances the court ordered 
that each of these programs be "comprehensive," and that 
reports be made to the court. The details of the 
foregoing are set forth in the opinio~and decrees of 
August 1, 1975, November 4 and 20, 1975, and May 11, 
1976. One may doubt whether there is any precedent for a 
federal court exercising such extensive control over the 
purely educational responsibilities of a school board. 
3. It merits emphasizing that the School Board 
invited this assumption of power. Indeed, the District 
Court had complimented the Board on its willingness to 
"implement any desegregation order the Court may issue! 
N-3 
App. 49a. But at one point there were serious second 
thoughts. In its brief in the Court of Appeals, the Board 
expressed grave concern as to what the District Court's 




[O]n May 11, 1976 •.. the District Court 
rdered equalization of all school facilities 
nd buildings preparatory to the 1976-77 school 
term; continuance of the comprehensive 
construction and renovation program; [and 
implementation of the educational components 
summarized in n. 2, supra] •.•• 
"Even without actual dollar figures, the 
financrai 1mpact of these orders could easii¥ 
destroy the educat1onal program of the Detro1t 
School system. The financing of these compo-
nents by the Detroit school system would only 
mean a concomittant elimination of existing 
programs. 
It is virtually impossible for the Detroit 
Board of Education to re-order its priorities 
when it is already operating on a woefully 
inadequate budget that cannot provide a minimal 
quality educational program. Any attempt to 
redistribute available resources will cause 
further deterioration in on-going educational 
programs and will merely result in robbing Peter 
to pay Paur.-" App. 189a (emphasis added). ~,-
_ _,.. 
the least, the financial impact of the court's 
decree was profoundly disturbing. But apparently the 
financially pressed Board was willing to surrender a 
substantial portion of its decisionmaking authority in 
return for the prospect of enhanced state funding. For by 
the time it made this statement to the Court of Appeals, 
the Board knew that the District Court had exercised its 
N-4 
power to do what the state legislature had chosen not to 
do: appropriate funds from the state treasury for these 
particular programs of the Detroit schools. 
4. The Court's opinion states, for example, that 
the District Court "expressly found that the two 
components of testing and counseling, as then administered 
in Detroit's schools, were infected with the 
discriminatory bias of a segregated school system." Ante, 
at 7. 
-
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in th e judgme nt . 
The Court's opinion addresse s this case as if it 
were conventional desegregation litigation. The 
wide-ranging opinion reiterates the familiar gene ra l 
principles drawn from the line of precedents commencing 
with Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and 
including today's decision in Dayton Boar~ of_EClucatio n v . 
Brinkman, post, at One has to read the opini on \ 
closely to understand that the case, as it finally r e aches 
us, is wholly diff e rent from any prior case. I wr ite t o 
emphasize its uniqueness, and the cons equent lim i ted 
precedential effe c t of much of the Court's opinion. 
Normally, the plaintiffs in this type o f 
lir.i. gat i o~ a re students, pa r e nts and suppnrti ng 
organizations who desire to desegr egate a school sys tem 
alleged to be the product, in whole or in part, of de jure 
segregative action by the public school authorities. 
The principal de fe ndant is usually the local board of 
education or school boQrd. Occasionally, the state board 
... 
of education and public officials are joined as 
defendants. This protracted litigation commenced in 1970 
in this conventional mold. In the intervening ye a rs, 
however, the posture of the litigation has changed so 
2 • 
drastically as . to leave it largely a friendly suit between 
the plaintiffs (respondents Bradley, et al.) and the 
original principal defendant, the Detroit School Board. 
These parties, antagonistic for years, have now joined 
forces apparently for the purpose of extracting funds from 
the state treasury. As between the original principal 
parties - the plaintiffs and the Detroit School Boa rd - no 
case or controversy remains on the issues now before us. 
The Board enthusiastically supports the entire 
desegregation decree even though the decree intrudes 
deeply on the Board's own decisionmaking powers. Indeed, 
the present School Board proposed most of the educational 
components included in the District Court's decree. The 
plaintiffs originally favored a desegregation plan that 
would have required more extensive transportation of 
pupils, and they did not initially propose or endorse the 
educational components. In this Court, however, the 
plaintiffs also support the decree of the District Court 
1 
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 
Thus the only complaining party is the State of 
Michigan (acting through state officials), and its basic 
... 
complaint concerns money, not desegregation. It has been 
ordered to pay about $5,800,000 to the Detroit School 
Board. This is one-half the estimated "excess cost" of 
four of the eleven educational components included in the 
desegregation decree: remedial reading, in-service 
2 
training of teachers, testing, and counseling. The 
3 • 
State, understandably anxious to preserve the state budget 
from federal court control or interference, now contests 
the decree on two grounds. 
First, it is argued that the order to pay state 
funds violates the Eleventh Amendment and principles of 
federalism. Ordinarily a federal court's order that a 
state pay unappropriated funds to a locality would raise 
the gravest constitutional issues. See generally 
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodgriguez, 411 
U.S. 1, 40-42 (1973); National League of Cities v. Usery, 
426 U .·s. 833 (1976) . But here, in a finding no longer 
subject to review, the State has been adjudged a 
participant in the constitutional violations, and the 
State therefore may be ordered to participate 
prospect~vely in a remedy otherwise appropriate. 
The State's second argument is one that normally 
would be advanced vigorously by the school board. Relying 
o n the established principle that the scope of the remedy 
i n a desegregation case is determined and limited by the 
4. 
extent of the identified constitutional violations, Dayton 
Board of Education, supra, at Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 
u.s. 284, 293-294 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 u.s. 
717, 744 (1974); Austin Independent School Dist. v. United 
States, 97 S. Ct. 517 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring), the 
State argues that the District Court erred in ordering the 
system-wide expansion of the four educational components 
mentioned above. It contends that there has been no 
finding of a constitutional violation with respect to the 
past operation of any of these programs, and it insists 
that without more specifically focused findings of this 
sort, the decree exceeded the court's powers. 
This argument is by no means a frivolous one. 
But the context in which it is presented is so unusual 
that it would be appropriate to dismiss the writ as 
improvidently granted. The argument is advanced by the 
State and not by the party primarily concerned. The 
educational programs at issue are standard and widely 
approved in public education. The State Board normally 
would be enthusiastic over enhancement of these programs 
so long as the local school board could fund them without 
requiring financial aid from the State. It is equally 
evident that the State probably would resist a federal 
court order requiring it to pay unappropriated state funds 
to the local school board regardless of whether violations 
by the local board justified the remedy. The State's 
. . ,
5 0 
interest in protecting its own budget - limited by ~. 
legislative appropriations - is a genuine one. But it is 
not an interest that is related, except fortuitously, to a 
claim that the desegregation remedy may have exceeded the 
extent of the violations. 
The State's reliance on the remedy issue contains 
a further weakness, emphasizing the unusual character of 
this case. There is no indication that the State objected 
-certainly, it does not object here - to the inclusion in 
the District Court's decree of the seven other educational 
components. See n. 2, supra. Indeed, the State expressly 
agreed to one of the most expensive components, the 
establishment of vocational education centers, in a 
stipulation obligating it to share the cost of 
construction equally with the Detroit Board. See App. 
139a-14la. Furthermore, the District Court's decree 
largely embodies the original recommendation of the 
Detroit Board. Since local school boards "have the 
primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and 
solving [the] problems" generated by "[f]ull 
implementation of ... constitutional principles' in the 
local setting, Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 
299 (1955), the State's limited challenge here is 
particularly lacking in force. 
Moreover, the District Court was faced with a 
school district in exceptional disarray. It found the 
6 • 
.. 
structure of the Detroit school· system "chaotic and 
incapable of effective administration." App. 124a. The 
"general superintendent has little direct authority." 
Ibid. Each of the eight regional boards may be 
preoccupied with "distribut[ing] local board patronage." 
App. 125a. The "local boards have diverted resources that 
would otherwise have been available for educational 
purposes to build new offices and other facilities to 
house this administrative overload." Ibid. The District 
Court continued: 
"In addition to the administrative chaos, we 
know of no other school system that is so 
enmeshed in politics .... Rather than devoting 
themselves to the educational system and the 
desegregative process, board members are busily 
engaged in politics not only to assure their 
own re-election but also to defeat others with 
whom they disagree." App. 125a-l26a 
(footnote omitted). 
Referring again to the "political paralysis" and 
ilf 
I' f' ' &£ '1nef 1c1ent bureaucracy" of the system, the court also 
noted - discouragingly - that the election then 
approaching "may well [result in] a board of education 
consisting of members possessing no experience in 
education." App. 126a. In this quite remarkable 
situation, it is perhaps not surprising that the District 
Court virtually assumed the role of school superintendent 
3 
and school board. 
,/ 
I 
Given the foregoing unique circumstances, it 
seems to me that the proper disposition of this case is to 
a...t.J ileA-~ fltlli ~ I 1 J .. a Gk #cJ~ t4l 
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of certiorari as improvidently granted. 
!*'W.~M-rl-~4ew, I join in the judgment as a result less 
likely to prolong the disruption of education in Detroit 
than a reversal or remand. ~ 'PAe 1H:~t"t i &e CO'\.W?t dw , a€~er 
aJ.l, .m iiJ$ e ....f.ipdLng s rel,ati rua the ~~es 
In my 
view, it is at least arguable that the findings in this 
respect were too generalized to meet the standards 
prescribed by this Court. See Dayton Board of Education, 
supra. But the majority views the record as justifying~ 
~~ . ~lib l~l\ that "the need for the educat 1onal components 
flowed directly from the constitutional violations by both 
4 
state and local officials." Ante, at 14. On that 
view of the record, our settled doctrine requiring that 
the remedy be carefully tailored to fit identified 
constitutional violations is~ by today's ,. 
result. I therefore concur in the judgment. 
Milliken footnotes 
N-1 
1. Until the case reached this Court the 
plaintiffs apparently did not view the educational 
components as necessary or even important elements of a 
desegregation plan. These components were not included in 
plans submitted by the plaintiffs, and in briefs filed 
below there were indications that the plaintiffs viewed 
some - if not all - of these components as being "wholly 
unrelated to desegregation of students and faculty in 
schools." See plaintiff's brief in the Court of Appeals, 
at 5, n. 6. 
2. In addition to these four components, there 
were some seven other educational directives that are not 
contested here. Perhaps the most expansive was the 
District Court's order that the City and State Boards 
create five vocational centers "devoted to in-depth 
occupational preparation in the construction trades, 
transportation and health services." App. 75a. As noted 
in the text infra, a compromise was reached as to these ,~/ 
centers and the State entered into a stipulation 
obligating it to share the cost of providing them. See 
App. 139a-142a. The other educational components ordered 
by the District Court included: (i) "two new technical 
high schools in which business education will be the 
central part of the curriculum" (App. 75a); (ii) a new 
curriculum prescribed by the court in some detail for the 
vocational education courses in the Detroit schools, 
N-2 
including the requirement that an additional "grade 13" be 
added to afford expand~d educational opportunities (App. 
76a); (iii) the inclusion of "multi-ethnic studies" in the 
curriculum, with a request for federal funds to support 
"in-service training for teachers involved in such 
programs" (App. 82a, 147a); (iv) a "Uniform Code of 
Conduct," which the Board was ordered to develop pursuant 
to guidelines established by the court (App. 79a, 148a); 
(v) a specific plan for "co-curricular activities" with 
other artistic and educational institutions in the area, 
to be developed by the Board and submitted for court 
approval (App. 82a); and (vi) a "community relations 
program" prescribed in remarkable detail by the court. 
(App. 80a, 132a). 
In most, if not all, instances the court ordered 
that each of these programs be "comprehensive," and that 
reports be made to the court. The details of the 
foregoing are set forth in the opiniornand decrees of 
August 1, 1975, November 4 and 20, 1975, and May 11, 
1976. One may doubt whether there is any precedent for a 
federal court exercising such extensive control over the 
purely educational responsibilities of a school board. 
3. It merits emphasizing that the School Board 
invited this assumption of power. Indeed, the District 
Court had complimented the Board on its willingness to 
"implement any desegregation order the Court may issue". 
N-3 
App. 49a. But at one point there were serious second 
thoughts. In its brief in the Court of Appeals, the Board 
expressed grave concern as to what the District Court's 
assumption of the Board's powers could do to the school 
system financially: 
"[O]n May 11, 1976 ..• the District Court 
ordered equalization of all school facilities 
and buildings preparatory to the 1976-77 school 
term; continuance of the comprehensive 
construction and renovation program; [and 
implementation of the educational components 
summarized inn. 2, supra] ...• 
"Even without actual dollar figures, the 
financial Impact of these orders could easily 
destroy the educational program of the Detroit 
School system. The financing of these compo-
nents by the Detroit school system would only 
mean a concomittant elimination of existing 
programs. 
"It is virtually impossible for the Detroit 
Board of Education to re-order its priorities 
when it is already operating on a woefully 
inadequate budget that cannot provide a minimal 
quali ty educational program. Any attempt to 
redistribute available resources will cause 
further deterioration in on-going educational 
programs and will merely result in robbing Peter 
topayPaul. 11 App. l89a (emphasis added). ?/ 
To say the least, the financial impact of the court's 
decree was profoundly disturbing. But apparently the 
financially pressed Board was willing to surrender a 
substantial portion of its decisionmaking authority in 
return for the prospect of enhanced state funding. For by 
the time it made this statement to the Court of Appeals, 
the Board knew that the District Court had exercised its 
.. 
N-4 
power to do what the state legislature had chosen not to 
do: appropriate funds from the state treasury for these 
particular programs of the Detroit schools. 
4. The Court's opinion states, for example, that 
the District Court "expressly found that the two 
components of testing and counseling, as then administered 
in Detroit's schools, were infected with the 
discriminatory bias of a segregated school system." Ante, 
at 7. 
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tunities resulting from past or present racial and ethnic 
isolation .... " Id., at 448.16 
See also George v. O'Kelly, 448 F. 2d 145, 150 (CA5 1971). 
And, as school desegregation litigation emerged in other 
regions of the country, federal courts have likewise looked in 
part to remedial programs, when the record supported 
an order to that effect. See, e. g., Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 
F. Supp. 216, 235. (Mass. 1975), aff'd, 530 F. 2d 401 (CAl 
1976), cert. denied,- U.S.- (1976); Hart v. Community 
School Board of Brooklyn, 383 F. Supp. 699, 757 (EDNY 
1974), aff'd, 512 F. 2d 37 (CA2 1975); cf. Booker v. Special 
School Dist. Number 1, Minneapolis, Minn., 351 F. Supp. 799 
(Minn. 1972).17 
Finally, in addition to other remedial programs, which 
could, if circumstances warranted, include programs to 
remedy deficiencies, particularly in reading and com· 
munication skills, federal courts have expressly ordered special 
in-service training for teachers, see, e. g., United States v. 
State of Missouri, 523 F. 2d 885, 887 (CA8 1975); Smith v. 
St. Tammany Parish School Board, supra, at 110; Moore v. 
Tanigpahoa Parish School Board, supra, at 253, and have 
altered or even suspended testing programs employed by 
school systems undergoing desegregation. See, e. g., Single· 
16 In denying the stay application, Mr. Justice Black was untroubled 
by the underlying order of the District Court: 
"It would be very difficult fol' me to suspend the order of the District 
Court that, in my view, does no more than endeavor to realize the 
directive of the Fourteenth Amendment and the decisions of this Court 
~hat racial discrimination in the public schoois must be eliminated root 
and branch." 404 U. S., at 1206. 
17 We do not, of course, pass upon the correctness of the particular 
holdings of cases we did not review. We simply note that these holdings 
,support the broader proposition that, when the record warrants, remedial 
programs may m e exercise o eqm a e 1scre , appropriate 
remedies to treat the condition that offends the Constitutio . Of course, 
+---=It must be shown that the const.itutional violation caused the condition 
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ton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 419 F. 2d 
1211, 1219 (CA5 1969), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 1032 (1970); 
Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Board, 444 F. 2d 1400, 1401 
(CA5 1971); Arvizu v. Waco Independent School Dist., 373 
F. Supp. 1264 (WD Tex. 1973!, rev'd in _part on oth.er i~~ues, 
495 F. 2d 499 (CA5 1974) a~ ('a. i-C~.-t1«.. ~ ~c. 
. t 
re.leo~-~ e~Ooet t , they demonstrate that the District 
Court in the case now before us did not break new ground in 
approving the School Board's proposed plan. Quite the con-
trary, acting on abundant evidence in this record, the District 
Court approved a remedial plan going beyond mere pupil 
assignments, as expressly approved by Swann and Mont-
gomery, County, supra. In so doing, the District Court was 
adopting specific programs proposed by local school author-
ities, who must be presumed to be familiar with the problems 
and the needs of a system undergoing desegregation.18 
We do not, of course, imply that the order here is a blue-
print for other cases. That cannot be; in school desegrega-
tion cases, "[t]here is no universal answer to complex 
problems . . . ; there is obviously no plan that will do the 
job in every case." Green, supra, at 439. On this record, 
however, we are bound to conclude that the decree before us 
was aptly tailored to remedy the consequences of the constitu-
tional violation. Children who have been thus educationally 
and culturally set apart from the larger community will in-
evitably acquire habits of speech, conduct, and attitudes 
reflecting their cultural isolation. They are likely to ac-
quire speech habits, for example, which vary from the envi-
ronment in which they must ultimately function and compete, 
18 This Court has from the beginning looked to the District Courts 
in desegregation cases, familiar as they are with the local situations 
coming before them, to appraise the efforts of local school authorities 
to carry out their constitutionally required duties. "Because of their 
proximity to local conditions ... the [federal district] courts which 
originally heard these cases can best perform this judicial appraisal." 
Brown II, supra, at 299. 
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